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Source: *American Indian Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1986), pp. 85-99

Published by: University of Nebraska Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1183982>

Accessed: 30-03-2020 23:48 UTC

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ROOTS OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN URBAN EXPERIENCE: RELOCATION POLICY IN THE 1950s

by
Larry W. Burt

IN 1970 FOR THE FIRST TIME the population of Native Americans in cities surpassed that in rural areas.¹ This was the capstone of a process that has contributed to some of the most significant developments in the recent history of Indian affairs. For example, by the 1950s and 1960s Indian enclaves of unprecedented size appeared in America's inner cities. This made Native Americans and their problems more visible than on isolated and remote reservations. Indians have always lagged behind other social groups in all categories of economic statistics, suffering from poverty, underdevelopment of people and resources, alienation, and hopelessness. But they now found themselves in the midst of the urban underclass at a time when other minority groups with similar problems were becoming increasingly active politically. The example of other civil rights movements and the multi-tribal and concentrated nature of the new urban Indian population encouraged the rise of the Red Power movement and the self-determination drive among Native Americans in the 1960s and 1970s.²

Indian urbanization was not a new phenomenon in post-World War II America but rather had a long history. In fact, the rate of farm-to-city movement among Native Americans before the 1930s was roughly the same as for the whole United States population at comparable levels of industrialization.³ The famous investigation of conditions on reservations and critique of federal Indian policy published in 1928 and known as the Meriam Report acknowledged the trend, predicted more of the same, and urged the government to help Indians in making the transition.⁴ The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) took no action until shortly after the war when it began actively encouraging Native American migration into cities. The program was known as relocation and would be largely responsible for inducing at least 30,000 Indians to move in the 1950s and almost three times that number during the 1960s and 1970s.

Relocation changed in both purpose and provisions during the three decades after World War II, evolving in response to the different federal Indian policies of various presidential administrations. Its initial inspiration and development resulted in a version of relocation that found fullest expression in the 1950s during the Dwight Eisenhower

presidency. The impetus came in part from the war itself. About 40,000 Native Americans had left their homes for cities to find jobs in the booming war industries.⁶ This accelerated pressures and enticements to assimilate. Many became accustomed to non-Indian urban lifestyles and the greater job opportunities and higher wages available in cities. As a result the desire among many in Indian communities to relocate continued even after the war.⁷

The changing political climate in the post-war years also helped mold the 1950s relocation program. In the 1930s with politics dominated by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier promoted a kind of cultural and political pluralism that sought to end the longstanding policy of forced assimilation and instead allow tribes to retain some sovereignty and to develop as much as possible within the contexts of their own cultures. The World War II experience, followed by the Cold War between Russia and the United States, helped generate a spirit of nationalism and a more singularly-defined notion of Americanism that fueled conservative ideology in general and a return to a more assimilationist Indian policy and reversal of Collier's Indian New Deal in particular. Termination became the catchphrase that described the assumptions and ideas behind this change in federal Indian policy. Broadly defined, it meant integrating Native Americans into the mainstream legally, socially, and economically as well as an overall federal withdrawal from Indian affairs and from services provided to Native Americans. More specifically, however, termination referred to a process of tribe-by-tribe legislation, revoking the tribal charters that under Collier's Indian Reorganization Act had stood as the foundation for Indian sovereignty and Indian status as distinct peoples in American society.

Conservative terminationists saw traditional Indian communal social structures as too similar to the dreaded communist systems that they perceived the United States to be in conflict with during the Cold War.⁸ They also found Indian sovereignty, or dual citizenship as they often called it, unacceptable. Expressing a highly chauvinistic version of the era's nationalism, terminationists believed that there was no room for presumably competing governmental loyalties. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 had granted United States citizenship to all Native Americans, and thereafter, they argued, the government should deal with them as individuals rather than as members of discrete social and political groups.⁹ Separate governmental and landholding status, federally-supplied services, and the continuation of the BIA itself violated a politico-economic system based upon individual property rights and private enterprise that conservatives saw as the foundation of the American system. They considered their

effort to be one of liberating Indians from government paternalism in order to enjoy the freedoms that could result only from the ability to compete as individuals within an unfettered marketplace.¹⁰

Other determinants in changing the direction of federal Indian policy came from factors arising outside Native American communities. The West experienced a tremendous postwar economic boom, and farming, stockraising, lumber, mining, manufacturing, and service industries schemed for possession of every available piece of unused land.¹¹ Terminationists wanted to ease private access to Indian trust lands where some of the West's last remaining resources were located. In addition, rapid economic development in the West stimulated growth by state and local governments, which in turn sought new sources of revenue to pay for escalating administrative and operating expenses. Changing the status of Indian lands to make them taxable seemed for a time a likely and attractive way of raising money.¹² Lastly, federal budget considerations played a role. Conservatives emphasized a reduction in social spending, and since federal withdrawal would cut spending on reservations, terminationist policies fit neatly within a larger plan for reducing federal expenditures. Since most politicians had little interest in Indian affairs, being preoccupied with other issues important to a complex society with worldwide commitments, policy was influenced more by these outside factors than on a careful assessment of Indian needs and desires.¹³

Terminationist goals and assumptions guided the initial creation of the relocation policy and defined its nature throughout the 1950s. Immediately after World War II the BIA responded to the continuing demand for assistance in finding jobs in cities by working out cooperative arrangements with the United States Employment Service.¹⁴ But the important catalyst for a postwar relocation program came in the winter of 1947–48 when major winter blizzards hit the Navajo and Hopi reservations. Only a massive government airlift prevented widespread starvation among people who were already among America's most needy. The incident proved to be an embarrassment for the government, rekindling longstanding controversies about policies toward the poor in general and Indians in particular. The publicity undoubtedly helped the 1950 passage of the Navajo-Hopi, or Long Range, Act, a ten-year almost \$90 million rehabilitation effort.¹⁵ In many ways that legislation violated terminationist goals and more closely resembled the development-on-Indian-terms theme of the 1930s and 1960s and 70s. But terminationists drew out of the experience a rationalization for their own brand of relocation.

Shortly after the near catastrophe, the Department of the Interior launched an investigation into conditions among the Navajos and

Hopis which concluded that chronic poverty resulted from a land base that could support only 35,000 of the area's 55,000 inhabitants. This "surplus population" theory was based on outdated BIA resource surveys but in the case of the desolated Navajo and Hopi reservations may have been justified.¹⁶ Throughout the 1950s terminationists applied this notion to all tribes.¹⁷ The Navajo-Hopi Act included job placement services to locate Indians in the Denver, Salt Lake City, or Los Angeles areas, initially placing most people in seasonal harvesting work.¹⁸ The pattern had been set for a relocation program that terminationists could promote as an alternative to more costly efforts to improve the economic status of Native Americans. Moving Indians into cities was much less expensive and involved a smaller federal role than the other generally-recognized option for reservation rehabilitation typified by the Navajo-Hopi Act. Some noted that relocation amounted to individual termination since Native Americans no longer qualified for federal services once off their reservations.¹⁹

The first commissioner of Indian affairs vigorously supportive of termination was Dillon Myer. He was appointed by President Harry Truman in 1950 at a time when federal Indian policy was in transition with terminationist strength growing but not yet sufficient to set the agenda entirely. Myer promoted relocation as part of a terminationist package, but his success was always limited by weak support in Congress. For example, he appealed to legislators for more funding for the program, arguing that future savings would outweigh the additional costs. But economy-minded appropriations subcommittees were in the mood to slash rather than increase programs and would not go along.²⁰ Myer then did as much as he could to fulfill his goals administratively. In 1951 he began expanding the relocation program beyond the Navajo and Hopi, assigning staff people to work in areas of high Indian population such as New Mexico, Arizona, California, Utah, and Colorado as well as opening field offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, and Denver. He publicly announced his program in early 1952, calling it Operation Relocation, and the first permanent relocatees from a variety of tribes began moving to cities with government assistance.²¹

The victory of Dwight Eisenhower as president and Republican majorities in both houses of Congress in the election of 1952 vastly strengthened the position of terminationists. In October of 1953 Assistant Interior Secretary Orme Lewis appointed a group of businessmen under the leadership of Phoenix banker Walter Bimson to devise a plan to implement federal withdrawal from Indian affairs and to trim the BIA's budget to conform with the administration's emphasis on reduced government spending. The Bimson team rec-

ommended expanded use of relocation, emphasizing the possibility of long-term cost savings.²²

President Eisenhower chose conservative New Mexico banker Glenn Emmons to be his commissioner of Indian affairs. When Emmons assumed office, the BIA was helping move about 2600 Indians annually to Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, and Salt Lake City. Following the advice of the Bimson team, the new commissioner vigorously promoted relocation. He tried to convince Congress to increase funding for the program on the promise of eventual savings but encountered the same reluctance that Myer had experienced several years earlier. Emmons then began expanding relocation using existing resources. However, in the long term this helped create conditions that many would later criticize as revealing a greater interest in ridding the government of an unwanted responsibility than in improving the status of Native Americans.²³

For example, the BIA expanded its recruitment activities. Indians typically learned of the program either from relocation officers stationed on most reservations or from literature distributed in places commonly frequented by Native Americans. The initial appeal was directed toward the hope of a material prosperity that few Indians enjoyed. Brochures with pictures of contented Indian men working at good jobs or of women standing next to big appliances like televisions or refrigerators naturally enticed those unaccustomed to such amenities.²⁴

Bureau officials denied the existence of quotas, but the way relocation officers were encouraged and pressured to enlist as many people as possible suggested that the greatest emphasis was on quantity. One officer later reported that his superiors threatened to abolish his office because he was not recruiting enough Indians. In another case a middle-aged woman accompanied her daughter to visit a relocation officer, who then convinced the woman to relocate as well in order to be with her daughter in case she experienced difficulty in making the move. The BIA contended that it carefully screened applicants to weed out those unlikely to make a successful adjustment to life in the city, but the process was oftentimes haphazard and far less than selective.²⁵ One former bureau official at the Winnebago agency noted that "everyone was jumping on the bandwagon." Officers literally rounded people up in trucks by simply asking them "do you want to go to California or somewhere to get a job?"²⁶

For most the decision to relocate was not a selection between various viable life alternatives but rather a desperate last resort. Many moved when there seemed to be no other escape from the many personal, family, and financial problems that are the concomitants of reservation and rural poverty.²⁷ The case of a niece of prominent

Choctaw leader Harry Belvin was all too typical. When her husband lost his job and a loan could not be obtained, the couple and their six children applied for relocation.²⁸

As a result of the recruitment tactics and the lack of other choices in life, many Native Americans found themselves in distant cities even though they were ill-prepared to make the transition or to hold a job. There were numerous cases of people with little education, poor eyesight and no glasses to correct their vision, drinking problems, criminal records, a limited ability to speak English, a lack of job skills, or various health problems. Most had little notion of what to expect and set out with insufficient money and little more than the clothes on their backs.²⁹ The BIA during the early 1950s offered only a bare minimum of assistance from an overworked and undermanned staff. Relocates received limited counseling in life within a non-Indian, urban environment, including how to use a city map, call on a telephone, use a checking account, make and live within a budget, or purchase goods at a supermarket or large department store. About twenty-five percent of the least affluent also received a small amount of material aid, usually in the form of money to transport family and household goods or to live on until a job could be found.³⁰

The next step after arriving in the city was to find a place to live. The BIA assisted in locating a person's or a family's first housing, and since accommodations had to fit within the bureau's aid package and Indian incomes, many ended up in lower-class neighborhoods.³¹ Tribal leaders frequently received complaints from relocates or their families about how "most in the first place went to skid row sections"³² or were moved into "slum areas."³³ Oftentimes the bureau moved Indians into large, high-rise apartment complexes, and many could not adjust to the crowded, confined setting after a life on a much more sparsely-populated, rural reservation.³⁴

The BIA also helped in finding a Native American's first job. Some undoubtedly found satisfying and permanent employment, but many were disappointed that the positions they received were not what they had been led to expect. Most jobs available to unskilled Indians were at the bottom of the wage and status scale.³⁵ One relocatee in Denver found himself working in a junkyard along with several other recently-arrived Indians and noted sarcastically that, "heck, if I wanted to work in a junkyard, I could've stayed at home. . . . There's junked cars at home."³⁶ Sometimes the anticipated employment did not materialize after moving. A Sioux from Pine Ridge, South Dakota, could find only temporary work rather than the position he thought he had been promised, and after weeks of walking the streets in search of a job, he finally returned home.³⁷ Jobs were notoriously insecure. If a

relocatee lost his or her first position, finding another and even subsisting from day to day could be difficult since the assistance of the BIA ended after locating housing and employment upon arrival.³⁸

The obstacles in the way of success all too often proved overwhelming. Some experienced racial discrimination in housing, in social life, or on the job. For example, a Wahpeton Sioux, who atypically was a union carpenter, reported that in California ethnic groups such as Italians and Arkies (refugees from the Arkansas dust bowl and depression conditions in the 1930s) were given preference over Indians and Mexicans within his trade.³⁹ Cultural dislocation was perhaps the greatest problem. The fast-paced, competitive existence in cities represented a dramatic departure from the collective, tribal world to which most were accustomed. Many became homesick for families and communities.⁴⁰ A former relocation officer later summarized the situation well when he described the difficulty experienced by an Indian who "has never been permanently employed, has never looked at a clock, and is expected with a week's counseling or three weeks' counseling to go out and face the world."⁴¹

Many of those that could not adjust to urban life returned home. Since most had exhausted BIA aid by this time and since that aid did not include transportation home, there were numerous stories of desperate calls to families, requesting money or a ride back to the reservation. It was not unusual for family members to travel cross-country to return a relocatee who had hit rock bottom and had no where to turn.⁴²

The return rate was always a matter of controversy and embarrassment for the BIA. The bureau tried to discourage returns by moving Indians to cities furthest from their homes. It also sometimes refused to give out names and addresses of Native Americans in the same vicinity to one another since association would encourage Indian cultural contacts and identification rather than the desired assimilation.⁴³ The BIA claimed that only thirty percent of relocatees ever returned to reservations, but critics contended that the number was much higher. The United States Comptroller General criticized the bureau for not keeping adequate statistics so the correct figure could be determined and the program accurately analyzed, but in response the agency ceased the collection of data altogether, maintaining that it only provided critics with ammunition.⁴⁴

Not all of those who wanted to return home could find a means of doing so. Many simply became a part of America's inner-city underclass, struggling to survive and frequently becoming new additions to the statistics that described the various responses to poverty and cultural alienation. Trouble with the law oftentimes resulted. Drun-

kenness was the most common reason for arrest but not the only one.⁴⁵ In one instance a Brule Sioux was caught along with another man burning the insulation off wire taken from a construction site in order to sell the copper.⁴⁶

By 1956 the Indian policies of the Eisenhower administration were becoming controversial and increasingly unpopular among Native Americans. Termination was for all practical purposes dead politically. Since it was associated with termination, relocation would also become the target of criticism and questioning. Within the Indian community this was most vividly seen in a series of regional conferences Commissioner Emmons held during the last half of 1956 with representatives of most tribal groups. Indian leaders voiced a number of grievances directed at both specific provisions within the program and its overall impact. Among other things, spokesmen criticized the bureau's recruitment tactics, the low level of assistance money, substandard living conditions, and the low level of jobs usually found for relocatees. Many expressed concern about the effect of relocation on tribal communities. The BIA made it easy for Indians to remove their land allotments from trust status immediately after leaving reservations. This further eroded the Indian land base since non-Indians were usually better able to purchase fee patented land. It also exacerbated the "checkerboard" problem of Indian and non-Indian land as it became so intermingled that it was impossible for Native Americans to muster blocks of reservation land for tribal enterprises.⁴⁷ Some noted how the program removed the most likely candidates for positions of social and economic leadership since the youngest and most skilled tended to relocate in disproportionate numbers, leaving an unbalanced population of those least able to make a tribe economically viable.⁴⁸

Some of the criticism leveled against relocation came from white liberals. An article by Ruth Mulvey Harmer entitled "Uprooting the Indians" appeared in *Atlantic Monthly* in March, 1956, and told of very bleak conditions confronting relocatees after moving to the cities.⁴⁹ That same month "The Raid on the Reservations" by Dorothy Van De Mark in *Harper's Magazine* described relocation as a policy motivated by the drive to remove Indians from their land so non-Indians could get it.⁵⁰ Both found a wide audience, and hereafter Emmons was frequently on the defensive, forced to respond publicly to angry questions from Native Americans aroused by the articles.⁵¹

Throughout the 1950s the policy alternative advocated by critics consisted of programs to encourage greater economic development of reservation communities through federal commitments to tribe-by-tribe rehabilitation typified in the Navajo-Hopi Act and to tribal enterprises run by and for Indians. The latter had been attempted to

a limited extent during the 1930s while Collier was commissioner, and during World War II the government had created some employment on reservations by setting up factories to produce certain war goods. As attacks on termination escalated, the call for more emphasis on developing reservation resources rather than trying to move Indians away from their land bases grew louder. Many tribal representatives at the 1956 regional conferences concluded that the money appropriated for relocation could be better spent on rehabilitating reservations so Indians could make a living in their homelands.⁵² Omaha tribal chairman Gus White pointed to the government factories that had employed Native Americans in the construction of aircraft during World War II and asked "Why can't the government do this in peace time the same as in war?"⁵³ Emmons was trying to bring jobs to reservations by offering economic incentives to outside businessmen in return for locating in Indian communities. But the program was experiencing little success, and congressional opponents gained an ever wider audience in demanding more vigorous action.

Emmons wanted to avoid a program that would cost more and lead to a more prominent federal role, and responded to growing criticism and agitation for reservation development by stepping up his commitment to relocation since it stood as the administration's primary policy alternative regarding the issue of improving Indian economics.⁵⁴ He altered the bureau structure to reflect the new emphasis by reorganizing several of its offices, creating a Division of Tribal Program and Relocation headed by an assistant commissioner. He also convinced Congress to more than triple the funding available for relocation. In late 1956 the BIA opened new offices in St. Louis, San Francisco, and San Jose. And in what was undoubtedly a response to recent attacks on the meager assistance given to relocatees, the bureau also expanded aid by making small grants available for the purchase of household goods, furniture, clothing, and one year of medical insurance.⁵⁵

Not everyone condemned relocation, and many of those who did quarreled only with some of the details or the way the program had been too closely structured to meet terminationist goals. At the commissioner's regional conferences in 1956 many had expressed approval of the program or prefaced their criticism with statements agreeing with the general concept.⁵⁶ Some saw relocation as an important option in the quest for upward mobility, others as the price necessary for physical survival or the only short-term way out of reservation problems.⁵⁷ Even congressional critics of the Eisenhower administration's Indian policies generally supported an altered relocation effort. Indian and non-Indian critics alike recognized the dichotomous

sentiments on reservations, with some people choosing to assimilate and others to live a more traditional existence. Most advocated a policy that made both options fully available without having to live in poverty.

A measure before Congress in the summer of 1956 revealed rare agreement between the two sides struggling to control federal Indian policy. Conservative E. Y. Berry of South Dakota and liberal Stewart Udall of Arizona co-sponsored legislation to subsidize Indian trade or vocational education for up to two years. Most Native Americans and liberal critics of terminationist policies welcomed any economic aid to Indians at a time when the administration was cutting the budgets of social programs. They saw the bill as a reshaping of a failed relocation effort into something more in tune with their own philosophy. Terminationists saw it as furthering their own relocation policy: their program of incentives to attract outside businesses would be enhanced by the payment of tuition and expenses in trade schools in cities where Indians relocated and would also subsidize on-the-job training for Native Americans employed in factories established on or near reservations. With such widespread support, the measure easily became Public Law 959 in August of 1956.⁵⁸

The next year saw an even more intense battle over the direction of Indian policy. The 1956 elections had eroded Republican strength in Congress, and as the new session began in 1957, liberals replaced conservatives in key positions on committees dealing with Indian affairs.⁵⁹ This gave the opposition a much improved opportunity to promote its proposals for more vigorous federal rehabilitation efforts on reservations. In the face of increasing agitation for more expensive projects, Emmons expanded his own programs still further in hopes of achieving some improvement that could be pointed to in the escalating debate. The BIA opened new relocation offices in Dallas, Texas, and in Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio. It also established offices in Joliet and Waukegan, Illinois, as an experiment to determine if relocation to smaller cities would result in a less severe cultural shock and thus a higher rate of permanent adjustment.⁶⁰

But this was not enough to counterbalance blows dealt to the program by the national economy. The severe recession of 1957 made it difficult for the bureau to find jobs for Indians.⁶¹ The number of Native Americans interested in relocating dwindled and the program languished throughout the remainder of the decade.

In the 1960 election Democrats swept Republicans out of the White House and strengthened their lead in Congress as well. They immediately began steering federal Indian policy in a new direction characterized by a willingness to spend more money on Indian problems

and to work within the context of traditional cultures. This constituted a virtual repudiation of the termination and federal withdrawal themes of the 1950s. The new commissioner of Indian affairs, Philileo Nash, revitalized relocation and also altered it to conform to the new governing philosophy. The BIA changed the name of the program to employment assistance since the title relocation had been so closely linked with termination policies that by this time had become controversial and discredited. The bureau also placed more emphasis on job training, and congressional appropriations for all phases of the program increased.⁶² Together with improvements in the national economy, the changes helped the program rebound. It became somewhat less controversial within Indian communities, and by 1968 over 10,000 Native Americans were relocating each year.⁶³

When used in the 1950s primarily as an alternative to reservation economic development, relocation failed to achieve most of its intended goals. Rather than dramatically reduce a federal social program, the attempt to depopulate reservations as fast and as inexpensively as possible actually contributed to a reversal of policy toward a more profound government commitment by creating conditions that critics could point to as examples of overall failure. Neither did it result in the cultural assimilation of Native Americans to any great extent. Instead, pan-Indian social institutions developed in cities that would eventually serve as the foundation for political activism based on Native American identity. It was only slightly more successful in the goal of improving the economic status of Indians. Numerous studies have appeared analyzing the economic impact of relocation, and most have agreed that those who stayed in cities were only marginally more prosperous than those on reservations once the higher cost of living in urban areas was factored into the economic equation. Most also concluded that certain categories benefited far more than others. People with existing job skills or experience off the reservation fared better. In other words, the more assimilated an Indian was in the first place, the greater were his chances to succeed on relocation.⁶⁴

NOTES

1. Elaine M. Neils, *Reservation to City: Indian Migration and Federal Relocation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Geography Department, 1971, p. 1.

2. For discussions of the relationship between federal relocation and recent pan-Indian activism see Joan Ablon, "Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Area: Social Interaction and Indian Identity," *Human Organization* 23 (Winter, 1964), pp. 296–304; James R. Wagner and Richard Corrigan, "BIA Brings Indians to Cities but Has Few Urban Services," *National Journal* 2 (July 11, 1970), pp. 1496–98; and Michael Harris, "American Cities: The New Reservations," *City* 5 (March–April, 1971), p. 46.

3. Neils, *Reservation to City*, p. 17.
4. Lewis Meriam, ed., *The Problems of Indian Administration*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, Institute for Government Research, 1928, pp. 21, 88.
5. James E. Officer, "The American Indian and Federal Policy," in *The American Indian in Urban Society*, ed. Jack O. Waddell and O. Michael Watson, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971, p. 59; Wagner and Corrigan, "BIA Brings Indians to Cities," p. 1495.
6. U.S., Department of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, "Annual Report," in *Annual Report of the Department of the Interior*, 1944, p. 238.
7. S. Lyman Tyler, "The Recent Urbanization of the American Indian," in *Essays on the American West, 1973-1974*, ed. Thomas G. Alexander, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1975, p. 44.
8. An example of the comparison of Indian communal social structure with international communism can be found in a speech by Senator George Malone of Nevada in the *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, 99, pp. 10294.
9. A statement summarizing conservative attitudes on the sovereignty question made by Arthur V. Watkins, the Senate's leading terminationist, can be found in U.S., Congress, *Termination of Federal Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians: Joint Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, on S. 2749 and H.R. 7322*, Part 5, 1954, p. 457; Dillon S. Myer, "Indian Administration: Problems and Goals," *Social Service Review* 27 (June, 1953), p. 193.
10. An early expression of the "liberation" view of Indian policy by a former Republican representative from Missouri appears in O.K. Armstrong, "Set the American Indian Free," *Reader's Digest* (August, 1945), pp. 47-51. A similar analysis by Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn Emmons over a decade later can be found in an outline the commissioner made of a proposed book entitled *Freedom for First Americans*, Folder 15, Box V, Glen Emmons Papers (GEP), University of New Mexico General Library (UNMGL).
11. Gerald D. Nash, *The American West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban Oasis*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977, pp. 197-212.
12. Glen E. Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," *Utah Law Review* 1966 (July, 1966), p. 132.
13. Myer, "Indian Administration," pp. 194-99; Neils, *Reservation to City*, p. 46.
14. Tyler, "The Recent Urbanization of the American Indian," p. 44.
15. Dennis Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," pp. 6-7, Box—Urban and Rural Indians, American Indian Policy Review Commission (AIPRC), Record Group (RG) 220, National Archives (NA); J. Leiper Freeman, "Chapter Nine: The Bureau of Indian Affairs" (part of an administrative history of the Department of the Interior), n.d., pp. 25-27, Box—BIA-Histories, Reports, AIPRC, RG 220, NA; Robert W. Young, *The Navajo Yearbook: 1951-1961, A Decade of Progress*, Window Rock, Arizona: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1961, p. 1.
16. "The Bureau of Indian Affairs Voluntary Relocation Program," found in BIA to Sarah McClendon, March 16, 1959, p. 2, Folder 14, Box IV, GEP, UNMGL; Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 7.
17. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," pp. 8-9; For examples of the general application of the "surplus population" theory see Myer, "Indian Administration," p. 198; Howard Pyle, Deputy Assistant to the President, to Mrs. Julian Griggs, April 10, 1956, Folder 121 (2)—Indians, Official File (OF), Central Files (CF), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL); and U.S., Comptroller General of the United States, *Audit Report to the Congress of the United States, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, For the Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 1952 and 1953*, p. 50, Folder 4-B—Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1953-1955, Box 117, OF, CF, DDEL.
18. Tyler, "The Recent Urbanization of the American Indian," p. 44.
19. *Congressional Record*, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102, pp. 379-80; Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," pp. 13, 16.

20. Myer, "Indian Administration," p. 199; Officer, "The American Indian and Federal Policy," p. 46.

21. Tyler, "The Recent Urbanization of the American Indian," p. 44; Patricia K. Ourada, "Dillon Seymour Myer, 1950–53," in *The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824–1977*, ed. Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979, p. 295.

22. Glenn Emmons, "Talk by Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn L. Emmons to the Central Office Staff of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," December 21, 1953, p. 5, transcript in Folder 12, Box II, GEP, UNMGL; A copy of the Bimson Report can be found in House Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs, *Survey Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs*, Committee Print 14, January 26, 1954, Box—BIA-Histories, Reports, AIPRC, RG 220, NA.

23. Comptroller General, *Audit Report, 1952 and 1953*, pp. 50–51; U.S., Congress, Senate, *Interior Department Appropriations for 1955: Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 8680*, 1954, p. 757; U.S., Department of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, "Annual Report," *Secretary of the Interior Annual Reports*, 1956, p. 214.

24. LaVerne Madigan, *The American Indian Relocation Program*, New York: American Association of Indian Affairs, 1956, pp. 10–11; *The New York Times*, December 16, 1956, p. 75; Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 29.

25. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 28; Herbert Hoover interview with Gordon Jones, June 2, 1971, tape 684, pp. 17–19, and Stephen Ward interview with Muriel Waukazoo, July 13, 1972, tape 853, pp. 13–14, transcripts in the South Dakota Oral History Center (SDOHC), University of South Dakota (USD).

26. Herbert Hoover interview with Alfred DuBray, July 28, 1970, tape 0533, p. 26, SDOHC, USD.

27. For discussions on the relationship between problems related to poverty and the decision to relocate see Ablon, "Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area," p. 297; Mary Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas: A Second Trail of Tears?" *Oral History Review* 1973, pp. 54–55; and John A. Price, "The Migration and Adaptation of American Indians to Los Angeles," *Human Organization* 27 (Summer, 1968), p. 171.

28. General Session, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi Conference, Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, p. 48, Folder 8, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

29. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 28; Harris, "American Cities," p. 45; U.S., Comptroller General of the United States, *Report to the Congress of the United States: Administration of Withdrawal Activities by Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior*, March, 1958, pp. 24–25.

30. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 31; Madigan, *American Indian Relocation Program*, pp. 10–12; U.S., Department of the Interior, "Annual Report," *Secretary of the Interior Annual Reports*, 1954, p. 24.

31. For general discussions of housing and neighborhoods see Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas," p. 55; Wagner and Corrigan, "BIA Brings Indians to Cities," p. 1496; and Stan Steiner, *The New Indians*, New York: Delta, 1968, p. 180–81.

32. Anonymous interview by Joseph Cash (restricted use), August 25, 1967, tape 0018, p. 39, SDOHC, USD.

33. Pine Ridge meeting with Glenn Emmons, Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, p. 20, Folder 2, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

34. Cynthia Kelsey interview with Naomi Warren LaDue, August 14, 1968, tape 224, SDOHC, USD.

35. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 12; Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas," p. 55; Price, "Migration to Los Angeles," p. 172.

36. Gerald Wolff interview with Alfred Ziegler, August 24, 1971, tape 785, p. 25, SDOHC, USD.

37. Gerald Wolff interview with Lenora DeWitt, August 25, 1971, tape 786, p. 14, SDOHC, USD.

38. Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 44; Ablon, "Relocated Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area," pp. 297-98.

39. Vince E. Pratt interview with Oliver D. Eastman, August 3, 1971, tape 768, p. 13, SDOHC, USD.

40. Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas," p. 55; Ablon, "Relocated Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area," pp. 296-97; Joan Ablon, "American Indian Relocation: Problems of Dependency and Management in the City," *Phylon* 26 (Winter, 1965), pp. 363-64, 368; Willard Fraser interview with Eloise Pease, September 10, 1970, tape 599, p. 9, SDOHC, USD.

41. Herbert Hoover interview with Gordon Jones, June 2, 1971, tape 684, p. 16, SDOHC, USD.

42. Pine Ridge meeting with Emmons, p. 20; Wagner and Corrigan, "BIA Brings Indians to Cities," pp. 1496-97.

43. Pratt interview with Eastman, p. 13.

44. Alan Sorkin interview with BIA Employment Assistance Officer, July, 1968, quoted in Alan Sorkin, *American Indians and Federal Aid*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971, p. 121.

45. Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas," pp. 56-57; Paul A. Brinker and Benjamin J. Taylor, "Southern Plains Indian Relocation Returnees," *Human Organization* 33 (Summer, 1974), p. 142; Theodore D. Graves, "The Personal Adjustment of Navajo Indian Migrants to Denver, Colorado," *American Anthropologist* 72 (February, 1970), pp. 37-38.

46. Wolff interview with DeWitt, p. 13.

47. Final General Session, Billings Area Conference, Folder 10, p. 5, Pine Ridge meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 2, pp. 20-21, Lower Brule meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 2, pp. 4-5, and General Session, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi Conference, Folder 8, p. 48, all found in Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

48. Taos Pueblo meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 5, p. 13, Jemez Pueblo meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 5, pp. 6-7, and Winnebago meeting with Glen Emmons, Folder 1, pp. 3-4, all found in Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

49. Ruth Mulvey Harmer, "Uprooting the Indian," *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1956, pp. 54-57.

50. Dorothy Van de Mark, "The Raid on the Reservation," *Harper's Magazine*, March, 1956, pp. 48-53.

51. Turtle Mountain meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 1, p. 7, and Flathead meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 10, p. 1, both found in Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

52. Final General Session, Billings Area Conference, Folder 10, p. 4, General Session, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi Conference, Folder 8, p. 48, Nambo Pueblo and Tesuque Pueblo meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 5, p. 17, and McDermitt meeting with Glenn Emmons, Folder 3, p. 79, all found in Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

53. Question and Discussion Period, First Aberdeen Area Session, Minutes: Tribal Area Conferences, 1956, p. 25, Folder 1, Box III, GEP, UNMGL.

54. Peter Dorner, "Needed: A New Policy for the American Indians," *Land Economics* 37 (1961), p. 167.

55. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, "Annual Report," 1956, p. 231; Carroll, "Relocation and the Urban Indian," p. 21; "Bureau of Indian Affairs Voluntary Relocation Program," in BIA to Sarah McClendon, p. 6.

56. General Session, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi Conference, *passim*.

57. Patrick, "Indian Urbanization in Dallas," pp. 55, 60.

58. U.S., Congress, House, *Providing Vocational Training for Adult Indians*, H. Rept. 2532 to Accompany H.R. 9904, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, pp. 1-2; U.S., Congress, Senate, *Relative to Employment for Certain Adult Indians On or Near Reservations*, S.

Rept. 2264 to Accompany S. 3416, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, pp. 2–3; Carroll, “Relocation and the Urban Indian,” pp. 18–21.

59. For example, in the Senate liberal James E. Murray of Montana replaced conservative George Malone of Nevada as chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and liberal Richard Neuberger of Oregon replaced conservative Arthur V. Watkins as head of the Indians Affairs Subcommittee.

60. “Bureau of Indian Affairs Voluntary Relocation Program,” in BIA to Sarah McClendon, p. 3; Neils, *Reservation to City*, p. 58.

61. William Metzler, “Relocation of the Displaced Worker,” *Human Organization* 22 (Summer, 1963), p. 143.

62. U.S., Department of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “Annual Report,” *Secretary of the Interior Annual Reports*, 1961, p. 277; S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, 1973, pp. 201–3.

63. Statistics on the number of Native Americans participating in relocation through 1970 can be found in Neils, *Reservation to City*, p. 55.

64. For examples of analyses of the economic impact of relocation see James H. Gundlach and Alden E. Roberts, “Native American Indian Migration and Relocation: Success or Failure?” *Pacific Sociological Review* 21 (January, 1978), pp. 122–26; Brinker and Taylor, “Southern Plains Indian Relocation Returnees,” p. 145; and Lawrence Clinton, Bruce A. Chadwick, and Howard M. Bahr, “Urban Relocation Reconsidered: Antecedents of Employment Among Indian Males,” *Rural Sociology* 40 (Summer, 1975), pp. 130–1.