

# Attitudes toward immigrants

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April 23, 2018  
Migration (SOCL 647)



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# Outline

- Contemporary American attitudes toward immigration
  - Espenshade, Hempstead 1996
  - Chandler, Tsai 2001
  - Haubert, Fussell 2006
- Examples of empirical analyses
  - Chandler, Tsai 2001 (opinion on legal/illegal immigrants)
  - Haubert, Fussell 2006 (crime, economy, jobs, ideas)
  - Amaral, Marquez-Velarde, Mitchell 2018 (number of immigrants)
- Sources of support for immigration restriction (discussion)
  - Shin, Leal, Ellison 2015

# Background

- Social identity
  - Immigration attitudes are developed when a person mentally puts their race in an “in-group” while placing other races in the “out-group” (Stets, Burke 2000)
- The development of these groups can be measured with political party, age, gender, occupation, religion, and region (Espenshade, Hempstead 1996; Fennelly, Federico 2008; Ha 2010; Knoll 2009; Wilson 1996)
  - However, there is not a direct correlation of these variables to “in-groups” and “out-groups”



# Group consciousness

- Some individuals self-identify with a group and desire to engage in collective activity to improve the group's situation
- They are more likely to participate in pro-immigrant activities and express their support for immigrant's rights (Sanchez 2006, 2008)

# Self and group interest

- Labor market competition hypothesis
  - Individual's believes that immigrants affect their job status or standard of living
  - This is especially expressed by people of lower **socioeconomic status** (Burns, Gimpel 2000; Espenshade 1995; Espenshade, Hempstead 1996)
- When majority race believes that minorities are purposely taking advantage of society resources, anti-minority attitudes increase (Blalock 1970)



# Cultural values and beliefs

- Values and beliefs are developed at a young age through the influence of the community, family, and culture (Espenshade, Calhoun 1993; Sears 1997; Sears et al. 1997)
  - Anti-immigration attitudes are developed in areas with strong conservative politicians (Semyonov et al. 2006)
- Religion seems to play a role in defining a person's attitudes toward immigration (Knoll 2009)
  - Positive attitudes are developed by religious groups that welcome minorities or support specific minority groups





# Social interactions

- People tend to dismiss negative thoughts about minority groups through interaction (Hood, Morris 1997; McLaren 2003)
  - A majority group member who lives in an area with many immigrants typically holds a positive attitude toward immigration (Dixon 2006)
  - People with positive attitudes toward immigration are typically wealthier and have more experiences with minority groups (Haubert, Fussell 2006)
- Interactions are more successful when (Pettigrew 1998)
  - People have similar class ranking
  - Local agencies stimulate contact
  - People have similar goals for the community
  - Both want to experience one another



# Stereotypes

- Individual's political and stereotypical beliefs play an important role in the development of immigration attitudes (Berg 2015)
  - Subtle prejudice can be the main factor in developing stereotypes against minority groups, which shapes attitudes toward immigrants (Pettigrew, Meertens 1995)
- Prejudice against Latinos significantly shapes respondents' views on (Shin, Leal, Ellison 2015)
  - Number of immigrants who should be allowed to the U.S.
  - Consequences of immigration in relation to
    - Higher crime rates
    - Job losses for the native-born population
    - Opening up to new ideas and cultures





# Political ideology

- Conservatives tend to hold more negative views toward immigration than liberals (Chandler, Tsai 2001; Haubert, Fussell 2006)
- The relationship between political partisanship and attitudes toward immigrants is not always straightforward (Neiman, Johnson, Bowler 2006)
  - In California, Republicans are more likely to think that immigration has negative effects on social and policy outcomes, but Democrats shared the same concerns

# Age and sex

- Age is positively related to anti-legal immigration attitudes (Chandler, Tsai 2001)
  - Older respondents are more likely to want to decrease the number of legal immigrants
- Women are more likely to be more anti-legal immigration than males
  - But this relationship is not statistically significant for anti-illegal immigration
- Overall, age and sex have not been consistent significant predictors of attitudes toward immigrants (Espenshade, Hempstead 1996; Fetzer 2000; Chandler, Tsai 2001)



# Race

- Race did not have a statistically significant relationship with anti-legal or illegal immigration (Chandler, Tsai 2001)
- Nativity and immigrant background do play a role in immigration attitudes (Haubert, Fussell 2006)
  - White immigrants and non-white immigrants are more likely to have favorable perceptions of immigrants, compared to white natives


# Education

- Level of education influences an individual's pro-immigrant attitude (Berg 2010; Burns, Gimpel 2000; Chandler, Tsai 2001; Espenshade 1995; Haubert, Fussell 2006; Hood, Morris 1997)
  - Individuals tend to form a positive response toward immigrant groups and beneficial government policies
- Disagreement about whether education defines an individual's immigration attitude or only teaches politically correct principles (Jackman, Muha 1984; Janus 2010)
  - This issue could be investigated with longitudinal data



# Income and occupation

- Income did not have a statistically significant relationship with anti-legal or illegal immigration (Chandler, Tsai 2001)
- Occupation significantly predicted negative perceptions of immigrants (Haubert, Fussell 2006)
  - Blue-collar and service workers are more likely to hold negative perceptions
  - Immigrants are perceived as competitors in the labor market for low-skilled jobs



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# Opinion on legal/illegal immigrant

- 1<sup>st</sup> dependent variable from General Social Survey (GSS)
  - “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot”
  - The categories are usually reported collapsed into “increased,” “decreased,” and “kept at present levels”

Table 1

Attitude toward immigration: post war trends

Question: Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?

	1946	1953	1965	1977	1981	1982	1986	1993 <sup>a</sup>	1994 <sup>b</sup>
More/increased	5%	13%	8%	7%	5%	4%	7%	6%	6.4%
Same/present level	32%	37%	39%	37%	22%	23%	35%	27%	28%
Fewer/decreased	37%	39%	33%	42%	65%	66%	49%	65%	65.6%

*Note.* 1946–1986, these trends data are taken from Simon (1987), Table 1. Columns may not add up to 100 due to “don’t know” responses. Also, in 1946, a “none” category was included.

<sup>a</sup> CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, 1993, p. 127

<sup>b</sup> These are the data used in the present study. Note: N = 1379.

Table 2  
Effects of theoretical variables on attitude toward immigration: frequency distribution by percentage

Theoretical variables	Increased	Decreased	N
<b>Personal social attributes:</b>			
A. Sex			
male	6.6%	64.6%	635
female	6.0	66.1	762
B. Race			
white	4.9%	66.6%	1,160
nonwhite	13.1	59.9	237
black	11.0	65.4	182
c. Age			
18–29	7.6%	58.6%	251
30–49	6.5%	65.9%	645
50–64	5.2%	65.9%	270
65 & over	5.7%	70.9%	230
<b>Economic threat:</b>			
A. Perceived national economy			
getting better	6.7%	58.9%	360
about the same	5.7	67.2	613
getting worse	7.1	69.2	406
B. Income			
\$10,00 or less	12.9%	64.4%	163
\$10,000–19,999	4.9	68.2	223
\$20,000 or more	5.5	64.6	876
<b>Fear of crime:</b>			
A. Any area around here or within a mile you would be afraid to walk alone?			
no	5.2%	67.6%	497
yes	7.8%	65.8%	436
B. Do you happen to have in your home or garage any guns or revolvers?			
yes	4.6%	72.6%	394
no	7.9	62.3	530
<b>Political conservatism:</b>			
Where would you place yourself on the scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative?			
liberal	8.0%	58.0%	374
moderate	4.6	68.5	496
conservative	6.0	68.2	485
<b>Cultural threat:</b>			
A. English language used in school			
in native language	10.2%	58.6%	215
native lang 1–2 yrs	5.8	62.9	660
English only	5.3	71.3	491
B. English language used in ballots			
printed in some other	7.0%	61.5%	857
printed in English only	5.3	72.4	508
C. English language as official language			
oppose	8.5%	53.7%	378
neither	9.7	54.0	24
favor	5.0	71.8	859
D. Bilingual education			
strongly favor	9.3%	58.5%	364
somewhat favor	5.7	66.3	540
somewhat oppose	4.7	69.9	236
strongly oppose	4.3	71.3	209

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Theoretical variables	Increased	Decreased	N
<b>Education:</b>			
A. Whether graduated from college			
not college graduated	6.3%	70.3%	1,024
graduated from college	6.2	52.0	369
B. Level of education:			
grade school only	3.7%	66.7%	27
high school	6.9	71.8	656
college	5.8	59.6	710

Note. Rows do not add up to 100 due to omission of "same/present level."

# 2<sup>nd</sup> set of dependent variables

- **Factor analysis** included several variables
  - **Seven questions** about opinion related to **legal immigrants**: (1) item about numbers of immigrants admitted; (2) eligibility for welfare; (3) demands for immigrant rights; (4) whether immigrants should “work their way up” without special favors; and effects of immigration upon (5) economic growth, (6) unemployment, and (7) problems of keeping the country united
  - **Three questions** about opinion related to **illegal immigrants**: (1) whether illegal immigrants should be entitled to work permits; (2) allowed to attend public universities at the same cost as other students; and (3) whether their children should continue to qualify as citizens when born in the U.S.
- It generated **two distinguishable factors**
  1. Variables concerning legal immigrants (anti-legal)
  2. Variables having to do with illegal immigrants (anti-illegal)



# Multiple regression models

Table 3

Attitude toward legal and illegal immigrants: The full multiple regression models


Independent variables	Legal immigrants b (beta)	Illegal immigrants b (beta)
age (actual age)	.005* (.078)*	-.003 (-.043)
race (white = 1, else = 0)	.047 (0.18)	.094 (.035)
sex (male = 1, female = 2)	.185* (.092)*	-.097 (-.043)
national economy	.139* (.104)*	-.075 (-.056)
college graduated	-.557* (-.248)*	.021 (.009)
cultural threat	.293* (.292)*	.150* (.150)*
political conservatism	.076* (.108)*	.048* (.068)*
Constant	-.987	.136
R Square	.218	.041
N	<u>1.061</u>	<u>1.061</u>

*Note.* Unless otherwise noted, all the independent variable (s) except college graduation are expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variables: attitude toward legal immigrant and illegal immigration.

\* Statistically significant at .05 level.







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# Crime, economy, jobs, ideas

- Data from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS)
- The dependent variable is an additive scale that estimates respondent's perceptions of immigrants' impact on the national economy and society
- Haubert and Fussell (2006) recoded the items so that higher scores consistently represent more favorable perceptions of immigrants





**TABLE 1**  
**DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

Variable	Description	Mean	S.D.
<b>Dependent Variables</b>			
Additive scale	Scale of following four questions	12.37	3.13
Crime	Immigrants increase crime rates	3.03	0.03
Economy	Immigrants are generally good for the nation's economy	3.02	0.03
Jobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America	2.74	0.03
Ideas & culture	Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures	3.58	0.03
<b>Independent Variables</b>			
Age	Age of respondent	42.79	15.56
Male	Respondent is male	0.48	–
Northeast	Lives in the Northeast	0.19	–
South	Lives in the South	0.32	–
Midwest	Lives in the Midwest	0.26	–
West	Lives in the West	0.23	–
White native	White and not of immigrant origin	0.73	–
White immigrant	White and of immigrant origin	0.12	–
Non-white immigrant	Non-white and of immigrant origin	0.04	–
Non-white native	Non-white and not of immigrant origin	0.11	–
White-collar	Works in a white-collar occupation	0.57	–
Blue-collar	Works in a blue-collar occupation	0.24	–
Service	Works in a service occupation	0.16	–
Not working	Retired, student, unemployed, or keeps house	0.03	–
No (4yr) college	No college degree	0.73	–
College	College degree (4yr)	0.19	–
Graduate school	Graduate degree	0.08	–
Liberal	Liberal or extremely liberal	0.15	–
Neutral	Slightly liberal or conservative, middle of the road	0.65	–
Conservative	Conservative or extremely conservative	0.20	–
Ethnocentric ideology	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans	2.78	1.07
Ever lived abroad	A non-immigrant who has ever lived abroad	0.15	–

Note: Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.



**TABLE 2**  
**REGRESSION OF THE SCALE OF PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00
Male	0.24 (0.19)	0.10 (0.18)	0.48 (0.20)	0.33 (0.19)	0.42 (0.19)	0.07
Northeast	-0.42 (0.29)	-0.46 (0.29)	-0.37 (0.28)	-0.36 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.27)	-0.04
South	-10.24 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)	-0.92 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)	-0.87 <sup>b</sup> (0.25)	-0.75 <sup>a</sup> (0.24)	-0.49 (0.24)	-0.08
Midwest	-0.75 <sup>a</sup> (0.27)	-0.44 (0.27)	-0.35 (0.26)	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.25)	-0.02
West	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Group Threat</b>						
White native	-	-	-	-	-	-
White immigrant	-	1.57 <sup>b</sup> (0.29)	1.58 <sup>b</sup> (0.29)	1.53 <sup>b</sup> (0.28)	1.59 <sup>b</sup> (0.27)	0.17 <sup>b</sup>
Non-white immigrant	-	2.50 <sup>b</sup> (0.47)	2.67 <sup>b</sup> (0.46)	2.67 <sup>b</sup> (0.45)	2.83 <sup>b</sup> (0.43)	0.19 <sup>b</sup>
Non-white native	-	-0.34 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.01
<b>Labor Market Competition</b>						
White-collar	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blue-collar	-	-	-10.48 <sup>b</sup> (0.23)	-0.78 <sup>b</sup> (0.25)	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.24)	-0.10 <sup>a</sup>
Service	-	-	-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.25)	-0.17 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.25)	-0.01
Not working	-	-	-1.32 (0.54)	-0.65 (0.53)	-0.51 (0.51)	-0.03
<b>Education</b>						
No college	-	-	-	-1.36 <sup>b</sup> (0.25)	-1.04 <sup>b</sup> (0.25)	-0.15 <sup>b</sup>
College	-	-	-	-	-	-
Graduate school	-	-	-	0.92 (0.37)	0.88 (0.36)	0.08 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Cosmopolitanism/Parochialism</b>						
Liberal	-	-	-	-	0.62 (0.25)	0.07
Neutral	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conservative	-	-	-	-	0.24 (0.22)	0.03
Reject ethnocentrism	-	-	-	-	0.62 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	0.21 <sup>b</sup>
Ever lived abroad (Natives)	-	-	-	-	0.65 <sup>a</sup> (0.25)	0.08 <sup>a</sup>
Intercept	13.18 <sup>b</sup>	12.86 <sup>b</sup>	13.13 <sup>b</sup>	13.74 <sup>b</sup>	11.09 <sup>b</sup>	-
Number of cases	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083	-
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.07	0.11	0.15	0.21	-

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.

<sup>a</sup>p < 0.01.

<sup>b</sup>p < 0.001.



TABLE 3  
REGRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL SCALE ITEMS ON THE FINAL MODEL


	Crime	Econ	Jobs	Ideas
Control Variables				
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Male	-0.02 (0.07)	0.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	0.14 (0.07)	0.14 (0.06)
Northeast	0.02 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)
South	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)
Midwest	0.11 (0.09)	-0.48 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)
West	-	-	-	-
Group Threat				
White native	-	-	-	-
White immigrant	0.33 <sup>b</sup> (0.10)	0.52 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)	0.35 <sup>b</sup> (0.10)	0.39 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)
Non-white immigrant	0.61 <sup>b</sup> (0.16)	0.81 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)	0.87 <sup>b</sup> (0.16)	0.55 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)
Non-white native	-0.05 (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)
Labor Market Competition				
White-collar	-	-	-	-
Blue-collar	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.08)	-0.23 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	-0.16 (0.08)
Service	0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)
Not working	-0.15 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.17)
Education				
No college	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)	-0.22 <sup>a</sup> (0.08)	-0.27 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	-0.26 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)
College	-	-	-	-
Graduate school	0.31 (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.23 (0.13)	0.15 (0.12)
Cosmopolitanism/Parochialism				
Liberal	0.12 (0.09)	0.17 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0.22 <sup>a</sup> (0.08)
Neutral	-	-	-	-
Conservative	0.03 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)	0.11 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
Reject ethnocentrism	0.22 <sup>b</sup> (0.03)	0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.03)	0.20 <sup>b</sup> (0.03)	0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.03)
Ever lived abroad (Natives)	0.00 (0.09)	0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	0.26 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)
Intercept	2.62 <sup>b</sup>	2.69 <sup>b</sup>	2.45 <sup>b</sup>	3.33 <sup>b</sup>
Number of cases	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.11

Notes: Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.

<sup>a</sup>p < 0.01.

<sup>b</sup>p < 0.001.





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# Opinion about number of immigrants

- What social characteristics are ascribed to those who are anti or pro-immigration?
- Investigate main factors associated with immigration attitudes in the United States
- Investigate several years of data: 1996–2016
- Explore disaggregated information on
  - Age group
  - Education degree
  - Political party identification





# Data

- Analyze cross-sectional cumulative data from the General Social Survey (GSS), 1996–2016

Year	Sample size
1996	1,141
2004	1,983
2008	1,294
2010	1,393
2012	1,262
2014	1,624
2016	1,845
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,542</b>

- Association of attitudes toward immigration with demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables






# Dependent variable

- Opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays
  1. Reduced a lot
  2. Reduced a little
  3. Remain the same as it is
  4. Increased a little
  5. Increased a lot
- Grouped into a three-category variable
  1. Reduce immigration
  2. Remain the same
  3. Increase immigration



# Opinion about immigration




# Political party affiliation

- Detailed information on political party affiliation
  1. Strong Democrat
  2. Democrat
  3. Independent, near Democrats
  4. Independent
  5. Independent, near Republicans
  6. Republican
  7. Strong Republican
  8. Other party
- Previous studies usually aggregated party into Democrats, Independents, and Republicans




# Political party affiliation




■ Strong Democrat   
 ■ Democrat   
 ■ Ind., near Dem.   
 ■ Independent  
■ Ind., near Rep.   
■ Republican   
■ Strong Republican   
■ Other party

# Immigration opinion and party


## Strong democrats




## Democrats



## Republicans




## Strong republicans




# Other independent variables

- Year
  - 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016

- Sex




- Race/ethnicity (Hispanic available since 2000)






# Birth cohort & Age

- Millennials (born in 1980 or after) are more in favor of immigration than non-millennials (Ross, Rouse 2015)




- Age group provided a deeper understanding on attitudes toward immigrants




# Education

- Education degree




- College completion



# Occupation

- Aggregated as 2010 Census Occupation Codes



Codes: [https://www.census.gov/people/io/files/2010\\_OccCodeswithCrosswalkfrom2002-2011nov04.xls](https://www.census.gov/people/io/files/2010_OccCodeswithCrosswalkfrom2002-2011nov04.xls)  
Source: 2016 General Social Survey.



Source: Amaral, Marquez-Velarde, Mitchell 2018.

# Multinomial logistic regression

- Association of several independent variables ( $x'_i$ ) with the opinion about how should the number of immigrants be in the country ( $y_i$ )

Reduce immigration  
(reference)  $Pr(y_i = 1|x_i) = P_{i1} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(x'_i\beta_2) + \exp(x'_i\beta_3)}$

Remain the same  $Pr(y_i = 2|x_i) = P_{i2} = \frac{\exp(x'_i\beta_2)}{1 + \exp(x'_i\beta_2) + \exp(x'_i\beta_3)}$

Increase immigration  $Pr(y_i = 3|x_i) = P_{i3} = \frac{\exp(x'_i\beta_3)}{1 + \exp(x'_i\beta_2) + \exp(x'_i\beta_3)}$

- Note: Sex was not statistically significant (results not shown)




# Relative risk ratios

$$[(\text{Exponential of coefficient}) - 1] * 100$$

- Next graphs show relative risk ratios
  1. Relative probability of immigration remaining the same over reducing immigration
  2. Relative probability of increasing immigration over reducing immigration
- e.g., relative probability of being
  - in favor of an increase in immigration rather than
  - being in favor of a reduction in immigration (ref.) is
  - 48% lower for Republicans than for Democrats (ref.)
  - **Not the same** as saying: probability of being in favor of an increase in immigration is lower for Republicans

# Political party relative risks ratios


Reduce immigration as baseline



\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004–2016 General Social Survey.

# Year relative risk ratios


Reduce immigration as baseline



\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004–2016 General Social Survey.

# Race/ethnicity relative risk ratios

Reduce immigration as baseline




\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004–2016 General Social Survey.



# Age group relative risk ratios


Reduce immigration as baseline



\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004-2016 General Social Survey.

# Education relative risk ratios


Reduce immigration as baseline



\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004–2016 General Social Survey.

# Occupation relative risks ratios

Reduce immigration as baseline



\*Significant at least at  $p < .05$ . Source: 2004–2016 General Social Survey.


# Marginal effects

- Marginal effects allow us to determine the effect of political party in the probability scale
  - Estimate **individual** predicted probabilities for each political party, year, and outcome
    1. Reduce immigration
    2. Remain the same
    3. Increase immigration
  - **Average** these probabilities by political party, year, and outcome
  - Estimate **difference to Democrats** for each year and outcome
- We also do this exercise for specific subgroups
  - Men, White, 25–44, High School, Construction
  - Men, Hispanic, 25–44, High School, Construction
  - Men, White, 25–44, Bachelor, Management
  - Men, Hispanic, 25–44, Bachelor, Management




# Marginal effects, reduce immigration

Based on average of individual predicted probabilities




# Marginal effects, reduce immigration


Men, White, 25–44,  
High school, Construction




Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
High school, Construction



Men, White, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management




Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management



# Marginal effects, remain the same


Based on average of individual predicted probabilities






# Marginal effects, remain the same


**Men, White, 25–44,  
High school, Construction**




**Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
High school, Construction**



**Men, White, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management**




**Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management**




# Marginal effects, increase immigration

Based on average of individual predicted probabilities




# Marginal effects, increase immigration


Men, White, 25–44,  
High school, Construction




Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
High school, Construction



Men, White, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management



Men, Hispanic, 25–44,  
Bachelor, Management



# Final considerations

- Differentials on attitudes toward immigration by political party affiliation are not dubious (Neiman, Johnson, Bowler 2006)
  - Republicans tend to desire immigration reduction
  - Democrats express opinion for immigration levels to remain the same or to increase
- Differentials by political party over time
  - **Reduce immigration**
    - Differentials grew for lower educated white men in natural resources/construction/maintenance occupations
    - Differentials decreased for higher educated Hispanic men in management/science/arts occupations
  - **Increase immigration**
    - Differentials grew by political party over time



# Next steps

- Explore other dependent variables related to attitudes toward immigration
  - America should exclude illegal immigrants
  - Immigrants increase crime rates
  - Immigrants are good for America
  - Immigrants take jobs away
  - Legal immigrants should have the same rights as Americans



# Next steps


- Investigate other independent variables
  - Geographic information
    - Region of interview
    - Region of residence at age 16
    - Type of place lived at age 16 (farm, little town, big city...)
    - State, county, census tract (restricted data)
  - Subjective class identification
  - Self ranking of social position
  - Religion in which raised and religious preference
  - Political views (liberal-conservative scale)
  - Opinions about economy and government spending
  - Marital status





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