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## **Immigration, Domestic Migration, and Demographic Balkanization in America: New Evidence for the 1990s**

WILLIAM H. FREY

THE IMPACTS of post-1965 immigration to the United States have come under a great deal of recent scrutiny by commentators (e.g., Brimelow 1995; Chavez 1995) and academics (e.g., Borjas 1994; Simon 1996) as well as a bipartisan federal commission (S.F. Martin 1993). The immigration legislation of 1965 overturned national origin quotas that favored European immigrants, replacing it with a more open system that emphasizes migrant family reunification. These changes, coupled with economic pressures in new origin countries, dramatically transformed the scope of immigration over the past three decades. Because the new immigration is heavily drawn from developing countries in Latin America and Asia and consists disproportionately of the less well-off and relatively unskilled, the current debate has focused on the economic consequences for native-born workers, taxpayers, and government programs.

An equally important impact, which is given much less emphasis, involves the social and demographic division that this immigration is creating across the national geographic landscape. This division is evident from a series of analyses conducted from detailed 1990 census migration statistics (Frey 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c), which indicate that: (1) Most recent immigrants still locate in a small number of traditional port-of-entry states and metropolitan areas. (2) The greatest domestic migrant gains occur in different areas from those attracting recent immigrants. (3) There is a unique, accentuated outmigration of low-income, less-skilled domestic migrants from high immigration areas.

These migration patterns portend an emergent “demographic balkanization”<sup>1</sup> across broad regions of the country (Frey 1995b). Under this scenario, areas where immigrants account for most of the demographic change will become increasingly multicultural, younger, and more bifurcated in their race and class structures. Other parts of the country, whose growth is more dependent on internal migration flows, will become far less multicultural in their demographic makeup and will differ as well in other social, demographic, and political dimensions.

What is new about this scenario is its geographic scope. Historically, new immigrant and other race and ethnic groups have become segregated across neighborhoods or between central cities and suburbs. More recently, the emergence of entire metropolitan areas or labor market regions that are distinct from the rest of the country in their race, ethnic, and demographic makeup introduces a new dimension.

While this new scenario is suggested by the detailed 1990 census migration analyses, its emergence depends on the continuation of these selective migration patterns. Below I review evidence for the first half of the 1990s in order to update those earlier studies. While immigration continues to focus on traditional port-of-entry metropolitan areas, internal migration is again directed largely to other parts of the country—responding to the geographic impacts of the early-1990s recession and new employment gains in the Rocky Mountain and Southwest states. There is also evidence of a continued early-1990s domestic outmigration from high immigration areas that is, again, accentuated among low-income and less-skilled residents.

The next section contrasts the distinctive destinations for immigrants and internal migrants for both the last half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The section that follows discusses arguments and evidence pertinent to the view that domestic outmigration from high immigration areas is a response, in part, to immigration itself. The final section focuses on the extent to which a demographic balkanization associated with these separate migration patterns appears to be emerging in the mid-1990s.

### **Immigrant magnets and domestic migrant magnets**

Central to the discussion of a potential demographic balkanization created by separate immigration and internal migration patterns is the distinction between the types of areas that are gaining from immigration and those gaining from internal migration. The distinction is explained by the different motivations for these two types of migration. Because current immigration policy gives priority to family reunification, immigration to the United States from foreign countries tends to occur in “chains” that link

family members and friends to common destinations (Massey et al. 1994). This is especially the case for lower-skilled immigrants, who are much more dependent on their family and friends to integrate them into informal job networks in traditional port-of-entry areas.

Internal migrants, on the other hand, tend to be less constrained in their destinations and more apt to respond to “pushes” and “pulls” of the labor market, as well as other amenities, which occasionally shift in response to economic cycles and global economic forces (Long 1988). For most of this century, the port-of-entry areas for immigrants were also attractive employment centers for internal migrants, so that these areas grew from both sources of migration. This has not been the case in the past decade, however, as I indicate below.

I begin with a discussion of how immigrants and internal migrants are attracted to different destinations at the geographic levels of states, metropolitan areas, and nonmetropolitan territory.

### Migration classification of states, 1990–95

Because internal migrants are attracted to destinations other than the traditional port-of-entry states of immigrants, it is possible to classify states into “high immigration states” and “high internal migration states.” The former represent states that receive the largest number of immigrants but where immigration is not overwhelmed by internal migration. The latter represent states that receive the greatest number of internal migrants and where internal migration substantially dominates immigration as a component of change.

Table 1 presents the high immigration states and high internal migration states as defined by the migration patterns of 1985–90 and 1990–95.<sup>2</sup> High immigration states are the same for both periods and include the port-of-entry states: California, New York, Texas, Illinois, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. The high internal migration states that attracted more than 200,000 net internal migrants differ over the two five-year periods, however. (Florida is included in this group because its internal migration contribution substantially exceeds its immigration contribution.)

Florida and Georgia appear at the top of this list for both periods. It is clear that the states in the South Atlantic division and the Mountain and Pacific divisions were attractive to internal migrants during each period. Some Mountain states, such as Colorado, suffered declines in the late 1980s but rebounded in the early 1990s (Miller 1994). In fact, the western states, in general, were more prominent in attracting internal migrants in the early 1990s.

Most of the high immigration states show negative results for internal migrants during both periods, suggesting that employment or amenity

TABLE 1 A migration classification of US states for 1985–90 and 1990–95

State	Contribution to 1985–90 population change		State	Contribution to 1990–95 population change	
	Immigration	Net internal migration		Immigration	Net internal migration
<b>High immigration states<sup>a</sup>—1985–90</b>			<b>High immigration states<sup>a</sup>—1990–95</b>		
California	1,356,920	173,586	California	1,314,792	–1,531,979
New York	550,846	–820,886	New York	546,713	–1,001,379
Texas	268,498	–331,369	Texas	355,295	318,840
New Jersey	186,510	–193,533	Illinois	221,926	–283,043
Illinois	173,548	–342,144	New Jersey	184,887	–220,131
Massachusetts	133,897	–96,732	Massachusetts	78,527	–181,117
<b>High internal migration states<sup>b</sup> —1985–90</b>			<b>High internal migration states<sup>b</sup> —1990–95</b>		
Florida	314,039	1,071,682	Florida	245,482	615,670
Georgia	51,419	302,597	Georgia	39,792	344,574
North Carolina	32,059	280,882	Arizona	48,302	291,661
Virginia	90,133	227,872	North Carolina	22,359	269,440
Washington	67,145	216,270	Washington	61,032	257,234
Arizona	56,518	216,177	Colorado	27,889	244,969
			Nevada	18,447	227,145
			Tennessee	13,241	217,044

<sup>a</sup>States with the largest immigration (excepting Florida, where internal migration substantially dominates)

<sup>b</sup>States with the largest net internal migration, which substantially exceeds immigration

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from special 1990 US census migration tabulations and US census postcensus estimates.

attractions for them lie elsewhere. Of course, favorable economic conditions can also *attract* internal migrants to these states, as was the case for California in the late 1980s and Texas in the early 1990s. In some respects, these two states are “mirror images” of each other for these two periods. For Texas, hard times in the oil and gas industries characterized the late 1980s, whereas the economy rebounded as it diversified in the early 1990s. California’s economy stumbled badly during the 1989–92 recession and the defense cutbacks of the early 1990s (Gabriel, Matthey, and Wascher 1995) after faring relatively well in the late 1980s. Yet, evidence discussed below suggests that some of this outmigration may also be a response to immigration.

### Migration classification of metropolitan areas, 1990–95

Unlike states, metropolitan areas conform more closely to the concept of the labor market or community in the broad sense. They are probably the

most appropriate geographic units for examining migration patterns. Yet, as with states, we find a fairly clear distinction between the primary destinations for recent immigrants to the United States and those that attract internal migrants (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Furthermore, the high immigration metropolitan areas constitute the same set of places for both periods of analysis, while the high internal migration metropolitan areas—following the patterns for states—change in accordance with geographic fluctuations in the economy.

The ten high immigration metropolitan areas dominate as destinations for international migrants over both periods (attracting 67 percent and 69 percent of all immigrants in 1985–90 and 1990–95, respectively). Most of these are traditional port-of-entry areas for US immigrants, with locations such as San Diego, Houston, and Dallas ascending to this role as entrants from Latin America increased their share of the country's immigrant pool. Washington, D.C., as the nation's capital, draws a more diverse array of immigrants, in terms of origins and skills, than most of the other port-of-entry areas in Table 2.

Another parallel with the state-level analysis is that most of these high immigration metropolitan areas sustain negligible or negative net internal migration over both periods. The shift to a metropolitan area analysis makes plain that Miami should be treated differently from the rest of Florida, as its population gains clearly come predominantly from immigration. Still, the net domestic migration levels tend to fluctuate across most of these areas between the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part reflecting changing economic circumstances.

The shifts are again most dramatic for metropolitan areas in California and Texas. Los Angeles was especially hard hit during the early 1990s through a combination of recessions, defense cutbacks, and natural disasters. Already experiencing a net loss of migrants in the late 1980s, Los Angeles experienced an acceleration of this pattern during 1992–95 (see Figure 2). San Diego, the only high immigration metropolitan area that grew substantially from internal migration over the late 1980s, was affected by substantial employment losses, leading to a sharp reversal in its domestic migration. San Francisco was somewhat less affected than the southern California areas but still exhibited higher domestic migration losses in the early 1990s.

Of the two high immigration metropolitan areas in Texas, Houston displayed the greater domestic migration reversal. Partially affected by the late-1980s petroleum-related declines, its economy rebounded in the early 1990s, leading to domestic migration gains over the first three years of the decade (see Figure 2). Dallas, which receives the lowest number of immigrants of the high immigration metropolitan areas, showed more consistent domestic migration gains over the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its more

**TABLE 2 High immigration and high internal migration metropolitan areas for the periods 1985–90 and 1990–95**

Contribution to 1985-90 population change			Contribution to 1990-95 population change		
Metropolitan area <sup>a</sup>	Immigration	Net internal migration	Metropolitan area <sup>a</sup>	Immigration	Net internal migration
High immigration metropolitan areas—1985-90					
Los Angeles, California	842,675	-174,673	Los Angeles, California	792,712	-1,095,455
New York, New York	714,346	-1,058,078	New York, New York	705,939	-1,113,924
San Francisco, California	262,185	-103,498	San Francisco, California	262,519	-260,961
Miami, Florida	194,491	45,287	Chicago, Illinois	216,309	-279,763
Washington, D. C.	163,696	103,616	Miami, Florida	157,059	-4,631
Chicago, Illinois	160,760	-285,204	Washington, D. C.	125,479	-91,643
Boston, Massachusetts	123,958	-75,331	Houston, Texas	110,323	45,017
San Diego, California	96,350	126,855	San Diego, California	85,025	-140,591
Houston, Texas	82,964	-142,562	Boston, Massachusetts	74,316	-165,822
Dallas, Texas	63,289	37,925	Dallas, Texas	72,246	75,978
High internal migration metropolitan areas—1985-90					
Atlanta, Georgia	31,799	205,010	Atlanta, Georgia	32,391	259,094
Seattle, Washington	46,886	183,820	Las Vegas, Nevada	12,501	211,536
Tampa, Florida	23,905	159,112	Phoenix, Arizona	27,516	165,760
Orlando, Florida	27,842	154,520	Portland, Oregon	22,618	128,878
Las Vegas, Nevada	14,979	152,197	Denver, Colorado	22,360	118,696
Phoenix, Arizona	33,789	145,226	Seattle, Washington	42,617	89,347
Sacramento, California	28,366	117,732	Austin, Texas	10,253	86,696
West Palm Beach, Florida	17,993	107,940	Raleigh, North Carolina	6,175	86,016
Portland, Oregon	22,939	73,294	Orlando, Florida	16,675	80,685
Raleigh, North Carolina	9,824	72,390	Tampa, Florida	18,297	77,650
Charlotte, North Carolina	5,859	66,961	West Palm Beach, Florida	18,899	74,903
Daytona Beach, Florida	4,088	66,773	Charlotte, North Carolina	6,214	69,198
Norfolk, Virginia	12,868	60,704	Nashville, Tennessee	5,096	63,592

<sup>a</sup>The metropolitan area definitions are consistent with Office of Management and Budget definitions of Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs), Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and New England County Metropolitan Area (NECMA) counterparts as of 30 June 1995. Official names are abbreviated by naming the primary central city and state. SOURCE: Compiled by the author from special 1990 US census migration tabulations and US Census postcensus estimates.

**FIGURE 1** High immigration and high internal migration metropolitan areas







FIGURE 2 Annual immigration and internal migration rates<sup>a</sup> for high immigration metropolitan areas, 1990–95



diversified economic base was able to weather the late-1980s economic downturns that affected Houston more severely.

All of the other high immigration metropolitan areas showed a negative domestic net migration in the early 1990s. New York and Chicago, the two largest non-California ports-of-entry, showed consistently high net out-migration levels over the entire 1985–95 period. Miami's modest domestic gains of the late 1980s turned to losses for part of the early 1990s, whereas Washington, D.C. sustained more consistent although modest losses for 1990–95. Finally, Boston's domestic net outmigration was most pronounced in the early 1990s, reflecting the area's employment declines.

While it is clear that the trends in domestic migration for the high immigration metropolitan areas are shaped by changing economic circumstances imposed by recessions and industry-specific growth patterns, the most dominant of these areas (Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago) show a consistent net outmigration vis-à-vis other parts of the country over the 1985–95 period; and the rest (with the exception of San Diego prior to the 1990s defense cutbacks) display fluctuating levels of declines or modest gains. These patterns are consistent with the possibility that immigration itself may exert some impact on domestic migration patterns, irrespective of the current economic conditions.

As a consequence of the regional economic fluctuations of the late 1980s to the early 1990s discussed earlier, most of the high internal migration metropolitan areas differ across these two periods. (These metropolitan areas are defined as those with the greatest numerical net internal migration gains over the period, where internal migration substantially dominates immigration as a component of population growth.<sup>3</sup>) The ascendancy of metropolitan areas in the western United States outside of California is apparent from the improved rankings of Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Portland, as well as the new inclusion of Denver on the 1990–95 list (Table 2). This, in part, reflects the reemergence of this region attendant on the wider dissemination of industries involved with computers, telecommunications, and entertainment/recreation. It also explains the inclusion of Austin as the single Texas area classified as a high internal migration metropolitan area. In addition to the resurgence of these western and southwestern areas, metropolitan areas in the southeast continue to attract internal migrants from other parts of the country. Atlanta continues to gain the largest number of domestic migrants of any metropolitan area in the United States; and Raleigh and Charlotte, North Carolina; Orlando, Tampa, and West Palm Beach, Florida; and Nashville, Tennessee continue to attract large numbers of domestic migrants. Corporate relocations to more pro-business environments, the growth of new knowledge-based industries around universities, and the attraction of these warmer states for northern retirees all help to explain the attraction of these areas to domestic migrants.

## Dispersed regional and nonmetropolitan destinations

The geographic separation of immigrant and domestic “magnet” metropolitan areas, just reviewed, suggests how current migration patterns may be laying the groundwork for more balkanized demographic structures emerging across different labor market and community areas. Another perspective can be gained by focusing on how these two types of migration differ in their broad regional destinations and across the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan continuum. Historically, immigrants have been prone to focus primarily on large metropolitan areas, and, as discussed above, this is the case through the early 1990s. However, since the early 1970s the overall population of the United States has experienced various stages of dispersement—both regionally, away from the Northeast and Midwest census regions toward the “Sun Belt,” and spatially, toward smaller-sized and even nonmetropolitan areas. While over three-quarters of Americans reside in metropolitan areas, and half live in areas with more than one million population (mostly in the suburbs), early-1990s statistics suggest a re-emergence of population dispersal, first observed in the 1970s (Johnson and Beale 1995). This raises the question: Is the recent dispersal across regions and toward smaller areas a product of domestic migration alone?

The attractions of smaller areas, particularly in the western region, have been extolled in popular accounts which suggest that urban outmigrants, especially from fast-growing multi-ethnic areas, are searching for the lifestyles found in smaller, slower-paced communities (Kotkin 1996). Still, economic shifts, be they in small manufacturing, recreation, or the ability to conduct business via telecommuting, must be put in place before any widespread population dispersal can occur. Evidence from the early 1990s shows that nonmetropolitan employment growth has gained on growth in metropolitan areas of the country (Fuguitt and Beale 1995). The migration data shown in Table 3 and Figure 3 confirm that there is a dispersal toward smaller and nonmetropolitan areas in the first half of the 1990s, and that it is dominated by the movement of internal migrants. Moreover, those parts of the country that exhibit the highest internal migration gains exhibit some of the lowest gains via immigration. These include nonmetropolitan territory in the West census region, as well as smaller metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan territory in the South. Among census divisions, the Mountain division within the West region shows the highest rate of growth and counterbalances the sharp decline in the Pacific census division. Clearly, the redistribution away from larger metropolitan areas in California is rippling out into smaller, nonmetropolitan territories in other parts of the West.

The preceding review makes plain that the state, metropolitan area, regional, and nonmetropolitan destinations of domestic migrants differ


**TABLE 3 Rates of immigration and net internal migration for census regions, census divisions, and metropolitan–nonmetropolitan categories**

Geographic category	Immigration rates <sup>a</sup>		Net internal migration rates <sup>a</sup>	
	1985–90	1990–95	1985–90	1990–95
<b>Census regions and census divisions<sup>b</sup></b>				
Northeast				
New England	1.9	1.0	–0.2	–2.9
Middle Atlantic	2.3	2.1	–3.1	–3.4
Midwest				
East North Central	0.8	0.8	–1.7	–0.8
West North Central	0.5	0.4	–1.2	0.6
South				
South Atlantic	1.6	1.1	5.3	2.9
East South Central	0.3	0.2	0.9	2.5
West South Central	1.2	1.4	–2.8	1.4
West				
Mountain	1.2	1.0	1.1	7.6
Pacific	4.4	3.7	1.2	–2.9
<b>Census regions and metropolitan–nonmetropolitan categories</b>				
Northeast				
Large metropolitan areas <sup>c</sup>	2.8	2.4	–3.9	–4.3
Other metropolitan areas	0.9	0.5	1.1	–1.3
Nonmetropolitan areas	0.5	0.2	2.1	0.2
Midwest				
Large metropolitan areas <sup>c</sup>	1.1	1.2	–1.8	–1.5
Other metropolitan areas	0.6	0.3	–0.5	–0.1
Nonmetropolitan areas	0.3	0.1	–2.0	1.4
South				
Large metropolitan areas <sup>c</sup>	2.2	1.7	2.3	1.8
Other metropolitan areas	0.9	0.7	2.8	2.8
Nonmetropolitan areas	0.3	0.3	0.1	2.6
West				
Large metropolitan areas <sup>c</sup>	4.5	3.6	1.4	–2.1
Other metropolitan areas	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.0
Nonmetropolitan areas	1.0	0.9	–1.0	6.2
Total United States				
Large metropolitan areas <sup>c</sup>	2.7	2.3	–0.5	–1.6
Other metropolitan areas	1.1	0.8	1.6	1.4
Nonmetropolitan areas	0.4	0.3	–0.6	2.5

<sup>a</sup>Rate per 100 population over five-year period<sup>b</sup>Figure 3 depicts the four census regions and nine census divisions.<sup>c</sup>Large metropolitan areas have 1995 populations greater than one million.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from special 1990 US census migration tabulations and US census postcensus estimates.

**FIGURE 3** Fastest-growing counties from immigration and internal migration within nine census divisions, 1990–95



sharply from the destinations of recent immigrants. Different sets of state and metropolitan area “magnets” for each group, as well as renewed domestic migration dispersal to smaller-sized places and less-developed regions, are further evidence that these two migration processes remain distinct.

### Does immigration exert a “push effect”?

The different destinations of immigrants and internal migrants reflect, in large part, the different motivations of each toward following social ties and informal networks, on the one hand, and behaving in a more “economically rational” manner on the other. Yet, research prior to the 1990s suggested that immigration may provide the impetus for some of the domestic outmovement from high immigration states and high immigration metropolitan areas. This possible “immigrant push”<sup>4</sup> was suggested in areas that were doing relatively well economically and were *attracting* domestic migrants from members of demographic groups that were less affected by immigrants (e.g., college graduates who moved into California during the state’s relatively prosperous 1985–90 period, while less-educated domestic migrants were moving out).

It is, in fact, the uniqueness of the population groups that depart from high immigration states and metropolitan areas which suggests that immigration may be exerting a selective impact on domestic outmigration. Unlike more conventional migration, which tends to attract college graduates to areas with high-paying or fast-growing employment opportunities (Long 1988), there was a unique and consistent pattern of outmigration among high school graduates, high school dropouts, and lower-income residents away from most high immigration metropolitan areas (Frey 1995b) and high immigration states (Frey 1994, 1995a, 1995d) in the 1985–90 period. A similar “downwardly selective” outmigration from such areas was evident for 1975–80 as well (Walker, Ellis, and Barff 1992; Filer 1992).

A possible connection between immigration and this unique outward selectivity is consistent with a number of explanations. First, relatively low-skilled immigrants provide competition for jobs with poorly educated long-term and native-born residents, and, therefore, they serve to bid down their wages and take away employment opportunities (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996).<sup>5</sup> Second, longer-term residents may hold the perception, correctly or not, that the new immigrants contribute to a variety of social costs, including higher crime rates, reduced services, or increased taxes, that imply greater out-of-pocket expenses for poor and middle-class residents. Patterns of public support for California’s 1994 state-wide referendum on Proposition 187, which would restrict *illegal* immigrants’ access to state services (P. Martin 1995), show that the perceived immigrant burden is widespread. Espenshade and Calhoun’s (1993) analysis of California’s public

opinion data show strong anti-immigrant sentiment among residents who view immigrants as a burden. A final factor is racial and ethnic prejudice, which has long been known to affect local moves across neighborhoods and between cities and suburbs. It is conceivable that the increased multi-ethnic presence that now characterizes entire metropolitan areas, and most neighborhoods within them, could precipitate some of the metropolitan-wide outmigration in high immigration areas.

While the relationship between immigration and internal migration is complicated, several multivariate statistical analyses of US internal migration during the 1970s and 1980s yield results that are generally consistent with the preceding explanations.<sup>6</sup> An alternative view attributes this unique immigration–internal migration distinction to economic restructuring that has been occurring in global cities that also serve as immigrant gateways (Sassen 1991; Walker, Ellis, and Barff 1992). This restructuring, it is argued, has led to the downsizing of traditional blue-collar jobs at the same time as professional white-collar jobs and low-paying service jobs have grown. Low-wage jobs create a demand for foreign immigrants without necessarily displacing long-term residents; and the observed outmigration of native workers may simply represent the demise of somewhat better-paying manufacturing jobs.

Although this argument may be relevant to some global cities, America's largest declines in urban manufacturing jobs occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s, rather than in the most recent period in which the immigration–internal migration relationship has been most evident. Moreover, rates of outmigration among native residents in high immigration regions of the country are most pronounced among those with a high school education or less (Frey 1995b, 1995c). Such groups are the most vulnerable to competition for less-skilled, low-paying jobs.

We now examine evidence for the first half of the 1990s, to see whether the unique selectivity pattern of domestic net outmigration from high immigration states persists. While it is not possible to undertake the detailed analyses that were conducted with decennial census migration data, it is possible to compile reasonably comparable domestic migration rates over the first four years of the 1990s from the US Census Bureau's annual Current Population Survey.<sup>7</sup> These rates, for 1990–94, along with comparable rates for 1985–90 (from the census), appear in Table 4.

The unique outmigration patterns shown for high immigration states are generally apparent for both the late 1980s and early 1990s. Typically, there is a higher rate of net outmigration for persons with “less select” demographic attributes—those with less than a college education and those with poverty-level incomes. Also, consistent with findings from the earlier period, selectivity is more pronounced for the non-Hispanic white populations of these states than for the overall populations. (Sample sizes pre-

TABLE 4 Net internal migration rates<sup>a</sup> for selected social and demographic categories, 1985–90 and 1990–94, high immigration states

Category	California		New York		Texas		Illinois		New Jersey		Massachusetts	
	1985–90	1990–94	1985–90	1990–94	1985–90	1990–94	1985–90	1990–94	1985–90	1990–94	1985–90	1990–94
<b>Race</b>												
Total	0.7	-2.3	-4.8	-5.0	-2.1	-6.7	-3.2	-0.3	-2.7	-3.2	-1.7	-2.2
Whites <sup>b</sup>	0.7	-4.2	-4.4	-4.1	-2.6	-4.1	-3.1	0.1	-3.4	-3.1	-2.3	-1.9
Blacks	1.1	4.6	-5.7	-7.8	0.5	-7.8	-3.8	0.6	-1.1	-3.8	1.0	3.4
<b>Education<sup>c</sup></b>												
Less than high school	-0.8	-2.1	-3.7	-6.7	-1.9	-6.7	-2.5	-0.3	-2.1	-4.6	-1.7	-3.7
High school graduate	-1.0	-4.5	-4.5	-3.8	-2.6	-3.8	-2.7	-0.1	-2.6	-1.7	-2.8	-1.1
College graduate	3.4	-2.3	-5.9	-3.7	-1.8	-3.7	-2.6	-1.8	0.8	-0.6	-2.1	-1.7
<b>Poverty status</b>												
Poor	-1.7	-1.5	-4.7	-6.8	-2.3	-6.8	-5.2	1.5	-10.1	-8.3	-0.4	-3.3
Nonpoor	0.8	-2.5	-4.8	-4.7	-2.1	-4.7	-2.6	-0.6	-1.5	-2.6	-2.2	-2.0
<b>Whites<sup>b</sup></b>												
<b>Education<sup>c</sup></b>												
Less than high school	-1.9	-3.9	-3.4	-5.4	-2.6	-5.4	-2.5	-0.2	-2.4	-3.3	-2.4	-2.7
High school graduate	-1.4	-7.2	-4.2	-2.9	-3.3	-2.9	-2.6	-0.8	-3.0	-2.4	-3.0	-0.9
College graduate	3.5	-3.0	-5.7	-3.8	-1.8	-3.8	-2.4	-1.3	-0.3	-0.6	-2.2	-1.7
<b>Poverty status</b>												
Poor	-4.0	-6.0	-4.2	-8.0	-4.8	-8.0	-5.2	-1.5	-15.4	-8.1	-3.3	-4.1
Nonpoor	0.8	-4.0	-4.4	-3.7	-2.4	-3.7	-2.6	0.2	-2.1	-2.8	-2.5	-1.7

<sup>a</sup>Rate per 100 population over the period

<sup>b</sup>Non-Hispanic whites

<sup>c</sup>Ages 25 and older

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from special 1990 US census migration tabulations (1985–90), and from single-year migration tabulations (1990–91, 1991–92, 1992–93, 1993–94), US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.



clude our conducting analyses specific to blacks, or providing overall measures for Latinos and Asians.)

The rates shown for New Jersey provide an example. Here, persons in poverty, especially whites, are most apt to leave the state. For example, in the early 1990s New Jersey's poverty population showed a net outmigration of 8.3 percent versus only 2.6 percent for the nonpoor population. Similar results obtained when comparing the migration of persons having only a high school education or less with those who are college graduates. For example, whites with less than a high school education left New Jersey at a rate of 3.3 per 100 in the early 1990s compared with a net outmovement of less than one per 100 among college graduates.

It is useful to compare the selectivity patterns of California with those of Texas because, as mentioned earlier, these states underwent divergent economic circumstances between the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the first period, California's economy was still relatively robust, while Texas was undergoing severe employment declines—conditions that had reversed by the early 1990s. Nonetheless, over both periods, each state's migrant selectivity patterns displayed an accentuated net outmigration for their poverty populations, and either accentuated net outmigration or reduced net immigration for persons with less education. Indeed, during the "good" periods for each state (1985–90 in California; 1990–94 in Texas) college graduates and the nonpoor were moving in while persons in poverty were moving out. This is consistent with the view that the poor and unskilled segments of the population may be less responsive to the current cyclical conditions of the economy and more responsive to the pressures of labor competition exerted by immigrants to these states (Frey 1995a).

The general pattern of net outmigration shown in Table 4 is unlike the "circulation of elites" characterization that is typically applied to interstate or intermetropolitan migration (Frey 1995b). Usually, states that are losing migrants because of economic downturns lose them disproportionately among their college-graduate or more well-off segments of the younger population. In like manner, states that are gaining internal migrants gain them disproportionately from these groups. The unique pattern of selective outmigration shown for most of these states during both the late 1980s and early 1990s is consistent with the explanations that link immigration to some domestic outmigration.


## Demographic balkanization in the mid-1990s

Distinct patterns of immigration and internal migration, along with evidence that an immigrant "push" may be operating in several high immigration areas, appear to be laying the groundwork for sharper geographic disparities in demographic composition for the US population. The post-

1965 immigrants differ distinctly from much of the native-born US population on characteristics such as race-ethnicity, age structure, skill level, and other attributes (Martin and Midgley 1994). A continued concentration of recent immigrants and foreign-born residents (Bartel 1989; Liaw 1996), coupled with the more dispersed migration patterns of long-term residents, suggests emerging social and economic divisions between the port-of-entry metropolitan areas and regions and other parts of the country.

To gain a sense of how this is emerging, I have compiled 1995 statistics from the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey that establish the high concentration of both long-term and recent immigrants in the ten high immigration metropolitan areas identified above. Figure 4 shows that this concentration remains relatively strong for native-born Hispanics, native-born Asians, and for the foreign-born populations of all race-ethnic groups who arrived in successive five-year intervals since 1965. Indeed, over 50 percent of Asians in all recent immigrant cohorts, and well over 60 percent of all Hispanics in these cohorts, reside in the high immigration metropolitan areas. Among the total foreign-born and the Hispanic foreign-born, those who arrived in the 1965–85 period are no more dispersed

**FIGURE 4** Percent resident in ten high immigration metropolitan areas in 1995 for the native born and for the foreign born by year of arrival, by race and ethnicity



than the 1985–95 entrants. This pattern suggests a continuing concentration of the recent foreign-born populations in selected metropolitan areas.

Another way of examining the impact of these shifts is to contrast the demographic makeup of high immigration metropolitan areas with the rest of the country on measures of nativity, minority status, and other social and demographic characteristics. It has been argued that port-of-entry metropolitan areas are taking on a “dual economy” character where large numbers of immigrants, participating in lower-skilled and informal sectors of the labor force, provide complementary activities for more advanced services and corporate headquarter activities among the mostly white-native professional ranks (Sassen 1991; Waldinger 1996). The demographic implications of this scenario become apparent when examining the foreign-born shares and minority shares of working-age adults with different socioeconomic attributes in high immigration metropolitan areas (see Table 5). For these metropolitan areas, the 1995 foreign-born population comprises a disproportionate share of persons without high school diplomas, and of workers in service and unskilled blue-collar occupations. The imbalance is even more pronounced in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, where, for example, foreign-born workers fill more than half of service and unskilled blue-collar jobs but hold no more than one-fifth of the managerial and professional jobs.

The divergence in the nativity-class structure for the combined high immigration metropolitan areas and for individual areas, such as Los Angeles and New York, contrasts markedly with the rest of the United States—where the foreign-born comprise only 6 percent of persons aged 18 and older, and where disparities by socioeconomic measures are not nearly so skewed. More contrasts can be made with respect to the minority composition of high immigration metropolitan areas and the rest of the United States (Table 5, right panel). The statistics for 1995 point up already sharp disparities with respect to the class-nativity and class-race-ethnic structures between the metropolitan regions that serve as ports-of-entry and other parts of the United States.

Although one cannot confidently predict the future, the Census Bureau’s recent population projections for states through the year 2025 provide one scenario.<sup>8</sup> These projections make the strong assumptions that current immigration and internal migration patterns will persist and that race-ethnic intermarriages do not take place. Still, the projected difference in race-ethnic compositions across states is striking. The projections indicate that in 2025, Hawaii, California, New Mexico, and Texas will have populations in which non-Hispanic whites comprise less than half of the total. An additional 18 states (including New York, New Jersey, and Florida) will have nonwhite populations exceeding 40 percent. At the other extreme stand 12 states with projected white populations exceeding 85 percent, located largely in upper New England, West Virginia, and several

**TABLE 5** Demographic profiles of working-age adults by foreign-born and minority status: Los Angeles, New York, ten high immigration metropolitan areas (combined), and the rest of the United States population, 1995

	Percent foreign born				Percent minorities <sup>a</sup>			
	Los Angeles	New York	High immigration metropolitan areas	Rest of US	Los Angeles	New York	High immigration metropolitan areas	Rest of US
<b>Total ages 18+</b>	38	28	27	6	51	35	40	18
<b>Age</b>								
18–24	44	23	27	6	71	44	54	24
25–34	46	29	30	7	63	44	48	22
35–44	38	30	28	6	52	36	40	19
45–64	33	30	26	6	42	33	35	15
65+	24	25	22	5	29	18	23	12
<b>Education<sup>b</sup></b>								
College graduate	21	20	20	8	23	17	19	11
Some college	25	23	21	5	33	26	28	13
High school graduate	21	24	18	4	41	36	36	18
Less than high school	56	38	38	7	71	49	56	23
<b>Occupation<sup>c</sup></b>								
<b>Men</b>								
Managerial and professional	19	20	17	5	27	18	21	10
Clerical and sales	31	23	22	4	47	32	36	14
Service	55	36	40	7	72	51	59	27
Skilled blue collar	48	30	30	5	57	30	40	14
Other blue collar	58	41	40	7	76	52	60	23
<b>Women</b>								
Managerial and professional	20	18	16	4	32	24	26	12
Clerical and sales	22	17	17	3	44	33	36	16
Service	51	41	38	6	74	56	58	26
Skilled blue collar	52	65	41	6	74	43	54	21
Other blue collar	71	66	53	8	78	62	64	26

<sup>a</sup> For populations not identified as non-Hispanic whites      <sup>b</sup>For ages 25–64      <sup>c</sup>For ages 16 and older  
 SOURCE: Compiled by the author from US Census Bureau, 1995 Current Population Survey data

Mountain division and North Central division states. In broad scope, these disparities reflect the distinctly different impacts of foreign immigration—contributing to the racial and ethnic diversity in specific regions of the country; and internal migration—contributing to the growing white and black populations of the South Atlantic region and the largely white, aging populations in other parts of the country.

These projections, while predicated on strong assumptions, suggest the kinds of demographic balkanization that can emerge across different parts of the United States, as a consequence of current patterns of immigration and internal migration. The evidence available for the first half of the 1990s, like that for the last half of the 1980s, is consistent with this scenario. The emergence of distinct demographic divisions can shape the social and spatial cleavages of the United States in fundamental ways. Younger, culturally diverse populations in certain regions of the country would have much less in common with largely white-black areas of growth or with regions of declining populations of aging whites. National political issues such as preserving affirmative action policies, or ensuring that the Social Security pension funds remain solvent, could take on new region-based constituencies. Moreover, within the most ethnically diverse parts of the country, a dual economy, polarized by both race and class, could make it more difficult for new, less well-off immigrants to follow the social mobility paths taken by immigrants in an earlier era.

Because the demographic divisions that are already evident depend, in large part, on immigration levels and preferences associated with current immigration policy, it is possible that alterations in that policy could lead to a greater dispersal of new arrivals to the United States. Clearly, these long-term population distribution impacts of immigration on the nation's social and political geography are just as important to evaluate in current policy debates as their short-term economic consequences. Scholars, commentators, and analysts would be well advised to focus on this aspect of current immigration policy as part of the ongoing national dialogue.

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## Notes

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1 I use the term "demographic balkanization" to refer to the spatial segmentation of population by race-ethnicity, class, and age across broad regions, states, and metropolitan areas. Unlike the term "segregation,"

which generally pertains to population segmentation patterns across neighborhoods, the former term denotes demographic differences across broader spatial units that are being driven by both immigration and long-distance internal migration patterns discussed below.

2 The 1990-95 components were compiled by the author from postcensus population estimates of counties prepared by the US Bureau of the Census (Population Division, Electronic Product PE-34). The 1985-90 components were derived from a special 1990 census tabulation of the "residence 5 years ago" question, based on the full (17 percent) sample of long-form respondents, weighted to the total population. Here, im-

migration refers to foreign-born persons who were residing in the United States in 1990 but were residing abroad in 1985. Net internal migration (domestic migration) refers to the difference between 1985–90 immigrants who resided elsewhere in the United States in 1985 *minus* 1985–90 outmigrants to other places in the United States. These 1985–90 measures are broadly comparable to the 1990–95 measures; however, they exclude the migration of individuals who were born or who died over the 1985–90 period.

Because the 1990–95 estimates for net internal migration do not permit separation of foreign-born and native-born domestic migrants, our net migration results for both 1990–95 and 1985–90 include both groups. However, a separate analysis of 1985–90 net migration for both native- and foreign-born residents indicates that overall net internal migration for the results shown here is dominated by the net domestic migration of native-born residents.

3 Although there are very few cases where metropolitan areas are gaining large numbers from both net internal migration and immigration, this is the case for San Diego in 1985–90 and for Dallas in 1990–95. They both are classified as high immigration metropolitan areas because net internal migration does not substantially dominate the immigration component.

4 The use of the term “immigrant push” is simply a descriptive device consistent with the convention in migration studies to identify various sets of origin “pushes” and destination “pulls” (Long 1988).

5 Most studies that attempt to detect immigration effects on native wages and employment in labor market areas utilize cross-sectional observations for areas without explicitly controlling for the impact that immigration may have exerted on the selective outmigration of the native-born. It has been argued that the omission of the latter control, in such studies, accounts for results that understate the negative impact of immigration on native employment (for a review, see Borjas 1994).

6 These studies tend to show that, when other relevant economic and amenity variables are added to the analysis, immigration

exerts a significant independent effect on domestic outmigration. Our studies of 1985–90 net domestic migration for metropolitan areas (Frey 1995b) and for states (Frey 1995c) show that immigration exerts a significant effect on outmigration, which is strongest for persons in poverty and with less than a college education. A more rigorous analysis, which separates the explanation of migration departures out of a state from the explanation of migrants’ destination choices (Frey et al. 1996), shows that immigration’s impact is greater on the departure part of the migration process, lending support to the view that it is more likely to serve as a “push” rather than as a reduced “pull.”

Studies using similar analytic techniques for migration over the late 1970s (Walker, Ellis, and Barff 1992; Filer 1992; White and Hunter 1993) and for the 1980s (White and Liang 1994) show general but not uniformly consistent support for an immigration effect on internal outmigration of less-skilled residents. One study (Barff, Ellis, and Reibel 1995) shows support for this effect in the late 1970s but inconsistent results for the late 1980s.

7 These rates were compiled from the “residence one year ago” question asked in the annual March supplements to the Current Population Surveys for the years 1991–94. The rates for 1990–94 can be compiled by adding the net migration components for each year, and computing a rate based on the average mid-year population over the period.

8 US Bureau of the Census (Population Division, Electronic Product PE-45) using methodology discussed in “Population projections for states by age, sex, race and Hispanic origin, 1995 to 2025” (PPL-47, October 1996, US Bureau of the Census), following Series A. The migration components are predicated, in part, on modeling based on observed Internal Revenue Service migration streams from 1975–76 through 1994–95 and tabulations of the “residence 5 years ago” question on the 1990 decennial census. The immigration component assumes a net annual immigration of 820,000 (685,000 legal immigrants, 115,000 refugee immigrants, 225,000 undocumented immigrants, 5,000 Puerto Rican immigrants, and 10,000 civilian citizens; reduced by 220,000 emigrants) throughout the projection period.

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