

Immigrant integration

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Migration (SOCI 647)**



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Outline

- Theories of incorporation
 - Bean, Stevens 2003 (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Integration of immigrants
 - Waters, Pineau 2015
- Integration of second generation (discussion)
 - Bean et al. 2012; Portes et al. 2009
- New Latino underclass (discussion)
 - Massey, Pren 2012



Theories of incorporation

- **Assimilation:** process by which immigrants transition and become part of the American society
 - Newcomers affect their host societies even as these societies are affecting the newcomers
- This term has normative connotation by implying that immigrants should become more like natives
 - More related to socio-cultural aspects
 - Less applied to labor-market outcomes, which are desired
- **Incorporation:** broader processes by which new groups establish relationships with host societies
 - Assimilation is one type of incorporation process
- Theories try to understand convergence between immigrant and native groups on various factors



Less economic mobility

- Economy appears to offer fewer chances for economic mobility than was the case in earlier decades
- **Policy significance:** U.S. policies for admitting immigrants are operating to select persons into the country with unfavorable chances of joining the economic mainstream
- **Theoretical significance:** substantive changes either in the characteristics of immigrants or in the structural circumstances confronting new arrivals are now inhibiting assimilation more than in the past



Multidimensional assimilation

- Assimilation has two major dimensions: economic and sociocultural
- Economic assimilation is desirable
- Sociocultural assimilation is more complicated
 - More ambivalence about whether sociocultural assimilation is desirable
 - Sociocultural assimilation involves issues of racial and ethnic identity, particularly when immigrants arrive with national origins that differ from those of the ancestors of natives
 - If natives define immigrants as racialized minorities, the process can create or reinforce consequential discriminatory barriers



Different theoretical approaches

- Different theoretical perspectives on immigrant incorporation tend to view connections between economic and sociocultural integration differently
- **Assimilation approach:** certain aspects of sociocultural assimilation (e.g., language acquisition, acceptance of broad norms and values) are precursors of economic assimilation
- **Ethnic pluralist approach:** less likely to posit a relationship between sociocultural and economic assimilations
 - Facets of sociocultural assimilation are becoming less likely to constitute prerequisites for economic assimilation
 - Economic assimilation may even influence sociocultural assimilation



Theoretical models

- Pace of incorporation may be slowing
- Nature of incorporation might be changing
- We must understand
 - Theories of immigrant and ethnic group integration
 - The various kinds of factors these theories postulate as influencing economic and sociocultural mobility
- Theoretical models
 - Assimilation model
 - Ethnic disadvantage model
 - Segmented assimilation model



Assimilation model

- Most prominent perspective on the issue of how rapidly immigrant groups attain upward mobility
- **Cultural assimilation:** immigrants gradually begin to absorb and influence cultural values and norms of the majority society
- Assimilation stages
 - **Cultural:** including linguistic
 - **Structural:** educational, occupational, labor market, including wages, earnings, and employment
 - **Primary structural:** close, personal interactions between dominant and subordinate group members
 - **Secondary structural:** equal-status relationships, e.g. interactions structured by occupation, education, political position, and neighborhood of residence, and thus by implication labor-market factors
 - **Marital and identificational**



Different assimilation rates

- Different stages of assimilation may occur at different rates among different groups
- Cultural assimilation is a precursor for other kinds of assimilation and is irreversible
 - Once primary structural assimilation is attained, the process is likely to proceed to completion
 - Immigrant/ethnic and majority groups become more similar over time in their norms, values, behaviors, and characteristics
- Debate about whether
 - Similarity involves subordinate group becoming more like the dominant group (an “Anglo conformity” model)
 - Or the two groups becoming more like each other (a “melting pot” model)



Convergence over time

- Assimilation model predicts a convergence of behavior and characteristics over time
- Members of later generations and those immigrants residing the longest in the U.S. have the greatest decline in differences in behavior compared to the majority group
- Differences remaining by the third generation or later would reflect partial assimilation
 - This would account for later generational discrepancies in wages and unemployment



Ethnic disadvantage model

- Assimilation model is insufficient to explain integration experiences of immigrant groups
 - Persistence of incomplete assimilation among immigrant groups
- **Ethnic disadvantage:** increasing knowledge of language of the new country and familiarity with its culture and customs often do not lead to increasing structural assimilation
 - Discrimination and structural and institutional barriers to equal access to employment opportunities constitute obstacles to complete assimilation
- Not until second and third generations that the realization emerges that goal of full assimilation may be more difficult and take longer than originally presumed



Language

- Immigrant generation exhibits different characteristics than natives
- By the second generation, language patterns and reference groups are in the process of shifting
 - First-generation Mexican-origin women, 84% have been found to use only Spanish at home
 - Third generation: 84% using only English at home and 12% using both English and Spanish
- Immigrant generation retains the country of origin as a primary reference group
 - Second generation begins to become more cognizant of barriers that block access to complete assimilation, as it shifts its reference group to the U.S.
 - Third generation makes the transition to the country of destination as the reference group

Aspirations and barriers

- First generation
 - Evaluates its socioeconomic experience most positively
 - Incentivize achievement aspirations in the second generation
- Second generation
 - Experience discrimination and awareness of its lower socioeconomic status compared to natives
 - Lower motivation to transmit aspirations to its children
- Third generation
 - Lower socioeconomic status, educational attainment, labor market outcomes than second generation
- Real and perceived barriers operate in third generation
 - Discourage socioeconomic achievement
 - Reinforce distinctiveness of ethnic group
 - Reaffirm and revitalize ethnic patterns and customs



Segmented assimilation model

- Uneven patterns of success do not significantly undermine the validity of the theory of assimilation
 - They suggest that process may follow a “bumpy” rather than “straight-line” course
- Incorporation experiences of immigrants are diverse
 - Some members of immigrant groups might be cut off from economic mobility
 - Others find multiple pathways to incorporation depending on their national origin, socioeconomic status, contexts of reception, family resources (social and financial)



Obstacles for assimilation

- Stagnant of even downward mobility
 - Structural barriers limiting access to employment and other opportunities
 - Obstacles that often are particularly severe in the case of the most disadvantaged members of immigrant groups
 - Even as fellow immigrants follow divergent paths toward classic straight-line assimilation
- Heavily disadvantaged immigrants may even reject assimilation altogether
 - Embrace attitudes, orientations, and behaviors considered “oppositional” in nature



Segmented combines models

- Segmented assimilation combines elements of the classic assimilation and ethnic-disadvantage perspective
 - It refocuses analytical attention on identifying contextual and structural factors that separate successful assimilation from unsuccessful, or even negative assimilation
 - It is important to identify structural impediments that prevent onset of assimilation among children of immigrants
- Immigrants have different pathways to mainstream status
- Some immigrants find such pathways blocked and come to view themselves as members of disadvantaged and racialized minority groups



New immigration

- Opportunities and structure circumstances for new immigrants are fundamentally different than for previous generations of immigrants
 - Mexico-U.S. migration has occurred more continuously across longer periods of time than earlier migrations
- Labor markets are more segmented
 - Fewer opportunities for economic and social mobility, especially for those with less education and lower skills
- Geographic concentration of new immigrants
 - It creates and sustains distinctive language and cultural communities on an unprecedented scale
 - It slows and halts traditional processes of assimilation that characterized European-origin populations





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Integration of immigrants

- Legal status
- Political and civic dimensions
- Spatial dimensions
- Socioeconomic dimensions
- Sociocultural dimensions
- Family dimensions



Legal status

- Legal status affects immigrants' opportunities to integrate across a wide variety of social dimensions
- Only naturalized citizens are allowed to vote and fully participate in the U.S. political system
- Legal status also defines access to social services and health care
 - Immigrants in undocumented status or some temporary statuses (e.g., Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals – DACA) are not eligible for health care benefits through the Affordable Care Act
 - Barriers immigrants face in accessing health care affect their children
- Legal status also impacts housing, including ownership
 - This process has consequences for the neighborhoods in which immigrants live, schools their children attend, and housing conditions



Legal status and education

- Legal status also can restrict access to higher education, with direct implications for immigrants' futures
- All children in the U.S., regardless of legal status, have the constitutional right to primary and secondary education
 - Kindergarten through 12th grade: K-12 education
- However, those in less permanent legal statuses have limited access to higher education
 - Several states do not extend to them the benefit of in-state tuition
- Undocumented or uncertain legal status can affect immigrants' initial optimism about educational opportunities, create higher barriers to social mobility, and negatively affect educational attainment



Legal status and earnings


- Legal status affects the kind of jobs immigrants can obtain and the wages they can earn
- Immigrants with postsecondary education or even professional degrees who are undocumented are often concentrated in low-paid and unstable jobs not commensurate with their education or experience
- This occurs among immigrants who come to the U.S. with relatively higher levels of human capital, as well as those who acquire skills in the country
- Undocumented status in particular prevents immigrants from acquiring jobs that are consistent with their expertise and degrees, potentially affecting paths to socioeconomic mobility
- The lack of labor rights associated with temporary visas and insecure legal status also negatively affects the occupational status and wages of immigrants



Legal status barriers

- All legal statuses, besides citizenship, are subject to deportation due to changes in the law that make even lawful permanent residents (LPRs) deportable
- Immigrants have the potential to “regularize” or legitimize their status and achieve LPR status via marriage, employer, or family petitions
 - However, many face barriers to adjustment of status
 - High fees, language barriers, technicalities about mode of entry, time of arrival, and lack of legal expertise
 - Complexities of the immigration system may be barriers to integration
- Legal status channels immigrants’ access to society’s benefits in the immediate future
 - This has direct effects on the life prospects of immigrants and their descendants





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Political and civic dimensions

- Integration of immigrants and their descendants is also related to civic and political life in the U.S.
- Naturalization and citizenship
- Political engagement, from voting and electoral participation to contacting officials or participating in peaceful protest
- Civic integration beyond formal politics, such as volunteering and participation in community-based organizations and engagement in globalized world






FIGURE 4-1 (Non)citizenship of the foreign-born in the United States (% of population).

SOURCE: Data from Gibson and Jung (2006); American Community Survey 2010, 2013.




FIGURE 4-2 Naturalization levels among foreign-born residents of the United States, 1920-2013 (% naturalized).

SOURCE: Data from Gibson and Jung (2006); American Community Survey 2010, 2013.




FIGURE 4-3 Percentage of immigrants who acquired U.S. citizenship among those eligible, and fees for I-40 application, 2002-2012.

SOURCE: Data from Office of Immigration Statistics “Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population,” for 2002 through 2012 (2005 missing).




FIGURE 4-4 National origin proportions in the eligible and naturalized populations, 2011.

NOTE: Dark shading = eligible populations, light shading = naturalized populations.

SOURCES: Panel's calculations from Lee and Foreman (2014, Table 1); Rytina (2012, Table 4).

TABLE 4-1 Grants Awarded by the Office of Citizenship through the USCIS Citizenship and Integration Grant Program

Fiscal Year	Number of Organizations Funded	Total Grants Awarded (in \$)
2009	13	1,200,000
2010	78	8,100,000
2011	42	9,000,000
2012	31	5,000,000
2013	40	9,900,000
2014	40	10,000,000

SOURCE: Data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Citizenship data. Available: <http://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-citizenship/citizenship-and-integration-grant-program-archives> [August 2015].




FIGURE 4-5 Volunteerism by nativity and race, 2014.

SOURCE: Current Population Survey Supplement, 2014. Available: <https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/current-population-survey-volunteers-supplement> [October 2015].

Naturalization barriers

- There are significant disparities in who becomes a citizen by socioeconomic status
- Naturalization process is more difficult for immigrants who already face barriers to integration
- Legal status bars many immigrants from citizenship, a burden that falls disproportionately on immigrants from Mexico and Central America
- No clear explanations for low naturalization rates
 - Particularly for those with higher socioeconomic status
 - Obstacle to naturalization lies somewhere in the process by which individuals translate their motivation into action
 - Further research is needed to understand barriers



Government representation

- Foreign-born representation at all levels of government is disproportionately low
 - Challenge to the American democratic ideal of civic equality
 - Implications for political integration and labor market participation
- Decentralized immigrant integration system hinders immigrants' political and civic integration
- Civil society groups are important to immigrant integration
 - In new immigrant destinations, lack of engagement between civil society and immigrants negatively affects integration
 - Public-private partnerships could provide a template for successful engagement with civil society
- Other social institutions (e.g., schools) continue to provide important tools for political and civic integration





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Spatial dimensions

- Spatial integration of immigrants and racial/ethnic minority populations is an important indicator of integration
- Place of residence reinforces social integration
 - It shapes access to good schools, safe neighborhoods, good jobs
- Different national origin groups have diverse distributions in geographic space
 - They often have unequal access to society's benefits from native-born population residing in the same locality
- In the 20th century, majority of immigrants concentrated in a small number of states and large metropolitan areas
- Today, “new immigrant destinations” include suburbs, rural areas, and urban areas throughout the U.S.






FIGURE 5-1 Change in geographic dispersal of immigrants by metro type, 1980-2010.

SOURCE: Adapted from Singer (2013a).




FIGURE 5-3 Five largest immigrant populations in metropolitan areas as a share of all metropolitan areas, 1900-2010.

SOURCE: Singer (2013, Fig. 1). Reprinted with permission.




FIGURE 5-4 Foreign-born population growth in primary cities and suburbs, 2000-2013.

SOURCE: Wilson and Svajlenka (2014). Reprinted with permission.




FIGURE 5-5 Dissimilarity from native-born whites by race/ethnicity and nativity in 2000.

SOURCE: Data from Iceland and Scopilliti (2008). Reprinted with permission.

Spatial distribution

- Local context of reception shapes immigrant integration into American society
 - This is important in a context in which immigrant population has grown and dispersed spatially
 - At the same time, individual immigrant groups (by source country) are concentrating in particular locations
- Spatial concentration is correlated with social mobility
 - Are some immigrants concentrated in economically declining areas, joining a minority underclass?
 - Or do new destinations provide better conditions for first generation immigrants and their children?
 - More research is needed to understand new destinations of recently arrived immigrants and their growing children



Spatial integration and race

- Spatial diffusion of immigrants implies greater spatial integration
 - But there are variations by race and national origin with respect to neighborhood segregation
- Neighborhoods are more diverse than ever
 - Number of all-white census tracts has fallen
- But racial segregation is still prevalent
 - Black immigrants experience the most residential segregation from non-Hispanic whites
 - Followed by Hispanic immigrants and Asian immigrants
- Spatial integration is mediated by race
 - Improvements in socioeconomic status do not translate into spatial integration with native-born whites
 - Particularly for black immigrants



Research on new destinations

- New destinations provide natural laboratories for better understanding how immigrant integration is shaped by
 - Context of reception
 - Presence of other co-ethnics
 - Good job opportunities
 - Residential segregation
 - Anti-immigrant sentiment
 - Inclusively or exclusionary public policies
- More research is needed to understand
 - Day-to-day experiences of immigrants and their descendants
 - In different places and facing diverse contexts of reception





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Socioeconomic dimensions

- Immigrants predominantly come to the U.S. to make a better life for themselves and their children
- European immigrants experienced a great deal of social mobility throughout the 20th century
 - First, second, and third generations achieved socioeconomic progress provided by an expanding labor market
- Have recent immigrants who have come from Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean experienced the same socioeconomic mobility?
 - Will their children do better than their immigrant parents?
 - Will they also achieve parity with other native-born Americans?



TABLE 6-1 Educational Attainment of First and Second Generation Men, Ages 25-59, by Source Country

Source Country	First Generation				Second Generation			
	Avg. Educ.	% with Education:		Sample Size	Avg. Educ.	% with Education:		Sample Size
		< 12	16+			< 12	16+	
Mexico	9.4	55.2	5.4	24,371	12.6	15.2	14.9	5,545
Cuba	12.9	13.6	24.7	1,614	14.2	3.5	40.4	599
Dominican Republic	11.8	26.7	15.8	1,303	13.4	7.3	23.3	254
Central America	9.8	48.0	9.5	6,414	13.4	8.1	25.7	665
South America	13.2	12.6	31.6	4,718	14.3	1.7	42.9	803
China	14.7	10.7	58.3	2,409	15.4	3.4	67.8	672
India	16.3	2.7	83.2	3,878	15.9	2.2	76.7	389
Japan	15.6	0.5	72.7	456	14.3	4.5	42.8	529
Korea	15.4	0.9	68.8	1,510	15.0	2.2	60.5	378
Philippines	14.4	2.5	49.1	2,977	14.3	2.2	42.7	1,168
Vietnam	13.0	15.2	30.1	2,062	14.4	4.9	48.9	256
Haiti	12.8	13.9	22.1	844	13.9	2.9	32.9	131
Jamaica	13.0	10.9	20.9	980	14.1	4.3	36.8	203
Africa	14.3	5.3	48.1	3,551	14.7	2.2	50.1	429
Canada	15.0	3.1	57.4	1,419	14.1	4.2	38.8	2,856
Europe	14.4	5.2	47.4	8,177	14.5	2.8	46.1	10,519
All Countries	12.1	28.2	28.4	78,471	13.9	7.1	35.6	29,631

NOTE: The first generation samples include foreign-born men ages 25-59, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The second generation samples include U.S.-born men ages 25-59 who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. See Duncan and Trejo (2015) for further details on methodology.

SOURCE: Adapted from Duncan and Trejo (2015, p. 119). Data from 2003-2013 CPS outgoing rotation group data.

TABLE 6-2 Educational Attainment of First and Second Generation Women, Ages 25-59, by Source Country

Source Country	First Generation				Second Generation			
	Avg. Educ.	% with Education:		Sample Size	Avg. Educ.	% with Education:		Sample Size
		< 12	16+			< 12	16+	
Mexico	9.5	53.9	6.5	21,762	12.8	14.6	18.2	6,034
Cuba	13.2	9.5	26.3	1,612	14.5	3.7	46.4	594
Dominican Republic	11.9	27.1	16.8	2,071	14.0	6.6	36.2	297
Central America	10.2	43.0	10.9	6,124	14.0	5.4	36.7	751
South America	13.4	10.2	33.1	5,495	14.5	2.3	45.8	860
China	14.2	11.5	52.6	2,918	15.4	1.9	70.1	689
India	15.8	4.0	78.1	3,445	16.1	2.4	79.8	397
Japan	14.8	0.6	53.4	874	14.7	2.0	47.8	518
Korea	14.5	3.9	53.7	2,267	15.3	2.1	65.3	387
Philippines	14.7	2.9	57.2	4,753	14.6	2.1	49.8	1,244
Vietnam	12.5	19.3	25.9	2,340	14.8	2.5	59.5	250
Haiti	12.6	17.0	21.0	975	14.7	5.8	53.3	158
Jamaica	13.4	10.6	28.4	1,408	14.7	2.1	46.2	274
Africa	13.5	9.9	37.9	3,201	15.0	2.4	58.1	443
Canada	14.8	2.2	51.4	1,707	14.4	3.0	43.4	2,920
Europe	14.4	4.9	47.0	9,316	14.6	2.3	46.3	11,015
All Countries	12.3	24.8	29.8	83,028	14.0	6.4	38.9	31,608

NOTE: The first generation samples include foreign-born women ages 25-59, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The second generation samples include U.S.-born women ages 25-59 who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. See Duncan and Trejo (2015) for further details on methodology.

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.




FIGURE 6-1 Average education (in years) of first and second generation men.

NOTE: The first generation samples include foreign-born men ages 50-59, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The second generation samples include U.S.-born men ages 25-34 who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the calculations.

SOURCE: Adapted from Duncan and Trejo (2015). Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.




FIGURE 6-2 Average education (in years) of first and second generation women.
 NOTE: The first generation samples include foreign-born women ages 50-59, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The second generation samples include U.S.-born women ages 25-34 who have at least one foreign-born parent. Sampling weights were used in the calculations.
 SOURCE: Adapted from Duncan and Trejo (2015). Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

TABLE 6-3 Average Education, Ages 25-59, by Race/Ethnicity, Sex, and Immigrant Generation

Race/Ethnicity	Men, by Immigrant Generation			Women, by Immigrant Generation		
	First	Second	Third+	First	Second	Third+
Hispanic (aggregate)	10.2 (0.02)	12.9 (0.02)	12.7 (0.02)	10.5 (0.02)	13.1 (0.02)	12.8 (0.02)
Mexican	9.4 (0.02)	12.6 (0.03)	12.6 (0.02)	9.5 (0.03)	12.8 (0.03)	12.7 (0.02)
Cuban	12.9 (0.07)	14.2 (0.11)	13.8 (0.21)	13.2 (0.07)	14.5 (0.11)	13.8 (0.18)
Central or South American	11.1 (0.04)	13.7 (0.07)	13.2 (0.14)	11.6 (0.04)	14.1 (0.07)	13.6 (0.13)
Other Hispanic	11.8 (0.15)	13.5 (0.12)	13.1 (0.05)	12.2 (0.13)	13.5 (0.12)	13.1 (0.04)
Non-Hispanic:						
White	14.3 (0.02)	14.4 (0.02)	13.8 (0.004)	14.1 (0.02)	14.5 (0.02)	13.9 (0.004)
Black	13.4 (0.04)	13.9 (0.08)	12.9 (0.01)	13.1 (0.04)	14.4 (0.07)	13.2 (0.01)
Asian	14.7 (0.02)	15.0 (0.04)	14.3 (0.04)	14.2 (0.02)	15.2 (0.04)	14.4 (0.04)
Other race	14.1 (0.16)	14.2 (0.08)	13.0 (0.02)	14.4 (0.14)	14.6 (0.08)	13.3 (0.02)
All Race/Ethnic Groups	12.1 (0.01)	13.9 (0.01)	13.6 (0.004)	12.3 (0.01)	14.0 (0.01)	13.8 (0.003)

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The samples include people ages 25-59. The “first generation” consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent. Remaining persons are members of the “third+ generation” (i.e., the third and all higher generations), which consists of U.S.-born individuals who have two U.S.-born parents. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. See Duncan and Trejo (2015) for further details on methodology. SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

TABLE 6-4 Average Education of Mexicans Ages 25-34 and 50-59, by Sex and Immigrant Generation

National Origin and Age Group	Men, by Immigrant Generation			Women, by Immigrant Generation		
	First	Second	Third+	First	Second	Third+
Mexican						
Ages 25-34	9.8 (0.04)	12.6 (0.04)	12.6 (0.04)	10.0 (0.04)	12.9 (0.04)	12.9 (0.03)
Ages 50-59	8.2 (0.07)	12.4 (0.11)	12.4 (0.06)	8.3 (0.08)	12.2 (0.11)	12.3 (0.05)

NOTE: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The samples include people ages 25-34 and 50-59. The “first generation” consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent. Remaining persons are members of the “third+ generation” (i.e., the third and all higher generations), which consists of U.S.-born individuals who have two U.S.-born parents. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. See Duncan and Trejo (2015) for further details on methodology.

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
TABLE 6-5 Employment Rates (percentage), Ages 25-59, by Education Level, Sex, and Immigrant Generation

Education Level	Men, by Immigrant Generation			Women, by Immigrant Generation		
	First	Second	Third+	First	Second	Third+
Years of education:						
< 12	83.9 (0.25)	63.4 (1.09)	58.2 (0.30)	47.5 (0.35)	42.9 (1.15)	40.8 (0.32)
12	84.9 (0.24)	80.0 (0.44)	78.3 (0.11)	59.7 (0.32)	65.6 (0.54)	66.6 (0.13)
13-15	84.0 (0.33)	83.0 (0.41)	83.6 (0.11)	68.1 (0.38)	73.1 (0.45)	73.6 (0.12)
16+	89.0 (0.21)	89.8 (0.29)	91.3 (0.08)	70.4 (0.29)	80.1 (0.36)	81.1 (0.10)
All education levels	85.7 (0.13)	83.2 (0.22)	82.3 (0.06)	61.4 (0.17)	72.1 (0.25)	71.9 (0.07)

NOTE: The reported figures give the percentage of individuals who were employed during the week they were surveyed by the CPS. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The samples include people ages 25-59. The “first generation” consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent. Remaining persons are members of the “third+ generation” (i.e., the third and all higher generations), which consists of U.S.-born individuals who have two U.S.-born parents. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. See Duncan and Trejo (2015) for further details on methodology.

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

A. Not Controlling for Education



Male employment differentials (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites)

B. Controlling for Education





FIGURE 6-3 Employment differentials of men, ages 25-59, by race/ethnicity and immigrant generation (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites).

NOTE: The reported figures represent employment rate differentials between each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites. These differentials are estimated from least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed during the CPS survey week. The samples include men ages 25-59. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year. The differentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for education level.

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

A. Not Controlling for Education




Female employment differentials (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites)

FIGURE 6-4 Employment differentials of women, ages 25-59, by race/ethnicity and immigrant generation (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites).

NOTE: The reported figures represent employment rate differentials between each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites. These differentials are estimated from least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed during the CPS survey week. The samples include women ages 25-59. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year. The differentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for education level.


SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

B. Controlling for Education



A. Not Controlling for Education

Male earnings differentials (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites)



B. Controlling for Education





FIGURE 6-5 Weekly earnings differentials of men, ages 25-59, by race/ethnicity and immigrant generation (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites).


NOTE: The reported figures represent log weekly earnings differentials between each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites. These differentials are estimated from least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings. The samples include men ages 25-59 employed in civilian wage and salary jobs. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year. The differentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for education level.

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

A. Not Controlling for Education



B. Controlling for Education



Female earnings differentials (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites)

FIGURE 6-6 Weekly earnings differentials of women, ages 25-59, by race/ethnicity and immigrant generation (relative to third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites). **NOTE:** The reported figures represent log weekly earnings differentials between each race/ethnicity and immigrant generation group and the reference group of third+ generation, non-Hispanic whites. These differentials are estimated from least squares regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings. The samples include women ages 25-59 employed in civilian wage and salary jobs. All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year. The differentials shown in the bottom panel are from regressions that also control for education level.

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

TABLE 6-7 Representation of Groups in Professional and Managerial Occupations, by Generation

	1st Generation			2nd Generation			3rd Generation		
	Prof.	Manag.	Both	Prof.	Manag.	Both	Prof.	Manag.	Both
Men									
Hispanics	4.9	5.8	10.7	12.9	12.6	25.5	12.5	11.9	24.4
Mexicans	2.7	4.1	6.8	11.5	10.4	21.9			
Central Americans	4.2	5.1	9.3	15.6	15.6	31.2			
Cubans	11.3	13.4	24.7	21.5	23.0	44.5			
Asians	34.3	17.0	51.3	35.1	20.8	55.9	27.6	18.8	46.4
Chinese, incl HK and Tn	41.7	18.4	60.1	39.7	24.8	64.5			
Filipino	27.3	11.2	38.5	28.1	15.8	43.9			
Indians	52.6	21.9	74.5	47.3	24.3	71.6			
Black	17.5	10.1	27.6	26.5	12.0	38.5	13.0	9.6	22.6
White	24.4	20.4	44.8	23.9	23.2	47.1	19.0	19.8	38.8
Women									
Hispanics	10.4	6.3	16.7	23.7	13.5	37.2	21.2	12.5	33.7
Mexicans	6.8	4.5	11.3	21.9	12.4	34.3			
Central Americans	8.4	5.6	14.0	28.7	16.0	44.7			
Cubans	18.9	13.0	31.9	36.1	19.7	55.8			
Asians	30.9	15.2	46.1	38.0	20.3	58.3	32.5	19.1	51.6
Chinese, incl HK and Tn	33.4	19.5	52.9	45.5	19.7	65.2			
Filipino	36.4	12.8	49.2	30.6	19.6	50.2			
Indians	49.3	17.8	67.1	50.5	24.7	75.2			
Black	25.9	9.0	34.9	34.1	13.3	47.4	22.1	11.8	33.9
White	29.2	16.1	45.3	33.2	19.7	52.9	30.0	16.7	46.7

NOTE: The table is limited to individuals between the ages of 25 and 59 who are in the labor force. Generational definitions are the same as in prior tables. In the first and second generations, national-origin groups are identified by the birthplaces of respondents and their parents; in the third+ generation, ethnoracial categories are self-identifications (see discussion in “Assessing Education Patterns in the Third+ Generation”). For further details on methodology, see Farley and Alba (2002).

SOURCE: Data from 2003-2013 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data.

TABLE 6-8 Percentage in Poverty (using federal poverty level), 2013, by Immigrant Generation, Race, and Hispanic Origin

	Poverty Status	Total	Native-Born	Foreign-Born
Total	Poverty	14.5	13.8	18.4
	Deep poverty	6.3	6.2	7.2
Hispanic	Poverty	23.5	23.5	23.5
	Deep poverty	9.4	9.9	8.6
Non-Hispanic	Poverty	14.5	12.6	23.5
	Deep poverty	12.6	12.4	14.1
White	Poverty	9.6	9.4	14.8
	Deep poverty	4.3	4.2	6.6
Black	poverty	27.2	27.7	22.0
	Deep poverty	12.3	12.9	7.4
Asian	Poverty	10.4	9.5	10.9
	Deep poverty	5.2	4.9	5.3
Other, Two or More	Poverty	19.2	19.6	10.4
	Deep poverty	9.2	9.5	4.1

SOURCE: Data from 2014 March Current Population Survey. Table was created courtesy of Youngmin Yi, Department of Sociology, Cornell University.

TABLE 6-9 Percentage of Adults in Poverty, 2013, by Immigrant Generation, Race, and Hispanic Origin

	Poverty Status	Total	Foreign-Born	Native		Total Native
				2nd Generation	3rd+ Generation	
Total	Poverty	12.8	18.8	13.6	11.5	11.7
	Deep poverty	5.6	7.6	5.8	5.1	5.2
Hispanic	Poverty	21.6	25.0	18.1	17.4	17.6
	Deep poverty	8.3	9.1	7.3	7.6	7.5
Non-Hispanic	Poverty	11.3	13.1	9.0	11.2	11.1
	Deep poverty	5.1	6.3	4.4	5.0	5.0
White	Poverty	9.0	12.9	8.8	8.9	8.8
	Deep poverty	4.0	6.2	3.1	4.0	4.0
Black	Poverty	22.8	18.8	--- <i>a</i>	23.6	23.3
	Deep poverty	10.1	8.8	--- <i>a</i>	10.4	10.3
Asian	Poverty	11.0	11.5	9.1	9.1	9.1
	Deep poverty	5.7	5.6	6.0	5.8	6.0

NOTE: *a* denotes cell with 30 or fewer cases.

SOURCE: Data from 2014 March Current Population Survey. Table was created courtesy of Youngmin Yi, Department of Sociology, Cornell University.

TABLE 6-10 Percentage of Children in Poverty, 2013, by Immigrant Generation, Race, and Hispanic Origin

	Poverty Status	Total	Foreign Born	Native		
				2nd Generation	3rd+ Generation	Total Native
Total	Poverty	19.8	30.2	29.1	17.6	19.8
	Deep poverty	8.8	13.1	10.5	8.2	8.8
Hispanic	Poverty	30.2	37.0	38.3	23.8	30.2
	Deep poverty	12.7	14.1	14.2	11.6	12.7
Non-Hispanic	Poverty	16.5	25.0	14.6	16.4	16.5
	Deep poverty	7.5	12.3	4.6	7.6	7.5
White	Poverty	10.6	28.6	13.4	10.2	10.6
	Deep poverty	4.5	17.9	5.3	4.3	4.5
Black	Poverty	38.9	39.7	30.3	39.8	38.9
	Deep poverty	19.0	13.8	9.5	20.3	19.0
Asian	Poverty	10.2	16.8	7.9	10.5	10.2
	Deep poverty	4.1	8.3	2.0	6.1	4.1

SOURCE: Data from 2014 March Current Population Survey. Table was created courtesy of Youngmin Yi, Department of Sociology, Cornell University.




FIGURE 6-7 Percentage in poverty, comparison of FPL and SPM, 2012, by nativity status, race, and Hispanic origin.

SOURCE: Data from Supplementary Poverty Measure and Current Population Survey.

Socioeconomic integration

- Socioeconomic integration is occurring for immigrants in the U.S. and especially for their native-born descendants
- Foreign-born are much more varied in their skill levels
 - Compared to general population of third+ generation native-born
 - Large share with little schooling and no ability to speak English
 - But also a disproportionate share of highly educated workers in science, technology, engineering, and health fields
- Robust representation of 1st and 2nd generations across occupational spectrum
 - U.S. labor market is absorbing immigrants and their children into higher-level jobs in recent decades
 - This might continue as the baby boom cohorts complete their retirement over the next two decades
- Socioeconomic integration is high for second generation

Educational progress

- Despite large differences in starting points among first generation, there has been strong intergenerational progress in educational attainment
- Second generation meets or exceeds schooling level of third+ generations of native-born Americans
- There are important variations between and within ethnoracial groups
 - They reflect different levels of human capital their immigrant parents bring to the U.S.
 - Children of Mexican and Central American immigrants progress a great deal relative to their parents, but they do not reach parity with the general population of native-born.



Employment rates

- Immigrant men are more likely to be employed compared to men in second and third+ generations
 - Especially least-educated immigrants, compared to native-born
 - They are filling an important niche in the U.S. economy
- For second+ generation men, employment varies by race/ethnicity
 - Hispanics: high employment rates when controlling for education
 - Asians: integrating into non-Hispanic white population
 - Blacks: employment rates for second generation blacks are moving toward general black native-born population
 - Higher education does not mean higher employment rates
- Among women, pattern is reversed
 - Lower employment rate for immigrants than for native-born
 - Employment rates for second+ generation approach parity with native-born



Earnings

- Foreign-born workers' earnings improve relative to native-born the longer they reside in the U.S.
- These patterns vary by race/ethnicity of immigrants
 - **As skin color darkens**, immigrants experience earnings penalty
 - **Hispanics**: earnings assimilation is slower (mainly Mexicans) than for other immigrants
 - **Asians** and descendants tend to be similar to native-born whites
 - But these comparisons become less favorable after controlling for education



Occupations

- Occupational distributions of first and second generations indicate intergenerational improvement similar to that for education and earnings
- Second generation men
 - They improve occupational position compared to first generation, among groups in low-status occupation
 - But they do not reach parity with third+ generation Americans
 - They are overrepresented in service jobs, but they have largely left agricultural jobs
 - They are less likely than their parents to take jobs in informal sector
 - They are more likely to receive health and retirement benefits through employment
- Occupational gains for second generation women relative to first generation are even greater than among men
 - Gap to third+ generation women narrows greatly



Socioeconomic mobility

- Nationally representative data rely on subjective ethnic identification and typically cannot distinguish the “true” third generation from later generations
 - Samples of later-generation Hispanics identified from subjective ethnic responses understate attainment of descendants of Hispanic immigrants
- Individuals from the third+ generations might hide progress for Mexican Americans
 - Many of those beyond third generation have ancestors who grew up in places and times with widespread and institutionalized discrimination
 - This is likely to impede socioeconomic mobility in such families
- Amount of socioeconomic mobility experienced by descendants of Mexican immigrants beyond second generation remains an open question



Barriers to black immigrants

- **Black immigrants** from the Caribbean and Africa arrive with relatively high levels of schooling
 - Second generation meet or exceed educational attainment of third+ generation Americans
 - But they experience a substantial earnings penalty in excess of 16% as skin color darkens
- **Second generation black men** have employment and earnings deficits similar to those of third+ generation African American men
 - These deficits are much larger for U.S.-born blacks than they are for U.S.-born Hispanics, especially after controlling for education.
- U.S.-born descendants of black immigrants achieve **integration**
 - But this happens in the racialized space occupied by African Americans rather than in non-Hispanic white mainstream
- **Data collection** is needed to identify generational change by race/ethnicity



Barriers for integration

- Variations of socioeconomic integration among different groups happened before
 - For instance, Italians took several generations to achieve parity with other immigrant-origin and native-born groups
- However, contemporary immigrants experience higher barriers to integration, particularly those with fewer skills and resources, due to
 - Economic stagnation
 - Rising income inequality
 - Failing public schools
 - Racial and ethnic discrimination
 - Complicated and restrictive legal structure
- Researchers and policymakers need to consider reception context to
 - Analyze immigrant integration
 - Understand complicated nature of comparisons to immigrant groups from the past





TEXAS A&M
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Sociocultural dimensions

- As in the past, popular fears and concerns worry that immigrants...
 - Do not share same social values as native-born population
 - Will not learn English and dominance of English is under threat
 - Are increasing crime rates
 - Are introducing new and unfamiliar religions
- These fears generally are concentrated among a minority of Americans, but they often drive public discourse about immigration




FIGURE 7-1 Political ideologies and party identification by nativity, 2012.
SOURCE: Data from General Social Survey.




FIGURE 7-2 Beliefs about the proper role of the federal government by nativity, 2012.

SOURCE: Data from General Social Survey.




FIGURE 7-3 Beliefs about whether same-sex couples should marry by nativity, 2002-2012.

SOURCE: Data from General Social Survey.




FIGURE 7-4 Beliefs about the American dream by nativity, 2012.
SOURCE: Data from General Social Survey.




FIGURE 7-5 Linguistically isolated households by language spoken, 2013.
SOURCE: Data from 2013 American Community Survey.




FIGURE 7-6 English-speaking ability of the foreign-born who speak a language other than English at home, 2013.

SOURCE: Data from 2013 American Community Survey; Gambino et al. (2014).





FIGURE 7-7 Religious affiliation of native-born and foreign-born adults in the United States, 2014.

SOURCE: Data from Pew Research Forum (2015). Available: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/chapter-4-the-shifting-religious-identity-of-demographic-groups/pr_15-05-12_rls_chapter4-01/ [November 2015].



Source: Authors' calculations from California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Data, 2005.

Note: Does not include federal inmates.

FIGURE 7-8 Percentage incarcerated in California, by age and place of birth.
SOURCE: Butcher and Piehl (2008). Reprinted with permission.

Sociocultural integration

- Evidence across various sociocultural dimensions is more positive than some fear
- Beliefs of both immigrants and second generation are converging with native-born attitudes on many important social issues
- Immigrants are actually more optimistic than native-born Americans about achieving the American Dream
- Immigrants and their descendants are learning English, despite some people's fears to the contrary
 - Immigrants are learning English at the same rate or faster than earlier waves
 - Spanish has become the dominant immigrant language
 - But language diversity among immigrants has increased



Learning English

- Potential cognitive and economic benefits of bilingualism are beginning to be understood
 - This has the potential to alter debate about language acquisition
- Since 1990, school-age population learning English as a second language has grown at a much faster rate than school-age population overall
 - Nearly 5 million students in K-12 education (9% of all students) are English-language learners
- A serious cause for concern is underfunding of English as a second language (ESL) and English language learner (ELL) programs
 - U.S. primary-secondary education system is not equipped to handle large numbers of English-language learners
 - This could discourage integration prospects of many immigrants and their children



Religion

- As in the past, recent immigration has made the country's religious landscape more diverse
 - But overwhelming majority of immigrants identify as Christian
- Immigrants involved in non-Western religions, especially Islam, may confront prejudice
 - But participation in religious organizations helps immigrants integrate into American society
- Immigration may in fact shore up support for religious organizations as religious affiliation and participation of native-born American declines



Crime

- Crime rates are another source of concern for Americans
 - Criminal propensity of immigrants is being widely discussed
 - These popular perceptions about immigrants' criminality are not supported by data
- Immigration is inversely associated with crime
 - Immigrants are less likely than the native-born to commit crimes
 - Neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants have much lower rates of crime and violence
- However, crime rates rise among second and later generations, perhaps a negative consequence of adaptation to American society



Integration as two-way exchange

- Immigrants and their descendants alter social and cultural environments even as they become more like native-born
- Increases in dual immersion education programs
 - Native-born English-language speakers and immigrant limited English proficient (LEP) students learn together in two languages
 - Enrollment in Spanish at college: Americans are learning to communicate in non-English languages and may value bilingual ability
- Immigrants are sustaining Christian religious congregations in many communities where native-born attendance has declined
 - At the same time, less familiar religions such as Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism become more visible
 - Increasing mainstream discussions about religious diversity and accommodation



Public perceptions

- Public perceptions about immigrants' higher potential for criminality continue to endure
 - Contrary to evidence that immigrants commit fewer crimes than native-born
 - Stimulated by media and highly visible political actors
- Inaccurate perceptions remain salient to the public because
 - Large number of immigrants currently residing in the U.S.
 - Rapid increase in undocumented immigration since 1990
- Historical precedents
 - Religious minorities and large groups of immigrants were able to integrate, despite their differences and prejudices against them
 - They reshaped American mainstream
- Open questions
 - Will new immigrants repeat those success stories?
 - Or will racial/religious differences present barriers to integration?



TEXAS A&M
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Family dimensions

- Family structure can change over time and across societies
- Families serve basic functions
 - Regulates sexual expression and procreation
 - Provides child care and socialization
 - Imposes social roles and rules of lineage on family members
 - Transmits culture: social mores, customs, language, beliefs
- Immigrant families are central in the process of social integration
 - This is where second generation learns to become Americans
- It is important to analyze immigrants and their descendants on
 - Patterns of marriage
 - Family formation
 - Patterns and differentials in immigrant fertility
 - Household structure



TABLE 8-1 Percentage Distributions of Immigrants and Natives Who Married in the Previous Year, 2008-2012
(multiracial individuals excluded)

	Marriages Formed in the Previous Year							
	Same Race							
	Native- Born	Foreign- Born	White	Black	American Indian	Asian	Hispanic	N
Native-born								
Men								
White	89.9	1.6	—	0.6	0.5	2.0	4.2	60,440
Black	73.7	2.3	14.7	—	0.5	1.3	5.6	6,233
American Indian	43.3	0.3	47.9	1.1	—	2.0	4.7	669
Asian	35.6	26.4	28.7	0.6	0.1	—	6.1	967
Hispanic	46.6	13.3	33.6	2.0	0.6	2.4	—	6,039
Women								
White	90.2	1.5	—	1.6	0.5	0.8	4.2	60,229
Black	85.8	4.3	6.0	—	0.1	0.3	2.6	5,355
American Indian	40.8	0.0	46.6	4.6	—	0.6	6.7	711
Asian	31.5	17.7	37.5	3.6	0.6	—	6.9	1,093
Hispanic	42.5	17.8	32.4	4.8	0.3	1.0	—	6,622

Foreign-born
Men

White	47.3	37.2	—	1.3	0.3	5.4	6.7	1,948
Black	23.6	55.2	12.7	—	0.1	1.6	5.3	973
American Indian	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Asian	8.9	75.8	11.1	0.7	0.1	—	2.1	2,174
Hispanic	22.5	62.4	12.5	0.9	0.2	1.2	—	5,229

Women

White	50.2	37.6	—	2.4	0.2	1.8	6.6	1,926
Black	18.7	68.8	7.2	—	0.1	0.7	3.3	780
American Indian	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
Asian	8.4	54.4	29.5	1.9	0.2	—	4.4	3,025
Hispanic	16.8	68.3	11.6	1.7	0.2	0.7	—	4,774

NOTE: “White” in this table actually means non-Hispanic white.

SOURCE: Adapted from Lichter et al. (2015a).

TABLE 8-2 Marriage Patterns of Hispanic Women by Generation, Ages 18-34, 1995-2008

Married to:	Generation			Total
	1st	2nd	3rd and Higher	
Hispanics	94.4	81.3	67.8	86.3
1st	84.6	39.7	10.5	60.5
2nd	7.8	28.3	12.1	12.6
3rd and higher	2.1	13.4	45.1	13.2
Non-Hispanics	5.6	18.7	32.2	13.7
White	4.6	14.8	27.3	11.3
Non-White	0.9	4.0	4.9	2.4
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	4,927	1,528	1,811	8,266

SOURCE: Data from Lichter et al. (2011), based on concatenated files of the March Current Population Survey (1995-2008).

TABLE 8-3 Total Fertility Rates for Immigrants and U.S.-Born Natives

	Immigrants	U.S.-Born
Hispanic	2.54	2.01
Black	2.48	1.83
White	2.05	1.84
Asian	2.10	1.69
All	2.31	1.86

SOURCE: Data from the 2012 American Community Survey.

TABLE 8-4 Living Arrangements of Children by Race and Generation Status (children between ages 0 and 17)

	Two parent	Single parent	No resident Parent
Hispanic			
First generation	70.0	23.0	7.0
Second generation	67.5	28.9	3.6
Third+ generation	54.1	40.1	5.8
Asian			
First generation	82.1	13.7	4.2
Second generation	84.9	13.5	1.7
Third+ generation	75.3	21.4	3.3
Black			
First generation	60.2	32.5	7.3
Second generation	58.7	37.8	3.6
Third+ generation	30.9	60.5	8.6
Non-Hispanic White			
First generation	83.1	13.7	3.2
Second generation	82.2	16.6	1.3
Third+ generation	75.1	22.3	2.6

SOURCE: Data from 2005-2014 March Community Population Survey.

TABLE 8-5 Percentage Living with or without Married Spouses, Alone, in Other Arrangements, or Cohabiting (individuals ages 20 to 34)

	Married, Spouse Present	Married, Spouse Absent	Cohabiting	Lives Alone	Lives with Other Family Members	Lives with Others in Nonfamily Households
Hispanic						
First generation	49.6	3.8	7.9	3.3	23.7	11.8
Second generation	30.7	1.6	8.4	4.8	46.4	8.1
Third+ generation	32.1	1.3	12.3	6.3	37.9	10.1
Asian						
First generation	49.7	3.4	3.7	8.6	23.5	11.1
Second generation	20.5	1.0	6.5	9.6	48.5	13.9
Third+ generation	21.8	0.8	7.8	7.7	44.7	17.2
Black						
First generation	32.9	4.8	5.5	12.4	34.8	9.7
Second generation	13.0	0.7	6.8	12.6	58.3	8.6
Third+ generation	18.7	1.2	9.4	12.1	51.1	7.5
White						
First generation	54.0	2.0	6.8	7.8	19.2	10.3
Second generation	38.8	0.9	9.5	8.8	32.0	10.0
Third+ generation	44.4	0.8	11.5	7.2	25.1	11.0

SOURCE: Data from 2005-2014 March Community Population Survey.

TABLE 8-6 Living Arrangements of Elderly Immigrants Age 65 and Above by Race and Generation Status

	Alone	With Spouse Alone	With Spouse and Children	Other Arrangements
Hispanic				
First generation	18.1	28.4	34.6	19.0
Second generation	25.1	36.8	22.1	16.0
Third generation	24.2	37.4	22.2	16.2
Asian				
First generation	13.9	32.3	38.8	15.0
Second generation	24.0	38.4	20.7	17.0
Third generation	19.3	38.5	28.9	13.3
Black				
First generation	26.3	20.3	31.1	22.3
Second generation	43.2	20.5	15.2	21.2
Third generation	36.4	25.5	16.7	21.5
Non-Hispanic White				
First generation	26.3	44.8	18.1	10.7
Second generation	35.5	44.6	10.0	9.9
Third generation	28.1	50.2	11.4	10.3

SOURCE: Data from 2005-2014 March Community Population Survey.

Integration of family patterns

- Immigrants have adapted to their new environments and resemble family patterns of the native-born non-Hispanic white population
 - Family structure: size and composition
 - Intermarriage
 - Patterns of fertility
 - Family living arrangements
- This happened for European ethnic groups in the last century
- Similar trends among contemporary immigrants

Marriage

- Racial barriers have slowed the growth of ethnoracial intermarriage between immigrants (Hispanics, Asians) and natives
- But marriage rates of U.S. non-Hispanic white population with ethnoracial minorities and immigrants has grown considerably
 - About one of every seven new marriages is an interracial or interethnic marriage, more than twice the rate a generation ago
- Sociocultural boundaries between native-born and foreign-born populations in the U.S. are less clearly defined than in the past
- Second and third generations from minority groups are more likely to marry higher-generation non-Hispanic whites than first generations
- Intermarriages also contribute to the increase in mixed-race Americans



Changes in marriage/family life

- Integration also means that families of new immigrants may increasingly reflect changes in marriage and family life in the U.S.
 - Retreat from marriage
 - More childbearing outside marriage
 - Higher rates of non-marital cohabitation
 - Increasing divorce and remarriage
- Household extension among immigrants has slowly given way to
 - Nuclear family system
 - Rise in nonfamily households (cohabitation, living alone)



Divorce & family composition

- Immigrants' divorce rates and out-of-wedlock birth rates start much lower than native-born Americans
 - Over time and across generations, these rates increase
- Likelihood of living in extended families with multiple generations declines
 - Immigrant and second generation children are much more likely to live in families with two parents than are third+ generations
- Single-parent families of immigrants converges toward native-born
 - Single-parent families are more likely to be impoverished
 - This is a disadvantage going forward



Integration: two-edged sword

- The typical or average family is changing
 - At the same time, America moves toward becoming a majority-minority society
- Strong family and kinship networks of largest immigrant groups (Mexicans and Asians) may influence national indicators
 - Marriage
 - Cohabitation
 - Fertility
 - This might slow the decline of two-parent families in the U.S.
- Rise in ethnoracial intermarriages suggests combination of family styles and demographic processes across culturally diverse populations



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