

# International migration

**Ernesto F. L. Amaral**

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# Outline

- Definition and concepts
- Patterns of world immigration over time
- Immigration to the United States
- What's driving Mexico-US migration?
- Immigration policies in the United States
- Policies not based on evidence
- Border security and immigration
- Proposed Southern border wall
- Public attitudes toward immigration
- Economic effects of international migration
- Asylum procedures in the United States
- Syrian refugee crisis





# Definitions and concepts

- The first international migration of humans are believed to have occurred about 60,000 years ago
- International migration is a geographical movement involving a change in residence that crosses the boundaries of two or more countries
- International migration has both positive and negative impacts upon the areas of origin and destination

# Immigration and emigration

- **Immigration** refers to the movement of people to a new country for the purpose of establishing permanent residence
  - An **immigrant** is a person who crosses an international boundary with the intention to live permanently in a new country
- **Emigration** refers to the permanent departure of people from a country
  - An **emigrant** is a person who moves away from a country with the intention of establishing a permanent residence elsewhere



# Long-term immigration

- In every international migration, a migrant is simultaneously an immigrant and an emigrant
- **Long-term immigration**
  - The residence establishment in the destination country is usually at least one year
  - Long-term immigrants comprised around 3.2% of the world's population in 2013
- In recent decades, the number of long-term immigrants has increased dramatically
  - 75 million in 1964
  - 120 million in 1990
  - 190 million in 2006
  - 232 million in 2013



# Remigration: return migration

- **Remigration** refers to the return of international migrants back to their countries of origin
- A **remigrant** is an international migrant who returns back to re-establish permanent residence in his/her original country of residence



# Tourists

- **Tourists** and visitors are different from international migrants
- Their visits to another country is usually short-term
- Their visits do not involve establishing permanent residence in the destination country

# Four broad immigrant groups

- A **refugee/asylee** is someone who involuntarily emigrates from his/her native country to a (often neighboring) new country due to persecution, violence, or deprivation
- A **migrant from a former colony** is someone who moves from a decolonized country to its former imperial country seeking better living conditions
- An **economic migrant** is someone who voluntarily moves to live in a destination country for economic reasons
- An “**ethnic privileged**” **migrant** is someone, who is a descendent of a nation’s ethnic core group, living outside of the mother-country for generations

# Definition of “generations”

- 1st generation: foreign-born population (immigrants)
- 1.5 generation: distinction for those who came as children
  - Those who arrived up to age 12
  - Or they can be disaggregated
    - 1.25 generation: those who came from ages 13–18
    - 1.5 generation: those who came from ages of 6–12
    - 1.75 generation: those who came from infancy to age 5
- 2nd generation: U.S.-born children of immigrants
  - 2.0 generation: no U.S.-born (native-born) parents
  - 2.5 generation: one U.S.-born parent and one foreign-born parent
- 3rd generation: grandchildren of immigrants
  - U.S.-born and two native-born parents



# Massey's laws of international migration

- Immigration is a lot easier to start than it is to stop
- Actions taken to restrict immigration often have the opposite effect
- The fundamental causes of immigration may be outside the control of policymakers
- Immigrants understand immigration better than politicians and academicians
- Because they understand immigration better than policymakers, immigrants are often able to circumvent policies aimed at stopping them






# Development and migration

- Structuralism (neo-Marxist, center-periphery) criticizes functionalist theory (neo-classical, push-pull)
  - Functionalist assumes socioeconomic forces tend towards equilibrium through migration
  - Structuralism sees a general pattern of disruptions, dislocations, and migrations intrinsic to capitalism
- However, they share these assumptions
  - More development leads to less emigration
  - Higher development differences across areas (spatial disequilibrium) leads to more migration

# Migration transition theory




Source: de Haas (2010).

# Capabilities and aspirations

- Migration theory should include structural constraints and independent choices (agency)
- We can incorporate notions of structure and agency in migration theory by conceptualizing migration at the micro-level as a function of...
  - **Migration capabilities:** individuals mobilize human, social, and material capital in order to migrate
  - **Migration aspirations** for personal, social, economic, and political opportunities, which vary for different people, based on their education, information, and social networks


# Hypothesized effect of human development on migration capabilities and aspirations



Source: de Haas (2010).




**In 2013, more than 50% of the international migrants in the world resided in just 10 countries (in millions)**



Source: United Nations, 2013c.




# Major origins and destinations of international migrants, 2010–2015



Annual Net Migrants 2010–2015 (thousands)

# Percent that is foreign (stock), 2013





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# Patterns of world immigration over time

- The first modern humans began in sub-Saharan Africa about 195,000 years ago
- By 35,000 years ago, humans were found at opposite ends of Eurasia, from France to Southeast Asia and even Australia
- How modern humans went about colonizing “these and other drastically different environments during the intervening 160,000 years is one of the greatest untold stories in the history of humankind” (Goebel, 2007)



# First international migration

- About 50,000 to 60,000 years ago, humans began to migrate out of Africa, first to southern Asia, China, Java, and later to Europe
- Then, they began migrating to the Americas around 14,000 years ago
- Movements were often through land areas and short sea routes

# Migration by army invasion

- After first migrants, population flows to a new territory were usually preceded by an invasion of armies
- An example could be found in the raiding activities by the Scandinavian pirates (the Norse or Vikings) in England, Ireland, and France between 800 and 1066 AD

# Forced migration

- International migrations/invasions could also involve the enslavement and **forced migration** of the defeated peoples to the land of the conquerors
- For example, during the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, living in Athens were about 75,000 to 150,000 slaves from both Africa and Asia
  - They represented about 25% to 35% of Athens' population

# Transoceanic migrations

- After the 14<sup>th</sup> century, international migrations/invasions became transoceanic
- Territorial exploration led by large naval expeditions played a role in the dynamics of human migration to other parts of the unknown world
- European emigrants as a share of the world population
  - 3% in 1750
  - 16% in 1930

# Intercontinental migration

- The largest period of European overseas migration occurred between 1840 and 1930
  - 52 million people emigrating primarily to North America
- Intercontinental migration from Asia before World War II was smaller in scale
  - Asian Indians emigrated to British Guiana, East Africa, Fiji, Mauritius, and Trinidad
  - Japanese and Filipino migrants moved to Hawaii
  - Japanese to Brazil
  - Chinese to the United States



# Slave migration

- The largest intercontinental slave migration in recorded human history occurred between 1650 and the 1800s
  - Around 9.6 million (11 million if we count those who died during the sea voyages) enslaved Africans were brought to the New World involuntarily
- World consequences of these large migrations
  - Geographic redistribution of the global population
  - Pressures of the population on land and resources in the Old World were relieved
  - Birth and death rates were delayed in European countries with large emigration, while birth rates were high in the destination countries in Americas



# Geographic distribution

- The geographic distribution of races has also changed dramatically
- By 1930
  - About 1/3 of all whites no longer lived in Europe
  - More than 1/5 of all blacks no longer lived in Africa
- Since the 1930s, there have been several major international migration movements
  - Most migrants being refugees and asylum seekers

# World War II

- Large numbers of Jews and political refugees fled Germany
- 20 million Eastern and Central Europeans were uprooted from their homelands between Adolf Hitler's rise to power in the 1930s and the end of World War II
- When WWII ended, about 3 million Japanese were returned by decree to Japan from other Asian nations



# Other migrations in the 1940s

- After the partitioning of India in 1947 into India and Pakistan
- More than 7 million Muslims fled from India to Pakistan
- A comparable number of Hindus moved from Pakistan to India
- In 1948, thousands of Palestinians were displaced from the territory that is now Israel



# Southeast Asian

- In the 1970s, millions of Southeast Asians were uprooted owing to political and economic upheavals
  - This resulted in one of the largest and most tragic refugee migrations in history
  - Ten million refugees migrated from what had been East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to northern India in 1971
  - Subsequently, millions of Asians escaped from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos into Thailand and elsewhere



# Afghanistan

- The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated massive numbers of refugees
- About 6.5 million Afghan refugees between 1988 and 1991
- Another 5 million from the early 1990s to 2000 fleeing Afghanistan
- By the early 2000s, about one in four Afghans were refugees



# Modern refugee era

- The modern refugee era began at the end of the Cold War around 1991
- Many developing countries were still engaged in violent conflicts after losing support from their superpower backers
- Around 2001, there were 3.6 million Afghans found in Pakistan and Iran
- In 2003, several million refugees fled Iraq due to the invasion by the United States



# UNHCR

- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated there were 46.3 million refugees in the world in 2014
- Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan sent out the largest numbers of refugees
- Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan are the countries receiving the largest numbers





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
# Immigration to the United States

- Around 98.5% of U.S. residents are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants
  - In 2010, about 1.5% (4.2 million) did not self-identify as immigrants or descendants of immigrants
  - American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians
- Immigrants of other countries are mostly migrant workers and rarely become citizens
  - United Arab Emirates: 84% foreign born, migrants have restrictive rights, seldom become permanent immigrants
- U.S. receives most immigrants of all the countries in the world: 46 million
  - 14% of U.S. population: this fraction is smaller than other countries: UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia




Figure 9.2

## Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1860 to 2010




Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2013.

# Migration flow, 2003–2012



**Percent of Population That is Foreign-Born**

- less than 5
- 5 - 9
- 10 - 19
- 20 +



# Immigration to the United States

- “Exceptional America” (Seymour Martin Lipset)
  - International migrants are positively self-selected
  - They are usually more highly (economically) motivated than the average population of their origin countries
- Legal and undocumented international migrants to the U.S. are less likely to commit serious crimes and to be imprisoned, compared to the native U.S.-born population
  - Yet, immigrants have been perceived as “threats” in political and public discourse






# Crime

## First and Second Generation Immigrant Offending Trajectories

*Prevalence of each group involved in at least 1 crime in the previous 12 months*



Source: Pew Research Center, 2013.

(<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/15/crime-rises-among-second-generation-immigrants-as-they-assimilate/>)






# Immigration: Shaping and reshaping America

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Millions of foreigners enter the United States each day
- 14.5 million immigrants were accepted as permanent legal U.S. residents between 1990–2005
  - An average of almost a million a year
- The recent waves of immigrants have brought greater diversity to the U.S. population
  - Europe was the source of most immigrants throughout our history
  - Most immigrants now come from Latin America and Asia
- Illegal immigration began rising in the 1970s



## Legal Immigration to the United States, 1820–2005



Note: IRCA adjustments refer to the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, under which 2.7 million undocumented foreign U.S. residents obtained legal immigrant status.

Source: DHS, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2005* ([www.dhs.gov](http://www.dhs.gov), accessed Oct. 12, 2006): table 1.

Source: Martin, Midgley 2006.




# Origins of immigrant to the U.S.

Period	Total Immigrants	Region of Origin:						% Foreign born
		N/W Europe	S/E Europe	Latin America	Asia	Africa	Elsewhere	
1820 to 1829	128,502	95,945	3,327	4,297	34	15	24,884	
1830 to 1839	538,381	416,981	5,790	8,238	55	50	107,267	
1840 to 1849	1,427,337	1,364,950	4,309	4,428	121	61	53,468	9.7
1850 to 1859	2,814,554	2,599,397	20,283	7,527	36,080	84	151,183	13.2
1860 to 1869	2,081,261	1,851,833	25,893	3,563	54,408	407	145,157	14.4
1870 to 1879	2,742,137	2,078,952	172,926	6,415	134,128	371	349,345	13.3
1880 to 1889	5,248,568	3,802,722	835,955	4,638	71,151	763	533,339	14.8
1890 to 1899	3,694,294	1,825,897	1,750,514	2,772	61,285	432	53,394	13.6
1900 to 1909	8,202,388	1,811,556	5,761,013	53,782	299,836	6,326	269,875	14.7
1910 to 1919	6,347,380	1,112,638	3,872,773	240,964	269,736	8,867	842,402	13.2
1920 to 1929	4,295,510	1,273,297	1,287,043	558,481	126,740	6,362	1,043,587	11.6
1930 to 1939	699,375	257,592	186,807	49,539	19,231	2,120	184,086	8.8
1940 to 1949	856,608	362,084	110,440	95,955	34,532	6,720	246,877	6.9
1950 to 1959	2,499,268	1,008,223	396,750	392,466	135,844	13,016	552,969	5.4
1960 to 1969	3,213,749	627,297	506,146	791,138	358,605	23,780	906,783	4.7
1970 to 1979	4,248,203	287,127	538,463	1,015,200	1,406,544	71,408	929,461	6.2
1980 to 1989	6,244,379	339,038	329,828	1,748,824	2,391,356	141,990	1,293,343	7.9
1990 to 1999	9,775,398	405,922	942,690	3,938,231	2,859,899	346,416	1,282,240	11.1
2000 to 2009	10,299,430	418,743	930,866	4,205,180	3,470,835	759,734	514,072	12.9



**FIGURE 1** Number of immigrants and immigrants as percentage of the US population, 1850 to 2013




SOURCE: Original figure based on U.S. Census Bureau data.

Source: Waters, Pineau 2016.



## Annual Number of Legal U.S. Immigrants by Decade and Region of Origin, 1960-2009



**Note:** Numbers may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.


**Source:** Department of Homeland Security Immigration Statistics.

**Audiocast:** Listen to Philip Martin discuss the data on the changing geographic makeup of immigrants over the past 50 years. [www.prb.org/PopulationBulletins/2010/immigration1.aspx](http://www.prb.org/PopulationBulletins/2010/immigration1.aspx)

Source: Martin, Midgley 2010.




## U.S. Immigrant Population by Country of Birth, 1960-2017



Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub  
<http://migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub>



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


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
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## Foreigners Entering the United States or Gaining Residency Status, 2003–2005, by Selected Categories

Category	Numbers in thousands			Annual average,
	2003	2004	2005	2003–2005
<b>Legal immigrants</b>	<b>704</b>	<b>958</b>	<b>1,122</b>	<b>928</b>
New arrivals	358	374	384	372
Adjustment of status*	347	584	738	556
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens	331	418	436	395
Other family-sponsored immigrants	159	214	213	195
Employment-based	82	155	247	161
Refugees and asylees	45	71	143	86
Diversity immigrants	46	50	46	48
<b>Legal temporary migrants **</b>	<b>27,849</b>	<b>30,781</b>	<b>32,003</b>	<b>30,211</b>
Visitors for pleasure	20,143	22,803	23,815	22,253
Foreign students and families	655	649	654	653
Temporary foreign workers/families	797	832	884	837
<b>Unauthorized foreigners (estimate)</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>525</b>


\*Includes people already in the United States legally who gained legal permanent resident status in that year.

\*\* Excludes about 150 million admissions annually of certain Canadian tourists and business visitors exempt from visas, along with Mexicans with multiple-entry visas or border crossing cards. These numbers refer to admissions rather than people, which means that many foreigners are counted more than once.

Sources: DHS, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2005* (www.dhs.gov, accessed Nov. 21, 2006): tables 6 and 26; and J.S. Passel, *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.* (2006).



## Status of Foreign-Born U.S. Residents, 2005



Source: J.S. Passel, *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.* (2006).



# Immigration and U.S. population

- Immigration has a major effect on the size, distribution, and composition of the U.S. population
- Fertility and mortality are relatively low in the United States
- Immigration's role in the growth of the population has increased
- Immigration contributed at least a third to the total population increase between 1990 and 2000
- The number of foreign-born U.S. residents rose from almost 20 million to over 31 million



## Increase in the U.S.-Born and Foreign-Born Population, 1980 to 2005

	<u>Total</u>	<u>U.S.-born</u>	<u>Foreign-born (FB)</u>
<b>Number (millions)</b>			
1980	<b>227</b>	213	14
1990	<b>249</b>	229	20
2000	<b>281</b>	250	31
2005	<b>288</b>	253	36
<b>Percent increase</b>			
1980–1990	<b>9.8</b>	7.7	40.4
1990–2000	<b>13.2</b>	9.3	55.4
<b>FB share of increase</b>			
1980–2000	<b>100.0</b>	68.9	30.4

Note: The 2005 estimates are not strictly comparable because they exclude people living in group homes or institutions.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006* (www.census.gov, accessed Nov. 21, 2006); and Pew Hispanic Center, *Foreign Born Population at Mid-Decade* (2006, www.pewhispanic.org, accessed Oct. 24, 2006).






**Percent of state population**

- 15% or higher
- 10.0% to 14.9%
- 5.0% to 9.9%
- 4.9% or less

State	Percent of State Population (65+)
CA	15% or higher
NV	15% or higher
TX	15% or higher
FL	15% or higher
NY	15% or higher
WA	10.0% to 14.9%
CO	10.0% to 14.9%
AZ	10.0% to 14.9%
IL	10.0% to 14.9%
MA	10.0% to 14.9%
OR	5.0% to 9.9%
MT	4.9% or less
ID	4.9% or less
WY	4.9% or less
ND	4.9% or less
SD	4.9% or less
IA	4.9% or less
MO	4.9% or less
OK	4.9% or less
AR	4.9% or less
LA	4.9% or less
MS	4.9% or less
AL	4.9% or less
GA	4.9% or less
SC	4.9% or less
NC	4.9% or less
VA	4.9% or less
WV	4.9% or less
KY	4.9% or less
TN	4.9% or less
MI	4.9% or less
IN	4.9% or less
OH	4.9% or less
PA	4.9% or less
DE	4.9% or less
MD	4.9% or less
DC	4.9% or less
AK	4.9% or less
HI	4.9% or less



## Percent Growth in Foreign-Born Population, 2000–2005




# Projections

(Waters, Pineau 2016)

- Census Bureau projections point to continuing increases in foreign-born population in the next decades
  - By 2060, the foreign-born proportion will reach nearly 20% of the population
- Non-Hispanic whites will have fallen to less than 50% of the population (majority-minority)
  - Most immigrants are from Latin America and Asia
- An estimated 11 million persons (about 25% of the current foreign-born total) are undocumented
  - Annual deportations from this group have approached or exceeded 400,000



## U.S. Population by Race and Ethnic Group, 1970, 2010, and 2050



**Note:** Numbers may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

**Source:** U.S. Census Projections With Constant Net International Migration, accessed at [www.census.gov/population/www/projections/2009cnmsSumTabs.html](http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/2009cnmsSumTabs.html), on June 7, 2010.




# Immigrant integration

(Waters, Pineau 2016)




- Many migrants from Mexico and Central America enter the U.S. with low educational levels and little English proficiency
  - Children of migrants are seen to have converged substantially to native-born averages in a broad array of domains
  - Education, earnings, occupation, poverty, residential integration, language
- However, integration also produced declines in well-being
  - Health, crime, family stability
- Integration with native-born non-Hispanic whites is
  - Fastest for Asian immigrants
  - Slower for Latino immigrants
  - Slowest for black immigrants
  - Especially difficult for undocumented individuals



## U.S.-Born and Recently Arrived Foreign-Born Americans by Education, 2005



Percent of population age 25 or older with


-  Bachelor's degree or higher
-  High school graduate/some college
-  Less than high school

\* Entered the United States after 1999.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Educational Attainment in the United States: 2005* (www.census.gov, accessed Nov. 3, 2006): table 10.



## Language Spoken at Home by the U.S. Foreign-Born Population, 2005



Note: Refers to people age 5 or older. Excludes people living in military barracks, college dormitories, or other group quarters. These data represent the midpoint of a range of estimates derived from the American Community Survey.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 *American Community Survey* (factfinder.census.gov, accessed Oct. 17, 2006): table C16005.







TEXAS A&M  
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# What's driving Mexico-US migration?

(Massey, Espinosa 1997)

- Models estimated the effects of 41 variables and explored the validity of five theories of international migration
- Three fundamental forces are at work in promoting Mexican migration to the United States
  - Social capital formation
  - Human capital formation
  - Market consolidation

# Social capital formation

(Massey, Espinosa 1997)

- Social capital is generally the most powerful factor predicting the odds of initial, repeat, and return migration
- People who are related to U.S. migrants are themselves more likely to migrate
- Each act of migration creates additional social capital capable of instigating and sustaining more migration
- About half of adult Mexicans are related to someone living in the United States (Camp 1993)

# Human capital formation

(Massey, Espinosa 1997)

- For undocumented migrants, the most important element of human capital is migration experience itself
  - Crossing the border, living in the U.S., working in the U.S. labor market, negotiating U.S. housing markets
  - The more U.S. experience a migrant accumulates, the higher her/his likelihood of migrating again
- This process intersects with social capital formation
  - Migration experience makes a person more valuable as a resource for gaining entry to the U.S. and finding a job
  - The more experience a person has, the more likely her/his friends and relatives are to begin migrating and to continue migrating themselves
- One-third of all Mexicans have been to the U.S. at some point in their lives (Camp 1993)

# Market consolidation

(Massey, Espinosa 1997)

- Over the past two decades, the economics of Mexico and the U.S. have become increasingly connected to each other and to the global capitalist economy
- **Rural Mexico**: displacement of manual workers, concentration of land, mechanization of production
- **Urban Mexico**: ending of import substitution industrialization has brought about important economic transformations that have displaced workers from enterprises and public bureaucracies

# Development and migration

(Massey, Espinosa 1997)

- Growing economic insecurity coupled with a strong desire to participate in the new political economy
  - Stimulated Mexican households to search for ways to self insure against threats to family income and to gain access to scarce capital
- Given ready access to human and social capital connecting them to the U.S.
  - Household heads and other family members migrate internationally as part of a conscious strategy of risk diversification and capital accumulation
- Economic development goes hand in hand with international migration

# Definition of variables

Variable	Operational Definition
Demographic background:	
Age .....	Age at last birthday
Married .....	Respondent in formal or informal union
No. of minors in household .....	No. of own children under age 18
General human capital:	
Labor force experience .....	No. of years since first job
Education .....	No. of years of school completed
Migration-specific human capital:	
Cumulative U.S. experience .....	Total months spent in United States
No. of prior U.S. trips .....	Total no. of trips taken to the United States
Unskilled urban job .....	Unskilled nonagricultural occupation in the United States
Skilled urban job .....	Skilled nonagricultural occupation in the United States
General social capital:	
Parent a U.S. migrant .....	Subject's parent was a U.S. migrant
No. of U.S. migrant siblings .....	No. of siblings with U.S. experience
% U.S. migrants in community .....	Proportion over age 15 with U.S. experience
Migration-specific social capital:	
Wife a U.S. migrant .....	Wife has begun migrating to the United States
No. of U.S. migrant children .....	No. of children who have begun migrating
U.S.-born children .....	Whether any children were born in the United States



# Definition of variables

Variable	Operational Definition
Physical capital:	
Land .....	Household owns farmland
Home .....	Household owns home
Business .....	Household owns a business
Community infrastructure:	
Preparatory school .....	Preparatory school in municipio
Paved road .....	Paved road between community and highway
Bank .....	Bank office open in municipio
Community economic context:	
% earning twice minimum wage .....	Proportion of workers earning at least twice the legal minimum wage
% self-employed .....	Proportion of workers who are self-employed
% females in manufacturing .....	Proportion of female workers employed in manufacturing
Community agrarian context:	
Agrarian economy .....	"1" if more than 50% of male labor force is employed in agriculture, "0" otherwise
Agrarian population density .....	Population divided by arable land
Proportion of land that is arable .....	Cultivable land divided by total land base
<i>Ejido</i> established .....	"1" if community had <i>ejido</i> , "0" otherwise



# Definition of variables

Variable	Operational Definition
<b>Macroeconomic context:</b>	
Expected wage ratio .....	Ratio of wages predicted from equations estimated from data on migrants to the United States and migrants within Mexico (United States/Mexico; in 1990 U.S. dollars)
Peso devaluation .....	Rate of change in dollar value of Mexican peso over prior year
Mexican inflation rate .....	Rate of change in Mexican consumer index over prior year
U.S. employment growth .....	Rate of change in total U.S. employment over prior year
Growth in foreign investment .....	Rate of change in direct foreign investment over prior year
Mexican real interest rate .....	Average cost of funds in Mexico – Mexican inflation
<b>U.S. policy context:</b>	
Availability of visas .....	Legal immigration divided by sum of legal immigration and gross illegal entries
Probability of apprehension .....	Likelihood of arrest while attempting to cross border without documents
Employer sanctions enacted .....	“1” if employer sanctions in force, “0” otherwise
Amnesty recipients in household .....	“1” if any member of household received amnesty under IRCA; “0” otherwise

# Definition of variables

Variable	Operational Definition
Expected value of U.S. services:	
Welfare .....	Estimated likelihood of using AFDC or food stamps if respondent were to migrate to United States $\times$ average value of monthly AFDC and food stamp payments in states receiving Mexican immigrants
Medical care .....	Estimated likelihood of receiving unreimbursed medical services if respondent were to migrate to United States $\times$ average value of Medicaid payments in states receiving Mexican immigrants
Education .....	Estimated likelihood of using public schools if respondent were to migrate to the United States $\times$ average per pupil school expenditures in states receiving Mexican immigrants

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF  
TAKING A FIRST TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t + 1$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Demographic background:				
Age .....	-.004	.031	-.055	.119
Age <sup>2</sup> .....	-.001*	.0004	.001	.001
Married .....	-.341*	.078	-.432	.444
No. of minors in household .....	.011	.020	-.005	.118
General human capital:				
Labor force experience .....	.013	.010	-.057	.040
Education .....	-.014	.008	-.002	.039
General social capital:				
Parent a U.S. migrant .....	.461*	.060	.720*	.263
No. of U.S. migrant siblings .....	.388*	.021	.676*	.073
% of U.S. migrants in community .....	5.016*	.817	-7.254	4.496
Physical capital:				
Land .....	.298*	.127	.759	.666
Home .....	-.446*	.093	-1.368	.759
Business .....	-.245*	.102	.400	.457
Community infrastructure:				
Preparatory school .....	-.249*	.075	-.061	.385
Paved road .....	-.107	.125	-.256	.527
Bank .....	.527*	.143	-.148	.549
Community economic context:				
% earning twice minimum wage .....	2.209*	.596	-7.730*	3.241
% self-employed .....	-.024	.412	-13.204*	2.490
% females in manufacturing .....	1.214*	.370	-6.337*	2.170
Community agrarian context:				
Agrarian economy .....	.480*	.078	2.034*	.765
Agrarian population density .....	-.001*	.0005	-.268	.155
Proportion of land that is arable .....	-.322*	.119	.214	.573
Ejido established .....	.321*	.221	-2.880*	.892

Note: Non-migrant as reference. Source: Massey, Espinosa 1997, p.960.

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF  
TAKING A FIRST TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t + 1$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Macroeconomic context:				
Expected wage ratio .....	.003*	.001	-.005	.008
Peso devaluation .....	-.115	.067	-.028	.376
Mexican inflation rate .....	-.702*	.298	2.744	1.472
U.S. employment growth .....	4.734*	1.938	11.637	10.220
Growth in foreign investment .....	-.228*	.067	.108	.351
Mexican real interest rate .....	2.264*	.531	-.842	2.490
U.S. policy context:				
Availability of visas .....	-2.828*	.511	-.568	1.965
Probability of apprehension .....	2.891*	.783	3.119	3.302
Employer sanctions enacted .....	.304*	.149	.135	.836
Amnesty recipients in household .....	2.561*	.353	4.656*	.874
Expected value of U.S. services:				
Welfare .....	-.019*	.006	.026	.017
Medical care .....	.019	.024	-.020	.066
Education .....	.002*	.0002	-.003	.015
Constant .....	-5.172*	.785	1.239	3.152
Log likelihood .....		6,648.100*		
$\chi^2$ .....		2,181.600*		
No. of person-years .....		55,762		

NOTE.—Event-history data gathered among male household heads from 25 Mexican communities.

\*  $P < .05$ .



MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF  
TAKING AN ADDITIONAL TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t + 1$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Demographic background:				
Age .....	-.156*	.021	-.005	.034
Age <sup>2</sup> .....	.001*	.0003	-.001	.001
Married .....	-.207*	.057	.004	.107
No. of minors in household .....	.071*	.012	.041*	.020
General human capital:				
Labor force experience .....	-.076*	.008	-.041*	.014
Education .....	-.033*	.007	.029*	.011
Migration-specific human capital:				
Cumulative U.S. experience .....	.012*	.001	.012*	.001
No. of prior U.S. trips .....	.176*	.008	.226*	.008
Last U.S. job unskilled urban .....	.404*	.052	.919*	.093
Last U.S. job skilled urban .....	.093*	.005	.354*	.087
General social capital:				
Parent a U.S. migrant .....	.224*	.043	.452*	.076
No. of U.S. migrant siblings .....	.006	.013	.090*	.020
% of U.S. migrants in community .....	2.992*	.558	6.430*	.956
Migration-specific social capital:				
Wife a U.S. migrant .....	1.340*	.118	2.482*	.163
No. of U.S. migrant children .....	.075*	.031	.304*	.040
U.S.-born children .....	1.114*	.138	1.376*	.164

Note: Non-migrant as reference. Source: Massey, Espinosa 1997, p.971–972.

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF  
TAKING AN ADDITIONAL TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t + 1$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Physical capital:				
Land .....	-.134	.071	.382*	.095
Home .....	-.327*	.048	-.324*	.079
Business .....	-.611*	.064	-.500*	.100
Community infrastructure:				
Preparatory school .....	.158*	.060	-.236*	.102
Paved road .....	-.177	.101	-.537*	.173
Bank .....	-.078	.097	-.021	.156
Community economic context:				
% earning twice minimum wage .....	.618	.389	-5.066*	.677
% self-employed .....	.143	.305	-6.107*	.582
% females in manufacturing .....	-.211	.253	-.732	.440
Community agrarian context:				
Agrarian economy .....	.200*	.061	.346*	.107
Agrarian population density .....	-.001	.001	-.001	.002
Proportion of land that is arable .....	-.113	.099	.968*	.169
<i>Ejido</i> established .....	.088	.133	-1.317*	.180

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF  
TAKING AN ADDITIONAL TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t + 1$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Macroeconomic context:				
Expected wage ratio .....	.001	.001	-.012*	.002
Peso devaluation .....	-.023	.040	-.009	.008
Mexican inflation rate .....	-.883*	.191	-.004	.331
U.S. employment growth .....	4.344*	1.462	4.440	2.691
Growth in foreign investment .....	-.167*	.048	-.157*	.078
Mexican real interest rate .....	1.593*	.375	2.142*	.656
U.S. policy context:				
Availability of visas .....	-2.900*	.409	1.617*	.639
Probability of apprehension .....	-2.182*	.527	1.923*	.824
Employer sanctions enacted .....	-.364*	.096	.235	.160
Amnesty recipients in household .....	1.767*	.143	3.748*	.160
Expected value of U.S. services:				
Welfare .....	-.060*	.003	.043*	.020
Medical care .....	.186*	.011	-.190*	.012
Education .....	-.0003*	.0001	-.002*	.0001
Constant .....	3.892*	.558	-1.309	.000
Log likelihood .....		11,829.000*		
$\chi^2$ .....		18,059.000*		
No. of person-years .....		27,813		

NOTE.—Event-history data gathered among male household heads from 25 Mexican communities.

\*  $P < .05$ .



LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF RETURNING TO  
MEXICO FROM THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Demographic background:				
Age .....	.002	.047	-.002	.097
Age <sup>2</sup> .....	-.0002	.0006	.001	.001
Married .....	.224*	.108	-.658*	.239
No. of minors in household .....	-.010	.027	.049	.055
General human capital:				
Labor force experience .....	-.007	.015	.042	.033
Education .....	-.048*	.013	-.087*	.029
Migration-specific human capital:				
Cumulative U.S. experience .....	-.025*	.002	-.035*	.002
Duration of trip in months .....	-.221*	.008	-.079*	.006
No. of prior U.S. trips .....	.270*	.022	.276*	.020
Holds unskilled urban job .....	-.607*	.096	-.124	.211
Holds skilled urban job .....	-.323*	.102	.289	.203
General social capital:				
Parent a U.S. migrant .....	.140	.087	.121	.170
No. of U.S. migrant siblings .....	-.039	.027	.065	.041
% of U.S. migrants in community .....	.653	1.115	-2.503	2.169
Migration-specific social capital:				
Wife a U.S. migrant .....	-.360	.198	-2.174*	.369
No. of U.S. migrant children .....	-.387*	.077	-.844*	.081
U.S.-born children .....	.050	.242	-1.326*	.367

Note: Non-migrant as reference. Source: Massey, Espinosa 1997, p.979–980.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF RETURNING TO  
MEXICO FROM THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Physical capital:				
Land .....	.931*	.168	.994*	.221
Home .....	.241*	.109	.216	.182
Business .....	-.193	.148	-.046	.226
Community infrastructure:				
Preparatory school .....	.172	.119	.875*	.223
Paved road .....	-.063	.174	1.332*	.469
Bank .....	.414*	.207	-.387	.413
Community economic context:				
% earning twice minimum wage .....	-2.782*	.761	-3.883*	1.548
% self-employed .....	1.939*	.596	-1.012	1.397
% females in manufacturing .....	-2.424*	.525	-6.072*	1.235
Community agrarian context:				
Agrarian economy .....	-.200	.120	-.127	.235
Agrarian population density .....	.001	.001	.014	.005
Proportion of land that is arable .....	.097	.202	-.624	.364
<i>Ejido</i> established .....	-.326	.288	-1.158*	.507

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ODDS OF RETURNING TO  
MEXICO FROM THE UNITED STATES IN YEAR  $t$

SITUATION OF SUBJECT IN YEAR $t$	WITHOUT DOCUMENTS		WITH DOCUMENTS	
	B	SE	B	SE
Macroeconomic context:				
Expected wage ratio .....	-.0003	.001	.0003	.002
Peso devaluation .....	-.027	.083	-.245	.151
Mexican inflation rate .....	1.098*	.396	3.032*	.724
U.S. employment growth .....	2.936	2.797	-5.879	5.616
Growth in foreign investment .....	-.136	.100	.530*	.168
Mexican real interest rate .....	1.560*	.760	-.326	1.443
U.S. policy context:				
Availability of visas .....	-1.990*	.848	-2.549	1.517
Probability of apprehension .....	-.090	1.126	-4.761*	1.937
Employer sanctions enacted .....	.232	.228	-1.133*	.332
Amnesty recipients in household .....	.092	.295	-.198	.281
Expected value of U.S. services:				
Welfare .....	-.010	.008	-.028*	.008
Medical care .....	-.014	.030	.297*	.045
Education .....	.0002	.0002	.0009*	.0002
Constant .....	3.565*	1.191	5.620	.225
Log likelihood .....	2,147.800*		743.340*	
$\chi^2$ .....	6,169.900*		2,963.300*	
No. of person-years .....	8,394		4,733	

NOTE.—Event-history data gathered among male household heads from 25 Mexican communities.

\*  $P < .05$ .





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# Immigration policies in the U.S.

- The importance of international migration to current and future policy challenges faced by the United States can hardly be overstated
- Migrants have been and will continue to be the primary driver of U.S. population growth throughout the 21st century
- They are shaping critical policy questions pertaining to the changing demographic landscape of the urban future as well as the overall population challenge of achieving an equitable society

# Immigration generates questions

- The U.S. has always celebrated its immigrant heritage
- However, Americans have always worried about economic, political, and cultural changes caused by immigration
- Immigration brings many changes that raise fundamental questions for Americans
  - Who are we?
  - What kind of a society have we built?
  - Whom shall we welcome to it?
  - What should we do to encourage the integration of newcomers?
  - How should we deal with those who arrive uninvited?



# Advocates of reducing immigration

- Immigration adds to population growth and environmental problems
- Immigrants can depress the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers
- Immigration can reduce the incentives for U.S. businesses to modernize
- “Too many” Spanish-speaking immigrants can hold back the integration of immigrants and undermine American values



# Policies and society

- Immigration policy affects, and is affected by, many aspects of society, both within the United States, as well as across other countries
- E.g. economic growth, labor markets, demographics, health, education, criminal justice, national security, border security (Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

# U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875
- Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920
- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
  - Several changes to immigration law after 1980

# U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875
  - Federal, state, and local governments, private employers, shipping companies and railroads, and churches promoted immigration to the United States
- Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920
  - Congress barred the entry of convicts and prostitutes in 1875
  - Immigration Act of 1882 for the first time prohibited immigration from China, which continued for most of the next 60 years
  - Immigrants from eastern and southern Europe aroused fear and hostility among Protestants and rural Americans
  - Laws instituted literacy tests beginning in 1897

# U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
  - In 1921, Congress imposed the first quantitative restrictions on immigration, limiting arrivals of the foreign-born persons of each nationality present in the U.S.
  - Quotas were applied only to the Eastern Hemisphere
  - In the 1960s, the civil rights movement highlighted government discrimination against nonwhites, which affected policies
  - Quantitative restrictions were placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere

# Immigration reforms, 1980–1990

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- 1980: U.S. adopted UN definition of refugee
  - Person outside her or his country of citizenship and unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to the person's race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion
- 1986: Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
  - Bargain between those who wanted to prevent more illegal migration
  - And those who wanted to legalize the status of illegal foreigners who had put down roots in the U.S.
- 1990: Congress enacted the Immigration Act (IMMACT)
  - Due to economic boom, more than doubled the number of immigrant visas available for foreigners requested by U.S. employers
  - Set the annual ceiling of 675,000 immigrants a year

# Major laws in 1996

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDPA)
  - It made easier to detain immigrants convicted of U.S. crimes without bail and to deport them after they had served their sentences
- Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
  - It made most legal immigrants ineligible for federal welfare benefits
- Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
  - It included measures to reduce illegal migration (e.g., border patrol)
  - It introduced a system by which employers could check whether newly hired workers were legally authorized to work in the U.S.
  - U.S. sponsors were required to have an income at least 125% the poverty line

# State-level policies

- In recent decades, the lack of a comprehensive federal immigration reform has resulted in the implementation of state policies
  - Restrict access to employment, education, housing, health care, and other services to unauthorized immigrants
  - But also other policies that have removed immigration status as a criterion for accessing certain benefits (e.g., in-state tuition, state driver's license, publicly subsidized health insurance) (Karoly and Perez-Arce 2016)



## Entries In and Out of the United States, 2004-2009

CATEGORY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Legal Immigrants</b>	<b>1,122,373</b>	<b>1,266,129</b>	<b>1,052,415</b>	<b>1,107,126</b>	<b>1,130,818</b>
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens	436,231	580,348	494,920	488,483	535,554
Other family-sponsored immigrants	212,970	222,229	194,900	227,761	211,859
Employment-based	246,878	159,081	162,176	166,511	144,034
Refugees and asylees	150,677	216,454	136,125	166,392	177,368
Diversity and other immigrants	75,617	88,017	64,294	57,979	62,003
Estimated emigration	-312,000	-316,000	-320,000	-324,000	-328,000
<b>Legal Temporary Migrants</b>	<b>32,003,435</b>	<b>33,667,328</b>	<b>37,149,651</b>	<b>39,381,925</b>	<b>36,231,554</b>
Pleasure/business	28,510,374	29,928,567	32,905,061	35,045,836	32,190,915
Foreign students (F-1)	621,178	693,805	787,756	859,169	895,392
Temporary foreign workers	882,957	985,456	1,118,138	1,101,938	936,272
<b>Illegal Immigration: Apprehensions</b>	<b>1,291,142</b>	<b>1,206,457</b>	<b>960,756</b>	<b>791,568</b>	—
Removals or deportations	246,431	280,974	319,382	358,886	—
Change in unauthorized foreigners	572,000	572,000	572,000	-650,000	—

— Data not available.

**Note:** The stock of unauthorized immigrants rose from 8.4 million in 2000 to 12.4 million in 2007, and dipped to 11.1 million in 2009.

**Sources:** Department of Homeland Security; and unauthorized foreigners data from Jeff Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, accessed at <http://pewhispanic.org/topics?TopicID=16>, on June 3, 2010.

**Audiocast:** Listen to Philip Martin explain the various types of immigrant entries into the United States and how these numbers have changed over the past five years.

[www.prb.org/PopulationBulletins/2010/immigration1.aspx](http://www.prb.org/PopulationBulletins/2010/immigration1.aspx)



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# Policies not based on evidence

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- Even when policies respond to changes in immigration, they are usually not based on understanding the driving forces of international migration
- These policies are usually shaped by economic circumstances, political ideologies, and symbolic significance of immigrants presented by the media, politicians, and legislators

# Policies shaped immigration

(Massey, Pren 2012)


- **Bracero Program**

- Temporary labor program that admitted short-term foreign workers in the country. Created in 1942. Expanded in 2nd half of 1950s. Terminated in 1968.

- Illegal immigration increased after this period, not because of an unexpected surge in Mexican migration
- The end of this labor program and limitations on the number of available permanent resident visas made it impossible to accommodate the previously established inflows of migrants

# Mexican immigration to the U.S.

**FIGURE 1 Mexican immigration to the United States in three categories, 1955–95**



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.




# Response to illegal migration

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- Increase in illegal migration until late 1970s shaped policy responses in the following years
- Politicians and political activists framed the Latino immigration as a threat to the country

# Media & Mexican immigration

**FIGURE 2** Frequency of pairing of the terms “flood,” “crisis,” or “invasion” with “Mexico” or “Mexican immigrants,” in four leading US newspapers (three-year moving average), 1965–1995



SOURCE: Proquest Historical Newspaper Files.



# Immigration legislation

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- This process resulted on restrictionist immigration legislation and more rigorous enforcement policies
- The militarization of the border began in 1986 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
- It increased by 50% the enforcement budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Other policies increased border enforcement in the following decades...

**TABLE 1 Restrictive immigration legislation enacted by Congress affecting Latin Americans, 1965–2010**

1965	<b>Hart–Cellar Act</b> Imposed first-ever annual cap of 120,000 visas for immigrants from Western Hemisphere
1976	<b>Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act</b> Put Western Hemisphere under preference system and country quotas
1978	<b>Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act</b> Combined separate hemispheric caps into single worldwide ceiling of 290,000
1980	<b>Refugee Act</b> Abolished refugee preference and reduced worldwide ceiling to 270,000
1986	<b>Immigration Reform and Control Act</b> Criminalized undocumented hiring and authorized expansion of Border Patrol
1990	<b>Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act</b> Sought to cap visas going to spouse and children of resident aliens
1996	<b>Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act</b> Authorized expedited removal of noncitizens and deportation of aggravated felons
1996	<b>Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act</b> Increased resources for border enforcement, narrowed criteria for asylum, and increased income threshold required to sponsor immigrants
1996	<b>Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act</b> Declared documented and undocumented migrants ineligible for certain entitlements
1997	<b>Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act</b> Allowed registered asylum seekers from Central America (mostly Nicaraguans) in the US for at least 5 years since December 1, 1995 to obtain legal status; but prohibited legalization and ordered deportation for those who lacked a valid visa or who previously violated US immigration laws (mostly Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans)
2001	<b>USA PATRIOT Act</b> Created Department of Homeland Security, increased funding for surveillance and deportation of foreigners, and authorized deportation of noncitizens without due process
2004	<b>National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act</b> Funded new equipment, aircraft, Border Patrol agents, immigration investigators, and detention centers for border enforcement
2005	<b>Real ID Act</b> Sharply increased the data requirements, documentation, and verification procedures for state issuance of drivers licenses
2006	<b>Secure Fence Act</b> Authorized construction of additional fencing, vehicle barriers, checkpoints, lighting and funding for new cameras, satellites, and unmanned drones for border enforcement
2010	<b>Border Security Act</b> Funded hiring 3,000 more Border Patrol agents and increased BP budget by \$244 million




**TABLE 2 Restrictive enforcement operations launched by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Department of Homeland Security 1993–2010**

<b>1993</b>	<b>Operation Blockade</b> Border Patrol's (BP) militarization of the El Paso Sector
<b>1994</b>	<b>Operation Gatekeeper</b> BP's militarization of the San Diego Sector
<b>1998</b>	<b>Operation Rio Grande</b> BP program to restrict the movement of migrants across the Texas and New Mexico border with Mexico
<b>1999</b>	<b>Operation Safeguard</b> BP's militarization of the Tucson Sector
<b>2003</b>	<b>Operation Endgame</b> Plan launched by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport all removable noncitizens and "suspected terrorists" living in the United States
<b>2004</b>	<b>Operation Frontline</b> Program launched by ICE to address "vulnerabilities in immigration and trade" by focusing on immigration violators who pose an "enhanced public safety or national security threat"
<b>2004</b>	<b>Arizona Border Control Initiative</b> Multi-agency effort supporting Homeland Security's anti-terrorism mission through the detection, arrest, and deterrence of all persons engaged in cross-border illicit activity
<b>2004</b>	<b>Operation Stonegarden</b> Federal grant program administered through the State Homeland Security Grant Program to provide funding to state and local agencies to improve immigration enforcement
<b>2005</b>	<b>Secure Borders Initiative</b> Comprehensive multi-year plan launched by ICE to secure America's borders and reduce illegal migration
<b>2005</b>	<b>Operation Streamline</b> Program mandating criminal charges for illegal migrants, including first-time offenders
<b>2006</b>	<b>Operation Return to Sender</b> Sweep of illegal immigrants by ICE to detain those deemed most dangerous, including convicted felons, gang members, and repeat illegal immigrants
<b>2006</b>	<b>Operation Jump Start</b> Program authorizing the deployment of National Guard troops along the US–Mexico border
<b>2007</b>	<b>Secure Communities Program</b> ICE program to identify and deport criminal noncitizens arrested by state and local authorities
<b>2007</b>	<b>Operation Rapid REPAT</b> Program to Remove Eligible Parolees Accepted for Transfer by allowing selected criminal noncitizens incarcerated in US prisons and jails to accept early release in exchange for voluntary deportation
<b>2008</b>	<b>Operation Scheduled Departure</b> ICE operation to facilitate the voluntary deportation of 457,000 eligible illegal migrants from selected cities
<b>2010</b>	<b>Operation Copper Cactus</b> Deployment of Arizona National Guard troops to assist BP in apprehension of illegal migrants



# Apprehensions & illegal entries


**FIGURE 3** Annual number of apprehensions and estimated illegal entries, 1955–1995



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

# Apprehensions & border patrol

**FIGURE 4** Feedback loop between apprehensions and border enforcement, 1965–1995




Effect of illegal entries on  
conservative reaction  
via apprehensions: 0.848  
(0.905\*0.937)

Indirect effect through  
enforcement feedbacks: 0.692  
(0.820\*0.873\*0.935\*0.936 + 0.820\*0.377\*0.029\*0.936 +  
0.336\*0.402\*0.029\*0.936 + 0.336\*0.181\*0.935\*0.936)

# Border enforcement

**FIGURE 5 Intensity of border enforcement, 1955–1995**




SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.



# Deportations


**FIGURE 6** Annual deportations from the United States, 1955–2009



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

# Deportations & internal control

**FIGURE 7 Feedback loop between deportations and internal enforcement, 1965–2009**




Effect of 1993 terrorist attack  
 On deportations: 0.236  
 On conservative reaction: 0.063

Effect of 2001 terrorist attack  
 On deportations: 0.615  
 On conservative reaction: 0.159



# Mexicans admitted out of quota

**FIGURE 8** Percentage of Mexicans admitted outside the country quota as relatives of US citizens, 1990–2010



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012).

# Increase in border enforcement

- Surge in border enforcement after 1986 (Massey 2015; Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)
  - Massive policy intervention
  - Undertaken for domestic political purposes
  - Not based on analysis of forces driving migration
- Politicians, pundits, and bureaucrats continue to call for more border enforcement
  - However, since 2008, net undocumented migration has been zero or negative


# The contradictory U.S. policy

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Restrictions on work permits turn legal migrants into unauthorized migrants
  - However, family preference systems prevail, which encourage non-workers to migrate
- Increasing border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migration from Mexico
  - Border enforcement discourages circularity
  - Undocumented immigrants are encouraged to stay
  - From a circular flow of male workers going to three states (CA, TX, IL)
  - To 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation



## Unauthorized Immigrants as Share of Foreign-Born by State, 2008



(US=30%)

- Highest % undocumented (45-80% of foreign-born)
- High % undocumented (35-45%)
- Lower % undocumented (25-35%)
- Lowest % undocumented (<25%)







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# Border security and immigration

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Increasingly stringent border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migrants from Mexico
- Transformed migration from a largely circular flow of male workers primarily going to three states (California, Texas, and Illinois)
- Into a population of 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation

# Theories and outcomes

- Previous studies have used several theoretical frameworks and independent variables to estimate the level of migration, mainly using data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)

(Massey, Denton 1993, Massey et al. 1994, Massey, Espinosa 1997, Massey 1999, Massey, Durand, Pren 2014, 2015, 2016, Massey, Gentsch 2014, Massey 2015)

TABLE 1  
VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION  
TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2010

Independent Variable	Definition
U.S. context:	
Border Patrol budget . . . . .	Border Patrol budget (MMP/U.S. Department of Homeland Security)
Rate of employment growth . . . .	% change in employment over prior year (U.S. Current Population Survey 2014)
Residence/work visas (000) . . . .	No. legal entries with residence or work visas (U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics 2014)
U.S. minimum daily wage . . . . .	Earnings in \$(2013) for eight hours of work at minimum wage (U.S. Department of Labor 2014)
Mexican context:	
Crude birthrate . . . . .	Crude birthrate 15 years earlier (Mitchell 2007)
Rate of GDP growth . . . . .	% change in Mexican GDP over prior year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2014)
Homicide rate . . . . .	Homicides per 100,000 persons (Aguirre Botello 2011)
Mexican minimum daily wage . . .	Mexico's minimum daily wage in \$(2013) (INEGI 2014)
Demographic background:	
Age . . . . .	Age in years (MMP)
Female . . . . .	1 = female, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Married . . . . .	1 if married, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of minors in household . . . .	Number of children <18 (MMP)
Human capital:	
Labor force experience . . . . .	Years of labor force experience (MMP)
Education . . . . .	Years of schooling (MMP)
Cumulative U.S. experience . . . .	Months of prior U.S. experience (MMP)
Previous U.S. trips . . . . .	Number of prior trips to United States (MMP)
Agricultural occupation . . . . .	Reference category
Unskilled occupation . . . . .	Unskilled manual occupation (MMP)
Skilled occupation . . . . .	Skilled manual/professional/managerial occupation (MMP)



TABLE 1  
VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION  
TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2010

Independent Variable	Definition
Social capital:	
Parent a U.S. migrant . . . . .	1 if parent ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S. migrant siblings . . . .	Number of siblings ever migrated to United States before person-year (MMP)
Spouse a U.S. migrant . . . . .	1 if spouse ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S. migrant children . . . .	Number of children ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S.-born children . . . . .	Number of children born in United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Proportion U.S. migrants in community . . . . .	Proportion of persons in community age 15+ ever migrated to United States in person-year (MMP)
Physical capital:	
Land . . . . .	1 if land owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Home . . . . .	1 if home owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Business . . . . .	1 if business owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Region of origin:	
Historical . . . . .	1 if Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Community size:	
Large urban area . . . . .	Reference category
Small city (10,000–99,999) . . . . .	1 if 10,000–99,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Town (2,501–9,999) . . . . .	1 if 2,501–9,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Rural village ( $\leq 2,500$ ) . . . . .	1 if $\leq 2,500$ , 0 otherwise (MMP)

NOTE.—MMP = Mexican Migration Project.



# Border Patrol budget

- The main predictor was the Border Patrol budget
- Compiled from the records of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and DHS
- Used as the indicator of the intensity of border enforcement (Massey, Durand et al. 2016)

# Border Patrol budget in millions




FIG. 1.—Border Patrol budget in millions of 2013 dollars





# Log of Border Patrol budget

- Border Patrol budget has increased exponentially after 1986
  - It is characterized by nonlinearity and a highly skewed distribution
  - It would generate problems of heteroscedasticity: non-explained portion of the model (residuals) would not have a random, homogenous distribution
- Use the natural log of Border Patrol budget
  - Linear trend across time
  - Normalizes the distribution
  - Improves the fit in six of eight models

# Reverse causality

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Using Border Patrol budget presents a potential issue of endogeneity bias (reverse causality)
  - Border enforcement and undocumented migration may simultaneously be caused by a common underlying factor
  - Volume of undocumented migration might influence the intensity of border enforcement



# Instrumental variable

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) budget:  
instrument to predict Border Patrol budget



- The DEA and Border Patrol budgets both rise over time in similar fashion, but for different reasons
  - Growth of the DEA is rooted in the politics of the war on crime and drugs
  - Growth of the Border Patrol's budget is grounded in manufactured hysteria over the “alien invasion” and the ensuing “war on immigrants”
- Independence of the two “wars” is indicated by their separate legislative histories

# Steps of estimation

- Regressed the log of the Border Patrol budget on the DEA budget

$$R^2 = 0.97$$

$$\ln(\text{Border Patrol budget}) = 5.435 + 0.001037 * (\text{DEA budget})$$

- This equation was used to generate an instrumental version of the logged Border Patrol budget variable
  - This predicted value of Border Patrol budget was employed in all analyses to estimate the causal effect of U.S. border enforcement on migratory outcomes

# Series of migratory outcomes

(Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Whether undocumented migrants crossed at a traditional location
- Whether crossed the border with a coyote
- Cost of crossing the border with a coyote
- Whether migrants were apprehended
- Probability of ultimately achieving a successful entry
- Risk of death during crossing
- Likelihood of returning home once entry has been achieved

TABLE 2  
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT BORDER-CROSSING OUTCOMES

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		USED A COYOTE		CROSSING COST (\$[2013])		APPREHENDED	
	$\beta$ (1)	SE (2)	$\beta$ (3)	SE (4)	$\beta$ (5)	SE (6)	$\beta$ (7)	SE (8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument . . .	-.59***	.12	1.10***	.17	731.54***	53.03	.34**	.15
Rate of employment growth . . . . .	.05**	.02	-.01	.02	.74	8.10	.05**	.02
Residence/work visas (000) . . . . .	.00***	.00	.00*	.00	-.16**	.07	.00*	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage . . . . .	-.02**	.01	.02**	.01	12.41***	3.38	.00	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate . . . . .	.04**	.01	.02	.02	4.20	5.72	-.03*	.02
Rate of GDP growth . . . . .	-.01*	.01	.01	.01	-5.64+	3.44	-.01	.01
Homicide rate . . . . .	.05***	.01	.00	.01	-37.84***	4.93	-.02	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage . . . . .	.01	.01	-.02	.02	3.16	5.85	.04**	.02
Demographic background:								
Age . . . . .	.00	.01	.00	.02	-18.26**	6.31	-.01	.02
Age <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	.00*	.00	.00**	.00	.00	.08	.00	.00
Female . . . . .	.32**	.15	.07	.17	-28.28	60.53	-.52**	.18
Married . . . . .	-.05	.06	.08	.07	14.23	26.84	.00	.07
No. of minors in household . . . . .	-.01	.01	.03**	.01	9.57*	5.53	.03*	.02
Human capital:								
Labor force experience . . . . .	.02***	.01	.03***	.01	11.21***	2.33	-.02**	.01
Education . . . . .	.02**	.01	-.01	.01	-8.32**	3.17	-.03***	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience . . . . .	.00*	.00	.00***	.00	-.08	.30	.00	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips . . . . .	-.01+	.01	-.06***	.01	-9.72**	3.43	-.04***	.01
Unskilled occupation . . . . .	-.14**	.05	-.11*	.06	-24.16	22.58	.06	.06
Skilled occupation . . . . .	.13	.10	.01	.13	87.04**	42.70	-.07	.12





TABLE 2  
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT BORDER-CROSSING OUTCOMES

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		USED A COYOTE		CROSSING COST (\$[2013])		APPREHENDED	
	$\beta$ (1)	SE (2)	$\beta$ (3)	SE (4)	$\beta$ (5)	SE (6)	$\beta$ (7)	SE (8)
Social capital:								
Parent a U.S. migrant . . . . .	-.02	.05	-.03	.06	14.15	22.44	.06	.06
No. of U.S. migrant siblings . . . . .	.10***	.01	.04**	.02	-3.61	6.09	.02	.02
Spouse a U.S. migrant . . . . .	.14*	.08	-.04	.10	18.27	35.34	-.19	.10
No. of U.S. migrant children . . . . .	.13***	.03	.11**	.04	31.33**	13.13	.05	.04
No. of U.S.-born children . . . . .	.06	.09	-.15	.10	-33.16	36.84	.16	.10
Proportion U.S. migrants in community . . . . .	.02***	.00	.01***	.00	-3.47***	.87	.00	.00
Physical capital:								
Land . . . . .	-.09	.06	-.25***	.08	-44.51	28.67	-.07	.08
Home . . . . .	-.05	.05	-.14**	.06	-33.45	21.48	-.10+	.06
Business . . . . .	-.18**	.07	-.12	.09	-55.32*	33.33	.20**	.09
Region of origin:								
Historical . . . . .	-.36***	.06	-.10	.08	-110.72***	27.98	-.34***	.08
Community size:								
Small city (10,000-99,999) . . . . .	-.73***	.09	.56***	.10	276.23***	37.89	.08	.11
Town (2,501-9,999) . . . . .	-.59***	.09	.73***	.10	170.38***	37.86	.10	.11
Rural village ( $\leq 2500$ ) . . . . .	-.95***	.10	.84***	.11	301.30***	40.30	-.04	.11
Place of crossing:								
Sonora to Arizona . . . . .	...		...		165.78***	29.95	-.11	.08
Southern Rio Grande to Texas . . . . .	...		...		-59.99**	24.56	.13*	.07
Crossing context:								
Used coyote during crossing . . . . .	...		...		...		.05	.07
Cost of coyote (hundreds of \$[2013]) . . . . .	...		...		...		-.01**	.00
Intercept . . . . .	2.86**	1.42	-7.30***	1.88	-3,511.00***	631.96	-1.20	1.74
Likelihood ratio . . . . .	991.62***		751.15***				194.39***	
Log likelihood . . . . .					-65,796.00			
Wald . . . . .	872.61***		646.98***				185.22***	
Sigma . . . . .					810.76***	6.37		
No. of trips . . . . .	11,558		10,737		8,106		8,097	

+  $P < .10$ .

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .

# Traditional crossing




FIG. 2.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at a traditional location and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



# Used a coyote




FIG. 3.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at with a coyote and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



# Crossing cost




FIG. 4.—Observed trends (*solid line*) in coyote cost and cost predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget and place of crossing.



# Apprehended and eventual entry




FIG. 5.—Observed probabilities of apprehension (*solid line*) on first attempt and eventual entry (*dotted line*) and apprehension probability predicted (*dashed line*) from trend in Border Patrol budget.



# Number of deaths




FIG. 6.—Observed deaths (*solid line*) at the border and deaths predicted (*dashed line*) by trend in the Border Patrol budget.





# First undocumented migration




FIG. 7.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of first undocumented migration and probabilities predicted from trends in Border Patrol budget (*dashed line*) and average age (*dotted line*).



TABLE 3  
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT DEPARTURE AND RETURN ON FIRST AND LATER UNDOCUMENTED TRIPS TO THE UNITED STATES

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		RETURN FROM FIRST TRIP		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		RETURN FROM LATER TRIP	
	$\beta$ (1)	SE (2)	$\beta$ (3)	SE (4)	$\beta$ (5)	SE (6)	$\beta$ (7)	SE (8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument . . . . .	.07	.08	-.53**	.18	-1.56***	.14	-.26*	.14
Rate of employment growth . . . . .	.04**	.01	-.06**	.03	-.02	.02	-.06**	.02
Residence/work visas (000) . . . . .	.00**	.00	.00	.00	-.00***	.00	-.00***	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage . . . . .	.01**	.01	.02**	.01	.03***	.01	.02**	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate . . . . .	.01	.01	-.01	.02	-.05***	.01	-.02	.02
Rate of GDP growth . . . . .	.02***	.01	.01	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.01
Homicide rate . . . . .	-.01	.01	.05**	.02	.02*	.01	.01	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage . . . . .	-.04***	.01	-.05**	.02	.02***	.01	-.03*	.02
Demographic background:								
Age . . . . .	.19***	.01	.08***	.02	.07***	.01	.08***	.02
Age <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	.00***	.00	.00***	.00	.00***	.00	.00***	.00
Female . . . . .	-.84***	.07	-.23	.15	-.38**	.13	-.52**	.18
Married . . . . .	-.19***	.04	.53***	.08	.15**	.05	.36***	.08
No. of minors in household . . . . .	-.04***	.01	-.03	.02	.04***	.01	-.01	.01
Human capital:								
Labor force experience . . . . .	.00	.00	-.01	.01	-.01**	.00	.02**	.01
Education . . . . .	-.01*	.00	-.03**	.01	-.04***	.01	-.03***	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience . . . . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	-.02***	.00	-.01***	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips . . . . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	.17***	.01	-.12***	.01
Unskilled occupation . . . . .	.05	.03	-.21**	.07	-.21***	.04	.27***	.05
Skilled occupation . . . . .	-.39***	.06	-.55**	.22	-.80***	.16	-.34	.21



TABLE 3  
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT DEPARTURE AND RETURN ON FIRST AND LATER UNDOCUMENTED TRIPS TO THE UNITED STATES

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		RETURN FROM FIRST TRIP		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		RETURN FROM LATER TRIP	
	$\beta$ (1)	SE (2)	$\beta$ (3)	SE (4)	$\beta$ (5)	SE (6)	$\beta$ (7)	SE (8)
Social capital:								
Parent a U.S. migrant . . . . .	.37***	.05	-.16*	.09	.00	.04	-.23***	.06
No. of U.S. migrant siblings . . . . .	.04***	.01	-.08**	.03	-.02	.01	-.05**	.02
Spouse a U.S. migrant . . . . .	-.40**	.11	-1.11***	.15	-.86***	.07	-.93***	.12
No. of U.S. migrant children . . . . .	.18***	.04	-.05	.06	-.23***	.02	.00	.03
No. of U.S.-born children . . . . .	-2.05***	.27	. . .		-.44***	.06	-.48***	.13
Proportion U.S. migrants in community . . . . .	.02***	.00	.00	.00	.01***	.00	-.01**	.00
Physical capital:								
Land . . . . .	-.15**	.06	-.20*	.11	-.07	.06	-.08	.07
Home . . . . .	-.32***	.04	.20**	.08	-.09**	.04	-.10*	.06
Business . . . . .	-.42***	.06	.18	.11	.10	.07	.08	.09
Region of origin:								
Historical . . . . .	.33***	.04	.11	.08	.37***	.07	-.17**	.08
Community size:								
Small city (10,000–99,999) . . . . .	.58***	.05	.22**	.11	.62***	.09	.02	.12
Town (2,501–9,999) . . . . .	.50***	.05	.01	.10	.60***	.09	.10	.12
Rural village ( $\leq 2500$ ) . . . . .	.70***	.06	.13	.11	.59***	.10	-.15	.13
Intercept . . . . .	-8.12***	.96	.15	2.10	6.61***	1.46	.09	1.67
Likelihood ratio . . . . .	5,037.28***		389.75***		6,996.45***		2,197.97***	
Wald . . . . .	3,361.14***		344.37***		3,649.39***		1,286.25***	
Total no. of person-years . . . . .	641,587		5,159		43,103		12,402	

<sup>+</sup>  $P < .10$ .

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .



# Return after undocumented trip




FIG. 8.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of return within 12 months of first undocumented trip and probability predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget.



# Undocumented migrants




FIG. 9.—Simulated size of undocumented population under two scenarios: observed Border Patrol budget (*solid line*) and budget fixed at 1986 level (*dashed line*).







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# Proposed Southern border wall

- 44 million foreign-born people in 2018
  - 10.7 million undocumented immigrants
    - 4.5 million are visa overstayers
    - ~6 million persons entered without inspection (EWIs)
- Southern border wall will cost over \$21.6 billion
- Why will the Southern border wall not work?
  - Visa overstayers
  - Selectivity of migration
  - Historical evidence
  - Don't worry



# Visa overstayers

- A biometric entry/exit system would monitor people entering and exiting the U.S.
  - It would reduce the number of visa overstayers
- The Congress mandated an electronic entry-exit system more than 20 years ago
  - But it has not been implemented because of objections from the tourism industry and other groups



# Selectivity of migration

- Only the strongest and most advantaged people attempt crossing the Southern border
- A wall will make the journey to the U.S. more dangerous
  - Many migrants will fail
  - But eventually most will succeed
- A wall will cause immigrants to settle and stay in the U.S., and not return to their home countries

(Massey, Durand, Pren, 2016)



# Historical evidence

- Virtually all the famous walls in the world did not or do not work
- China's Great Wall took almost 2,000 years to build at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives
  - Actually it consists of a series of walls
- China's walls did not keep out foreigners
  - Mongols entered China and ruled China in the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368)
  - The Manchu entered China and ruled China in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911)



# Don't worry

- EWIs don't take jobs from U.S.-born Americans
  - Almost all EWIs perform work Americans don't want to do
  - Little evidence that EWIs harm or suppress the employment or wages of local people
  - See extra readings in course website
- About half of EWIs pay taxes
  - In 2015, the IRS received more than 4 million tax returns from workers without Social Security numbers, and many of them are EWIs
  - They paid almost \$24 billion in income taxes
  - They won't get any of it back in Social Security and Medicare payments



# Crime and drugs

- Foreign-born people have considerably lower crime rates than do the U.S.-born
- Most illicit drugs don't enter the U.S. via EWIs
  - Most drugs smuggled into the U.S. do not arrive on the backs of those who cross illegally
- In 2015, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reported
  - Mexican drug cartels bring most drugs over the southern border through ports of entry via trucks, passenger vehicles, and tractor-trailers







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# Public attitudes toward immigration

- Public attitudes/perceptions toward immigration and questions about the social and economic impacts of immigrants are linked
- The fortunes of immigrants, and their effects on the economy, political system, schools, and society shape public opinion on additional immigration
- Discourse typically links undocumented immigrants to terrorism
  - Terrorist attacks have not been committed by illegal immigrants

# Immigrants and terrorism

Lawful Entry or Residence		Carrying Concealed Explosives	Visa Overstay Violations	Illegal Entry
World Trade Center 1993 Attackers	Would-be NYC Subway Bombers	Millennium Bomber	Some of the 9/11 Hijackers	
Oklahoma City Bombers	Times Square Bomber	Shoe Bomber		
Anthrax Attacker	Fort Hood Shooter	Liquid-Explosives Bombers		
D.C. Snipers	Boston Marathon Bombers	Underwear Bomber		
Fort Dix Six	San Bernardino Shooters			

Source: Scott Savitz (RAND presentation, 2016).

# Policies should consider attitudes

- Successful immigration policies need to address political issues and public attitudes/perceptions
  - Not only humanitarian and economic interests
- Full consideration of this complex issue requires
  - Understanding of changes in immigration landscape over time
  - Comprehensive immigration reform

# Polarized policy debate

- Present discussions focus on **unauthorized immigrants** and range from deporting all such persons and building a wall along the southern border of the United States to granting full amnesty to those without criminal records
- Policy proposals regarding **legal immigration** include opening doors for all visa applicants, implementing a labor market driven points-based system as in Canada or, alternatively, implementing more restrictive country-based policies
- Although a polarized immigration debate makes for interesting political debates, sustainable policy solutions must address **comprehensive impacts of immigration**, taking diverse societal priorities and needs into account


# Policy scenarios

- Develop **policy simulations** to inform policymakers on the impacts of various incremental immigration policy options, as well as comprehensive immigration reform
  - **Review of immigration research** to pinpoint which factors influence immigration, potential outcomes of specific policies, and which policy issues should be included in the scenarios
  - **Craft a conceptual model** to illustrate the causal links between policies and outcomes
    - How various factors affect immigration flow and, in turn, how immigration stock and flow can affect a range of different sectors (e.g., border security, education, health, employment, or labor)
  - Provide a set of policy simulations (**agent-based models**)
    - Varying immigration policy options to model how changes in one policy area could reverberate in distinct ways across multiple sectors: age distribution of the U.S. population, education systems, health services, labor markets, inequality, border security, national security, and the criminal justice system




# Model international migration to the U.S.

## First set of regressions



## Second set of regressions





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# Economic effects of immigration

- Immigration raises concerns that native workers might experience negative impacts on earnings and employment
    - Mainly those with lower levels of education
    - These natives might experience an increasing competition for low-paying jobs with immigrants and refugees
  - Does an increase in labor supply, due to immigration, have negative effects on labor outcomes of competing low-skilled native workers?
    - There are no definitive answers, because numerous and concurrent effects are related to economic outcomes
- (Waters, Pineau 2015)



# Different results

- Immigration reduces the wage and labor supply of competing native workers (Borjas 2003, 2016)
  - Wages of natives decreased by almost 4% when there was a 10% increase in the labor supply of immigrants
- Immigration had a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree between 1990 and 2006 (Ottaviano, Peri 2012)
  - Immigration had a small positive effect on average native wages
  - But had a substantial negative effect on wages of previous immigrants in the long run



# Different approaches


(Card 2012)

- Assumption about capital
  - If **fixed**: negative effects of immigration on labor outcomes
  - If **adjusted** in the long run: effect of immigration is approximately zero
- Education groups
  - If **four groups** (dropouts, high school, some college, college)
    - Immigrant dropouts lower relative wages of native dropouts
  - If **two groups** (high-school equivalents, college equivalents)
    - Earnings have been largely unaffected by immigration
- Immigrants and natives with low levels of education
  - If **equal competition** is assumed: negative effects on wages
  - If **natives having advantages** is assumed (e.g. language proficiency, broader social networks): positive effects on outcomes of natives



# The Long-Term Fiscal Impact of One Immigrant

Amount in U.S. dollars (thousands)



Source: J.P. Smith and B. Edmonston, eds., *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (1997): table 7-5.





# Natives adapt to immigration

- Natives experience occupational upgrading and specialization, as an adjustment to immigration flows (Fogel, Peri 2015)
- While immigrants tend to concentrate on manual jobs, due to language and cultural limitations, natives leave their previous occupations to work on more complex jobs
- This pattern generates improvements in natives' wages and mobility, without negative effects on unemployment for unskilled natives

# Immigration policies and natives

- Countries with larger immigrant competition experience a move of native workers to more sophisticated skills with higher incomes, which require higher education levels  
(Cattaneo, Fiorio, Peri 2013)
- Natives engage in entrepreneurial activities in response to larger immigrant competition
- Open immigration policies tend to generate better career opportunities for natives, when combined with flexible labor markets (Peri 2014)

# Immigration models

- Models should take into account skills of workers and capital to assess the effect of immigration on the wages of native workers in the long run
  - Reduced-form (e.g., only skills) does not give complete information about the wage effect of immigration
  - These partial estimates are only the effect of direct competition
  - Total wage effect is also determined by indirect complementarities among different types of immigrants and natives
- Immigration to the U.S. had a modest negative long-run effect on real wages of the least educated natives in 1990–2006
  - Effect was between  $-2.1\%$  and  $+1.7\%$





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Migrants from Honduras, hoping to reach the United States to seek asylum, run from tear gas released by US Customs and Border Protection near the fence between Mexico and the US in Tijuana.



# Asylum procedures in the U.S.

- People who request protection at a U.S. entry point must be referred to an asylum officer for a screening interview
  - More than 75% of applicants pass this “credible-fear interview”
  - Migrant families are likely to be placed on buses to Texas, where they will remain in detention centers for mothers and children
  - Adult men are likely to be detained in any number of facilities across the country that hold undocumented immigrants






# Immigration judge phase


- If applicant passes the interview, the person must then present his or her case before an immigration judge
  - This process can take several months or longer
  - Migrants often are allowed to travel to the interior of the country
  - They stay with relatives or friends while their cases run their course
  - They are typically fitted with ankle monitors
  - In recent months, migrant advocates say, the federal administration has kept many migrants seeking asylum in detention



# Asylum denial rates in the U.S.




# Asylum denial rates by representation




- Having an attorney continued to be almost a necessity for winning asylum in Immigration Court

# Changes in asylum seekers (FY2005–FY2010) vs. (FY2011–FY2016)



# Asylum denial rates for top ten nationalities, 2011–2016







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# Syrian refugee crisis

- Since the Syrian civil war began in March 2011 (UNOCHA 2018)
  - Over 6.1 million people have been internally displaced
  - 5.6 million Syrians have fled the country, as of February 2018
- By March 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates the number of refugees and asylum seekers to be almost (UNHCR 2018b)
  - 3.6 million in Turkey
  - 1 million in Lebanon
  - 700,000 in Jordan
  - 250,000 in Iraq
  - 130,000 in Egypt
  - 35,000 in other North African countries.
- Out of this total group of Syrian refugees, close to 1 million have requested asylum in different countries within the European Union (EUI 2016)

# Current response to the crisis

- The response to the refugee crisis has focused largely on providing humanitarian assistance for refugees
  - International aid response has failed to keep up with the rising need of Syrian refugees (MSF 2013; OXFAM 2016b)
- The Syrian conflict has already lasted for more than seven years
  - There is no short-term solution in sight
  - A strategy that addresses the evolving long-term issues of refugees in their host countries is needed

# Severity of refugee situation

- UNHCR indicates that the severity of the refugee situation is defined by (UNHCR 2004)
  - Displacement duration
  - Daily life conditions
  - Socioeconomic integration of refugees in the host country
- Therefore, it is imperative that host countries establish a long-term strategy that helps integrate refugees into their economies and societies

# European response

- Some improvements have been made, but the Europe's admission of Syrian refugees remains low
- Greece and Bulgaria are the closest and most accessible to refugees
  - Allegations of forced removal and mistreatment
- UK response has been to contain the crisis in Syria and to make minimal efforts to increase admission
- Containment of crisis to Syrian region is unviable
  - Neighboring countries are overwhelmed



# EU-Turkey agreement

## (March 18, 2016)

- New irregular migrants will be returned to Turkey
- For every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to EU
- Turkey will prevent new routes of irregular migration
- EU will increase resettlement of refugees residing in Turkey
- Accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish citizens to EU
- Financial support for Turkey's refugee population
- €3 billion in 2016 and another €3 billion by 2018
- Improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria



# Criticism of EU-Turkey agreement

- Agreement violates long-standing international prohibitions on collective expulsion
- Leaders changed the discourse of large-scale mechanism to send back irregular migrants
- Current speech indicates the need to implement a process that respects individual asylum rights
- Governments hope that message about agreement will deter arrivals without having to test its legality



# Data on refugees

- UNHCR refugee registration database and household surveys
- UNHCR MENA Region
- UNHCR Data for Jordan
- UNICEF Jordan
- World Bank MENA Region team
- Oxfam: livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
- Norwegian Refugee Council and Harvard Law School
- Syrian Refugee Health Access Survey in Jordan, Lebanon
- IMF, The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges
- REACH - Informing more Effective Humanitarian Action
- United Nations Data




# Data on natives and others

- Surveys from European Foundation (Eurofound)
  - 2004–2013 European Company Survey
  - 2003–2012 European Quality of Life Survey
  - 1990–2015 European Working Conditions Survey
- European Social Survey (since 2001, every 2 years)
- Eurostat of the European Commission
- 2015 Jordanian Population Census
- Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Database
- OECD Migration Database
- World Bank Migration and remittances data
- Global Attitudes Surveys




*Of about 14 million refugees worldwide, only 1 million live in the EU*



*The number of refugees living in European countries  
now is still low compared to the 1990s*

### **Refugees, 1960-2014**


(Thousands)




1/ Due to a national change in definition, the number of refugees in Germany was reduced in 2013.



# Asylum-seeking individuals




# Refugees departed for resettlement



Resettlement can be an important option for refugees, since they can be transferred from an asylum country to another country that approves to host them, and where they might get settled permanently (UNHCR, 2018a)



# Syrian refugees departed for resettlement




Number of Syrian refugees resettled to countries above is smaller than refugees living in the region (e.g., Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt) and those who fled but do not have a formal refugee status (Ostrand, 2015)


# Previous recommendations

- Europe should implement a comprehensive plan of action built on existing laws and policies (Orchard et al. 2014)
  - Activate a regional humanitarian admission and temporary protection regime
  - Expand resettlement programs
  - Develop alternative legal routes for refugees
  - Combat anti-immigrant sentiment...

# Europeans who agreed with specific statements, 2016



# Migration Integration Policy Index, 2014




# Economic aspects of refugees

- Short-term macroeconomic effects
  - Modest increase in GDP growth
  - Expansion in labor supply
  - Concentrated in Germany, Sweden, Austria
- Medium and long-term growth
  - Lower employment rate and wages than natives, but effects diminish over time
  - Depends on refugee integration into labor market
    - Language
    - Transferable job qualifications
    - Barriers to job search
    - Legal work constraints during asylum application



# Activity performed during the last 7 days





# EU Regional Trust Fund

- EU is the leading donor in the international response to the Syrian crisis with over €6.1 billion (by 2016)
- Trust Fund addresses longer term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq
- Provide education, training, health care, water, sanitation, hygiene, infrastructure, economic recovery
- Incentivize work permits in neighboring countries
- Implementation of a trade initiative to apply lower taxes for manufactured products exported to EU
- World Bank is also providing interest-free loans



# Policies to integrate refugees

- Minimize restrictions on working
- Wage subsidies to private employers
- Temporary exceptions to minimum wages
- Ease self-employment (access to credit)
- Facilitate skill recognition
- Reduce restrictions on geographical mobility
- Adverse effects on wages and employment of natives are limited and temporary
- If refugees work, they pay taxes and contribute to social security, offsetting effects of population aging

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