Immigration policies

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Migration importance in the U.S.

- The importance of international migration to current and future policy challenges faced by the United States can hardly be overstated
- Migrants have been and will continue to be the primary driver of U.S. population growth throughout the 21st century
- They are shaping critical policy questions pertaining to the changing demographic landscape of the urban future as well as the overall population challenge of achieving an equitable society

Policies and society

 Immigration policy affects, and is affected by, many aspects of society, both within the United States, as well as across other countries

• E.g. economic growth, labor markets, demographics, health, education, criminal justice, national security, border security (Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

• Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875

• Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920

- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
 - Several changes to immigration law after 1980

U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

• Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875

- Federal, state, and local governments, private employers, shipping companies and railroads, and churches promoted immigration to the United States
- Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920
 - Congress barred the entry of convicts and prostitutes in 1875
 - Immigration Act of 1882 for the first time prohibited immigration from China, which continued for most of the next 60 years
 - Immigrants from eastern and southern Europe aroused fear and hostility among Protestants and rural Americans
 - Laws instituted literacy tests beginning in 1897

U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
 - In 1921, Congress imposed the first quantitative restrictions on immigration, limiting arrivals of the foreign-born persons of each nationality present in the U.S.
 - Quotas were applied only to the Eastern Hemisphere
 - In the 1960s, the civil rights movement highlighted government discrimination against nonwhites, which affected policies
 - Quantitative restrictions were placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere

Immigration reforms, 1980–1990

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- 1980: U.S. adopted UN definition of refugee
 - Person outside her or his country of citizenship and unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to the person's race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion
- 1986: Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
 - Bargain between those who wanted to prevent more illegal migration
 - And those who wanted to legalize the status of illegal foreigners who had put down roots in the U.S.
- 1990: Congress enacted the Immigration Act (IMMACT)
 - Due to economic boom, more than doubled the number of immigrant visas available for foreigners requested by U.S. employers
 - Set the annual ceiling of 675,000 immigrants a year

Major laws in 1996

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDPA)
 - It made easier to detain immigrants convicted of U.S. crimes without bail and to deport them after they had served their sentences
- Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
 - It made most legal immigrants ineligible for federal welfare benefits
- Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
 - It included measures to reduce illegal migration (e.g., border patrol)
 - It introduced a system by which employers could check whether newly hired workers were legally authorized to work in the U.S.
 - U.S. sponsors were required to have an income at least 125% the poverty line

The role of the state

(Massey 1999)

- Theories of international migration have not emphasized the nation-state as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration
- Attention has focused primarily on immigrantreceiving countries
- Little has been written about the regulation of emigration in countries of origin
- The state's role either in promoting or in limiting international migration is poorly understood and lacks adequate theoretical background

Efficacy of immigration restriction

(Massey 1999)

- Little research has been done outside North America to evaluate the efficacy of restrictive policies
- The efficacy of restriction is likely to vary substantially from country to country depending on 5 factors
 - Relative power and autonomy of state bureaucracy
 - Relative number of people seeking to immigrate
 - Degree to which political rights of citizens and noncitizens are constitutionally guaranteed
 - Relative independence of the judiciary
 - Existence and strength of an indigenous tradition of immigration

Types of state capacity

(Massey 1999)

- Continuum of state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies
- Centralized authoritarian governments: lack of an independent judiciary and a well-established regime of constitutional protections; no tradition on immigration; oil-exporting countries in Persian Gulf
- **Democratic states:** with strong and centralized bureaucracies; moderate demand for entry; little native tradition of immigration; Western Europe and East Asia
- Countries that lack highly centralized state: with strong traditions of individual liberty; long-standing cultures of immigration; U.S., Canada and Australia

State capacity

TABLE 1Conceptual classification of factors affecting state capacity toimplement restrictive immigration policies

	Strength of bureaucracy	Demand for entry	Strength of constitutional protections	Independence of judiciary	Tradition of immigration	Continuum of state capacity
Relationship to state capacity:	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	
Kuwait	High	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	High
Singapore	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	
Britain	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Low	I
Switzerland	High	Moderate	High	High	Low	I
Germany	High	High	High	High	Low	I
France	High	High	High	High	Moderate	I
Argentina	Low	High	Moderate	Moderate	High	I
Spain	Low	Moderate	High	High	Low	I
Canada	High	High	High	High	High	I
United States	Moderate	High	High	High	High	Low

Policies not based on evidence

(Massey, Pren 2012)

 Even when policies respond to changes in immigration, they are usually not based on understanding the driving forces of international migration

 These policies are usually shaped by economic circumstances, political ideologies, and symbolic significance of immigrants presented by the media, politicians, and legislators

Policies shaped immigration


(Massey, Pren 2012)

Bracero Program

- Temporary labor program that admitted short-term foreign workers in the country. Created in 1942.
 Expanded in 2nd half of 1950s. Terminated in 1968.
- Illegal immigration increased after this period, not because of an unexpected surge in Mexican migration
- The end of this labor program and limitations on the number of available permanent resident visas made it impossible to accommodate the previously established inflows of migrants

Mexican immigration to the U.S.

FIGURE 1 Mexican immigration to the United States in three categories, 1955–95



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.4.


Response to illegal migration (Massey, Pren 2012)

 Increase in illegal migration until late 1970s shaped policy responses in the following years

• Politicians and political activists framed the Latino immigration as a threat to the country

Media & Mexican immigration

FIGURE 2 Frequency of pairing of the terms "flood," "crisis," or "invasion" with "Mexico" or "Mexican immigrants," in four leading US newspapers (three-year moving average), 1965–1995



SOURCE: Proquest Historical Newspaper Files.

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.7.

Immigration legislation

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- This process resulted on restrictionist immigration legislation and more rigorous enforcement policies
- The militarization of the border began in 1986 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
- It increased by 50% the enforcement budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Other policies increased border enforcement in the following decades...

TABLE 1 Restrictive immigration legislation enacted by Congress affecting Latin Americans, 1965–2010

1965	Hart–Cellar Act Imposed first-ever annual cap of 120,000 visas for immigrants from Western Hemisphere
1976	Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act Put Western Hemisphere under preference system and country quotas
1978	Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act Combined separate hemispheric caps into single worldwide ceiling of 290,000
1980	Refugee Act Abolished refugee preference and reduced worldwide ceiling to 270,000
1986	Immigration Reform and Control Act Criminalized undocumented hiring and authorized expansion of Border Patrol
1990	Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act Sought to cap visas going to spouse and children of resident aliens
1996	Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Authorized expedited removal of noncitizens and deportation of aggravated felons
1996	Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Increased resources for border enforcement, narrowed criteria for asylum, and increased income threshold required to sponsor immigrants
1996	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act Declared documented and undocumented migrants ineligible for certain entitlements
1997	Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act Allowed registered asylum seekers from Central America (mostly Nicara- guans) in the US for at least 5 years since December 1, 1995 to obtain legal status; but prohibited legalization and ordered deportation for those who lacked a valid visa or who previously violated US immigration laws (mostly Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans)
2001	USA PATRIOT Act Created Department of Homeland Security, increased funding for surveil- lance and deportation of foreigners, and authorized deportation of noncitizens without due process
2004	National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act Funded new equipment, aircraft, Border Patrol agents, immigration investi- gators, and detention centers for border enforcement
2005	Real ID Act Sharply increased the data requirements, documentation, and verification procedures for state issuance of drivers licenses
2006	Secure Fence Act Authorized construction of additional fencing, vehicle barriers, checkpoints, lighting and funding for new cameras, satellites, and unmanned drones for border enforcement
2010	Border Security Act Funded hiring 3,000 more Border Patrol agents and increased BP budget by \$244 million



Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.10.

TABLE 2 Restrictive enforcement operations launched by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Department of Homeland Security 1993–2010


1993	Operation Blockade Border Patrol's (BP) militarization of the El Paso Sector		
1994	Operation Gatekeeper BP's militarization of the San Diego Sector		
1998	Operation Rio Grande BP program to restrict the movement of migrants across the Texas and New Mexico border with Mexico		
1999	Operation Safeguard BP's militarization of the Tucson Sector		
2003	Operation Endgame Plan launched by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport all removable noncitizens and "suspected terrorists" living in the United States		
2004	Operation Frontline Program launched by ICE to address "vulnerabilities in immigration and trade" by focusing on immigration violators who pose an "enhanced public safety or national security threat"		
2004	Arizona Border Control Initiative Multi-agency effort supporting Homeland Security's anti-terrorism mission through the detection, arrest, and deterrence of all persons engaged in cross- border illicit activity		
2004	Operation Stonegarden Federal grant program administered through the State Homeland Security Grant Program to provide funding to state and local agencies to improve im- migration enforcement		
2005	Secure Borders Initiative Comprehensive multi-year plan launched by ICE to secure America's bor- ders and reduce illegal migration		
2005	Operation Streamline Program mandating criminal charges for illegal migrants, including first-time offenders		
2006	Operation Return to Sender Sweep of illegal immigrants by ICE to detain those deemed most dangerous including convicted felons, gang members, and repeat illegal immigrants		
2006	Operation Jump Start Program authorizing the deployment of National Guard troops along the US-Mexico border		
2007	Secure Communities Program ICE program to identify and deport criminal noncitizens arrested by state and local authorities		
2007	Operation Rapid REPAT Program to Remove Eligible Parolees Accepted for Transfer by allowing selected criminal noncitizens incarcerated in US prisons and jails to accept early release in exchange for voluntary deportation		
2008	Operation Scheduled Departure ICE operation to facilitate the voluntary deportation of 457,000 eligible il- legal migrants from selected cities		
2010	Operation Copper Cactus		

Deployment of Arizona National Guard troops to assist BP in apprehension of illegal migrants A M

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.11.

Apprehensions & illegal entries

FIGURE 3 Annual number of apprehensions and estimated illegal entries, 1955–1995




SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.12.

Apprehensions & border patrol

FIGURE 4 Feedback loop between apprehensions and border enforcement, 1965–1995




Effect of illegal entries on conservative reaction via apprehensions: 0.848 (0.905*0.937)

Indirect effect through enforcement feedbacks: 0.692 (0.820*0.873*0.935*0.936 + 0.820*0.377*0.029*0.936 + 0.336*0.402*0.029*0.936 + 0.336*0.181*0.935*0.936)

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.13.

Border enforcement


FIGURE 5 Intensity of border enforcement, 1955–1995



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.14.

Deportations




SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.15.

Deportations & internal control

FIGURE 7 Feedback loop between deportations and internal enforcement, 1965–2009



Effect of 1993 terrorist attack	
On deportations:	0.236
On conservative reaction:	0.063


Effect of 2001 terrorist attackOn deportations:0.615On conservative reaction:0.159



Source: Massey, Pren 2012, p.16.

Mexicans admitted out of quota

FIGURE 8 Percentage of Mexicans admitted outside the country quota as relatives of US citizens, 1990–2010



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012).

Increase in border enforcement

- Surge in border enforcement after 1986 (Massey 2015; Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)
 - Massive policy intervention
 - Undertaken for domestic political purposes
 - Not based on analysis of forces driving migration
- Politicians, pundits, and bureaucrats continue to call for more border enforcement
 - However, since 2008, net undocumented migration has been zero or negative

The contradictory U.S. policy

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Restrictions on work permits turn legal migrants into unauthorized migrants
 - However, family preference systems prevail, which encourage non-workers to migrate
- Increasing border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migration from Mexico
 - Border enforcement discourages circularity
 - Undocumented immigrants are encouraged to stay
 - From a circular flow of male workers going to three states (CA, TX, IL)
 - To 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation

Theories and outcomes

 Previous studies have used several theoretical frameworks and independent variables to estimate the level of migration, mainly using data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)

(Massey, Denton 1993, Massey et al. 1994, Massey, Espinosa 1997, Massey 1999, Massey, Durand, Pren 2014, 2015, 2016, Massey, Gentsch 2014, Massey 2015)

TABLE 1 Variables Used in Analysis of Undocumented Mexican Migration to the United States, 1970–2010

Independent Variable	Definition	
U.S. context:		
Border Patrol budget	Border Patrol budget (MMP/U.S. Department of Homeland Security)	
Rate of employment growth	% change in employment over prior year (U.S. Current Population Survey 2014)	
Residence/work visas (000)	No. legal entries with residence or work visas (U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics 2014)	
U.S. minimum daily wage	Earnings in \$(2013) for eight hours of work at minimum wage (U.S. Department of Labor 2014)	
Mexican context:		
Crude birthrate	Crude birthrate 15 years earlier (Mitchell 2007)	
Rate of GDP growth	% change in Mexican GDP over prior year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2014)	
Homicide rate	Homicides per 100,000 persons (Aguirre Botello 2011)	
Mexican minimum daily wage	Mexico's minimum daily wage in \$(2013) (INEGI 2014)	
Demographic background:		
Age	Age in years (MMP)	
Female	1 = female, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Married	1 if married, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
No. of minors in household	Number of children <18 (MMP)	
Human capital:		
Labor force experience	Years of labor force experience (MMP)	
Education	Years of schooling (MMP)	
Cumulative U.S. experience	Months of prior U.S. experience (MMP)	
Previous U.S. trips	Number of prior trips to United States (MMP)	
Agricultural occupation	Reference category	
Unskilled occupation	Unskilled manual occupation (MMP)	
Skilled occupation	Skilled manual/professional/managerial occupation (MMP)	



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1566–1567.

TABLE 1				
VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION				
TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2010				

Independent Variable	Definition	
Social capital:		
Parent a U.S. migrant	1 if parent ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
No. of U.S. migrant siblings	Number of siblings ever migrated to United States before person-year (MMP)	
Spouse a U.S. migrant	1 if spouse ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
No. of U.S. migrant children	Number of children ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
No. of U.Sborn children	Number of children born in United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Proportion U.S. migrants in community	Proportion of persons in community age 15+ ever migrated to United States in person-year (MMP)	
Physical capital:		
Land	1 if land owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Home	1 if home owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Business	1 if business owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Region of origin:		
Historical	1 if Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Community size:		
Large urban area	Reference category	
Small city (10,000–99,999)	1 if 10,000-99,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP)	
Town $(2,501-9,999)$ Rural village $(\leq 2,500)$	1 if 2,501–9,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP) 1 if \leq 2,500, 0 otherwise (MMP)	

NOTE.—MMP = Mexican Migration Project.

Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1566–1567.

Border Patrol budget

- The main predictor was the Border Patrol budget
- Compiled from the records of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and DHS
- Used as the indicator of the intensity of border enforcement (Massey, Durand et al. 2016)

Border Patrol budget in millions




FIG. 1.—Border Patrol budget in millions of 2013 dollars

Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1567.

Log of Border Patrol budget

- Border Patrol budget has increased exponentially after 1986
 - It is characterized by nonlinearity and a highly skewed distribution
 - It would generate problems of heteroscedasticity: non-explained portion of the model (residuals) would not have a random, homogenous distribution
- Use the natural log of Border Patrol budget
 - Linear trend across time
 - Normalizes the distribution
 - Improves the fit in six of eight models

Reverse causality

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Using Border Patrol budget presents a potential issue of endogeneity bias (reverse causality)
 - Border enforcement and undocumented migration may simultaneously be caused by a common underlying factor
 - Volume of undocumented migration might influence the intensity of border enforcement



Instrumental variable

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) budget: instrument to predict Border Patrol budget Volume of undocumented migration
 DEA border enforcement
 - The DEA and Border Patrol budgets both rise over time in similar fashion, but for different reasons
 - Growth of the DEA is rooted in the politics of the war on crime and drugs
 - Growth of the Border Patrol's budget is grounded in manufactured hysteria over the "alien invasion" and the ensuing "war on immigrants"
 - Independence of the two "wars" is indicated by their separate legislative histories

Steps of estimation

 Regressed the log of the Border Patrol budget on the DEA budget

 $R^2 = 0.97$

In(Border Patrol budget) = 5.435 + 0.001037*(DEA budget)

- This equation was used to generate an instrumental version of the logged Border Patrol budget variable
 - This predicted value of Border Patrol budget was employed in all analyses to estimate the causal effect of U.S. border enforcement on migratory outcomes

Series of migratory outcomes

(Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Whether undocumented migrants crossed at a traditional location
- Whether crossed the border with a coyote
- Cost of crossing the border with a coyote
- Whether migrants were apprehended
- Probability of ultimately achieving a successful entry
- Risk of death during crossing
- Likelihood of returning home once entry has been achieved

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		Used a Co	YOTE	CROSSING COST (\$[2013])	Apprehended	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument	59^{***}	.12	1.10***	.17	731.54***	53.03	.34**	.15
Rate of employment growth	.05**	.02	01	.02	.74	8.10	.05**	.02
Residence/work visas (000)	.00 ^{***}	.00	*00.	.00	16^{**}	.07	.00*	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage	02**	.01	.02**	.01	12.41***	3.38	.00	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate	.04**	.01	.02	.02	4.20	5.72	03*	.02
Rate of GDP growth	01*	.01	.01	.01	-5.64+	3.44	01	.01
Homicide rate	.05***	.01	.00	.01	-37.84^{***}	4.93	02	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage	.01	.01	02	.02	3.16	5.85	.04**	.02
Demographic background:								
Age	.00	.01	.00	.02	-18.26 **	6.31	01	.02
Age ²	.00*	.00	.00**	.00	.00	.08	.00	.00
Female	.32**	.15	.07	.17	-28.28	60.53	52 **	.18
Married	05	.06	.08	.07	14.23	26.84	.00	.07
No. of minors in household	01	.01	.03**	.01	9.57*	5.53	.03*	.02
Human capital:								
Labor force experience	.02***	.01	.03***	.01	11.21***	2.33	02^{**}	.01
Education	.02**	.01	01	.01	-8.32^{**}	3.17	03^{***}	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience	.00*	.00	.00***	.00	08	.30	.00	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips	01+	.01	06***	.01	-9.72^{**}	3.43	04^{***}	.01
Unskilled occupation	14^{**}	.05	11*	.06	-24.16	22.58	.06	.06
Skilled occupation	.13	.10	.01	.13	87.04**	42.70	07	.12

 TABLE 2

 Equations Estimated to Predict Border-Crossing Outcomes



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1574–1575.

 TABLE 2
 Equations Estimated to Predict Border-Crossing Outcomes

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		USED A CO	OYOTE	CROSSING COST	Crossing Cost (\$[2013])		Apprehended	
	β (1)	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)	
Social capital:								(-/	
Parent a U.S. migrant	02	.05	03	.06	14.15	22.44	.06	.06	
No. of U.S. migrant siblings	·10 ^{非非非}	.01	.04**	.02	-3.61	6.09	.02	.02	
Spouse a U.S. migrant	.14*	.08	04	.10	18.27	35.34	19	.10	
No. of U.S. migrant children	.13***	.03	.11**	.04	31.33**	13.13	.05	.04	
No. of U.Sborn children	.06	.09	15	.10	-33.16	36.84	.16	.10	
Proportion U.S. migrants									
in community	.02***	.00	.01***	.00	-3.47 * * *	.87	.00	.00	
Physical capital:									
Land	09	.06	25***	.08	-44.51	28.67	07	.08	
Home	05	.05	14**	.06	-33.45	21.48	10+	.06	
Business	18**	.07	12	.09	-55.32*	33.33	.20**	.09	
Region of origin:									
Historical	36***	.06	10	.08	-110.72^{***}	27.98	34^{***}	.08	
Community size:									
Small city (10,000–99,999)	73^{***}	.09	.56***	.10	276.23***	37.89	.08	.11	
Town (2,501–9,999)	59^{***}	.09	.73***	.10	170.38***	37.86	.10	.11	
Rural village (≤ 2500)	95^{***}	.10	.84***	.11	301.30***	40.30	04	.11	
Place of crossing:									
Sonora to Arizona					165.78***	29.95	11	.08	
Southern Rio Grande to Texas					-59.99**	24.56	.13*	.07	
Crossing context:									
Used coyote during crossing							.05	.07	
Cost of coyote (hundreds									
of \$[2013])							01^{**}	.00	
Intercept	2.86**	1.42	-7.30***	1.88	-3,511.00***	631.96	-1.20	1.74	
Likelihood ratio	991.62***		751.15***				194.39***		
Log likelihood					-65,796.00				
Wald	872.61***		646.98***				185.22***		
Sigma					810.76***	6.37			
No. of trips	11,558		10,737		8,106		8,097		

 $^{+}P < .10.$

* P < .05.

** P < .01.

*** P < .001.

Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1574–1575.

Traditional crossing




FIG. 2.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at a traditional location and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1572.

Used a coyote




FIG. 3.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at with a coyote and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1576.

Crossing cost




FIG. 4.—Observed trends (*solid line*) in coyote cost and cost predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget and place of crossing.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1577.

Apprehended and eventual entry




FIG. 5.—Observed probabilities of apprehension (*solid line*) on first attempt and eventual entry (*dotted line*) and apprehension probability predicted (*dashed line*) from trend in Border Patrol budget.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1578.

Number of deaths




FIG. 6.—Observed deaths (*solid line*) at the border and deaths predicted (*dashed line*) by trend in the Border Patrol budget.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1580.

First undocumented migration




FIG. 7.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of first undocumented migration and probabilities predicted from trends in Border Patrol budget (*dashed line*) and average age (*dotted line*).



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1582.

TABLE 3
Equations Estimated to Predict Departure and Return on First and Later Undocumented Trips to the United States

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		Return from First Trip		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		Return from Later Trip	
	$_{(1)}^{\beta}$	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	$_{(7)}^{\beta}$	SE (8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument	.07	.08	53**	.18	-1.56^{***}	.14	26*	.14
Rate of employment growth	.04**	.01	06**	.03	02	.02	06**	.02
Residence/work visas (000)	.00**	.00	.00	.00	00***	.00	00***	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage	.01**	.01	.02**	.01	.03***	.01	.02**	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate	.01	.01	01	.02	05^{***}	.01	02	.02
Rate of GDP growth	.02***	.01	.01	.01	01	.01	.01	.01
Homicide rate	01	.01	.05**	.02	.02*	.01	.01	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage	04^{***}	.01	05 **	.02	.02***	.01	03*	.02
Demographic background:								
Age	.19***	.01	.08***	.02	.07***	.01	.08***	.02
Age^2	.00 ^{***}	.00	.00***	.00	***00.	.00	***OO.	.00
Female	84^{***}	.07	23	.15	38**	.13	52^{**}	.18
Married	19***	.04	.53***	.08	.15**	.05	.36***	.08
No. of minors in household	04^{***}	.01	03	.02	.04***	.01	01	.01
Human capital:								
Labor force experience	.00	.00	01	.01	01^{**}	.00	.02**	.01
Education	01*	.00	03**	.01	04***	.01	03^{***}	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience					02^{***}	.00	01^{***}	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips					.17***	.01	12^{***}	.01
Unskilled occupation	.05	.03	21**	.07	21***	.04	.27***	.05
Skilled occupation	39^{***}	.06	55 **	.22	80***	.16	34	.21



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1584–1585.

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EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT DEPARTURE AND RETURN ON FIRST AND LATER UNDOCUMENTED TRIPS TO THE UNITED STATES

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		Return from First Trip		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		RETURN FROM LATER TRIP	
	β (1)	SE (2)	$^{\beta}_{(3)}$	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)
Social capital:								
Parent a U.S. migrant	.37 ^{***}	.05	16*	.09	.00	.04	23***	.06
No. of U.S. migrant siblings	.04 ^{***}	.01	08**	.03	02	.01	05**	.02
Spouse a U.S. migrant	40**	.11	-1.11 ***	.15	86***	.07	93***	.12
No. of U.S. migrant children	.18***	.04	05	.06	23***	.02	.00	.03
No. of U.Sborn children	-2.05***	.27			44***	.06	48***	.13
Proportion U.S. migrants in								
community	.02 ^{****}	.00	.00	.00	.01 ^{***}	.00	01**	.00
Physical capital:								
Land	15**	.06	20*	.11	07	.06	08	.07
Home	32***	.04	.20**	.08	09**	.04	10*	.06
Business	42***	.06	.18	.11	.10	.07	.08	.09
Region of origin:								
Historical	.33***	.04	.11	.08	.37***	.07	17**	.08
Community size:								
Small city (10,000–99,999)	.58***	.05	.22**	.11	.62***	.09	.02	.12
Town (2,501–9,999)	.50***	.05	.01	.10	.60***	.09	.10	.12
Rural village (≤2500)	.70***	.06	.13	.11	.59***	.10	15	.13
Intercept	-8.12^{***}	.96	.15	2.10	6.61***	1.46	.09	1.67
Likelihood ratio	5,037.28***		389.75***		6,996.45***		2,197.97***	
Wald	3,361.14***		344.37***		3,649.39***		1,286.25***	
Total no. of person-years	641,587		5,159		43,103		12,402	

 $^{+}P < .10.$

* P < .05. ** P < .01.

*** P < .001.



Return after undocumented trip




FIG. 8.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of return within 12 months of first undocumented trip and probability predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget.



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1587.

Undocumented migrants




FIG. 9.—Simulated size of undocumented population under two scenarios: observed Border Patrol budget (*solid line*) and budget fixed at 1986 level (*dashed line*).



Source: Massey, Durand, Pren 2016, p.1593.

In summary

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Increasingly stringent border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migrants from Mexico
- Transformed migration from a largely circular flow of male workers primarily going to three states (California, Texas, and Illinois)

 Into a population of 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation

Migration importance in the U.S.

- In recent decades, the lack of a comprehensive federal immigration reform has resulted in the implementation of state policies
 - Restrict access to employment, education, housing, health care, and other services to unauthorized immigrants
 - But also other policies that have removed immigration status as a criterion for accessing certain benefits (e.g., in-state tuition, state driver's license, publicly subsidized health insurance) (Karoly and Perez-Arce 2016)

Public attitudes toward immigration

- Public attitudes/perceptions toward immigration and questions about the social and economic impacts of immigrants are linked
- The fortunes of immigrants, and their effects on the economy, political system, schools, and society shape public opinion on additional immigration
- Discourse typically links undocumented immigrants to terrorism
 - Terrorist attacks have not been committed by illegal immigrants

Immigrants and terrorism

Lawful Entry or Residence		Carrying Concealed Explosives	Visa Overstay Violations	Illegal Entry
World Trade Center 1993 Attackers	Would-be NYC Subway Bombers	Millennium Bomber	Some of the 9/11 Hijackers	
Oklahoma City Bombers	Times Square Bomber	Shoe Bomber		
Anthrax Attacker	Fort Hood Shooter	Liquid- Explosives Bombers		
D.C. Snipers	Boston Marathon Bombers	Underwear Bomber		
Fort Dix Six	San Bernardino Shooters			

Source: Scott Savitz (RAND presentation, 2016).

Policies should consider attitudes

- Successful immigration policies need to address political issues and public attitudes/perceptions
 - Not only humanitarian and economic interests
- Full consideration of this complex issue requires
 - Understanding of changes in immigration landscape over time
 - Comprehensive immigration reform

Possible research projects

- Estimate models to evaluate the influence of several factors on the likelihood of legal and illegal immigration
 - Based on studies that assess the importance of several migration theories, including changes in policies and border enforcement actions (e.g., the Border Patrol budget as measured by DHS) (Massey, Denton 1993, Massey et al. 1994, Massey, Espinosa 1997, Massey 1999, Massey, Gentsch 2014, Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2014, 2015, 2016)
- Add background information on immigrants
 - As available from interviews conducted by the U.S.
 Customs and Border Protection with unaccompanied immigrant children (case study)

Big data

- Include data on the prevalence of social media conversation about immigration
 - Collected with a machine-learning approach: big data
 - Along borders and other locations that feature prominently in immigrant crossings
 - Sites on both sides of the border, and the relevant locations will be updated regularly based on information from interviews with immigrants
- Empirical migration models should be easily replicated to several contexts

Polarized policy debate

- Present discussions focus on unauthorized immigrants and range from deporting all such persons and building a wall along the southern border of the United States to granting full amnesty to those without criminal records
- Policy proposals regarding legal immigration include opening doors for all visa applicants, implementing a labor market driven points-based system as in Canada or, alternatively, implementing more restrictive countrybased policies
- Although a polarized immigration debate makes for interesting political debates, sustainable policy solutions must address comprehensive impacts of immigration, taking diverse societal priorities and needs into account

Policy scenarios

- Develop **policy simulations** to inform policymakers on the impacts of various incremental immigration policy options, as well as comprehensive immigration reform
 - Review of immigration research to pinpoint which factors influence immigration, potential outcomes of specific policies, and which policy issues should be included in the scenarios
 - Craft a conceptual model to illustrate the causal links between policies and outcomes
 - How various factors affect immigration flow and, in turn, how immigration stock and flow can affect a range of different sectors (e.g., border security, education, health, employment, or labor)
 - Provide a set of policy simulations (agent-based models)
 - Varying immigration policy options to model how changes in one policy area could reverberate in distinct ways across multiple sectors: age distribution of the U.S. population, education systems, health services, labor markets, inequality, border security, national security, and the criminal justice system

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